Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique

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Abstract

We study the consequences of policy interventions when social norms are endogenous but costly to change. In our environment a group faces a negative externality that it partially mitigates through incentives in the form of punishments. In this setting policy interventions can have unexpected consequences. The most striking is that when the cost of bargaining is high introducing a Pigouvian tax can increase output - yet in doing so increase welfare. An observer who saw that an increase in a Pigouvian tax raised output might wrongly conclude that this harmed welfare and that a larger tax increase would also raise output. 

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1. Introduction

This paper shows that outside interventions in environments where groups are governed by social norms can have unexpected consequences. We can illustrate the main idea through a simple story. Consider a negative production externality, for example, fishing in a lake. From the work of Coase (1960), Ostrom (1990), and others, we know that it is likely that fishermen will self-organize and use peer pressure to mitigate the externality. We refer to such an arrangement as a social mechanism. Suppose that a naive planner unaware of the existence of such a mechanism arrives on the scene and observing the negative externality introduces a tax designed to reduce it. The fishermen then have a choice. They can negotiate a new social mechanism. If they do so output will go down as expected. However, bargaining is costly and in the presence of the tax an agreement may not be so valuable, so they may choose not to do this. They may instead maintain the existing mechanism even though it is ill-adapted to the presence of a tax. Alternatively, as the externality is mitigated by the tax anyway, rather than maintaining a costly system of monitoring and punishment they may find it better to revert to non-cooperative behavior. Suppose this is the case. While the tax will tend to lower output, abandoning social incentives will tend to increase it and the overall effect is ambiguous. As we will show output may go up rather than down. This, we imagine, will come as a surprise to the naive planner who will then conclude that the tax is a failure, and perhaps get rid of it. That, however, might also be a mistake, as the increase in output induced by the tax may nevertheless be coupled with increased welfare for the group. The goal of this paper is to determine when such a story might be true, and what other consequences an unanticipated intervention might have in the presence of a social mechanism.

Our model follows Townsend (1994) and Levine and Modica (2016) by modeling the self-organization of a group as a mechanism design problem. Our setting is one of a production externality. The group can establish an output quota, it has a noisy monitoring technology for observing whether the quota is followed, and it can punish group members based on these signals. The new feature that this paper incorporates is that social norms may be costly to redesign after an external intervention: this introduces a stickiness in which social norms may be maintained when they are no longer optimal, or abandoned altogether.\footnote{Levine (2012) gives evidence that social norms change very quickly when incentives for such a change are strong, while Bigoni et al (2016) and Dell et al (2018) give evidence that social norms can be sticky when incentives for change are weak.} We study a simple environment with two periods. In the first period the group designs a social mechanism anticipating the second period will likely be the same as the first. In the second period an unanticipated intervention may take place - for example, the introduction of a Pigouvian tax. If there is an intervention the group may, at a cost, design a new mechanism to cope with changed circumstances. It may at no cost choose to maintain the existing mechanism, the quotas and punishments - although individuals will reoptimize in response to changed circumstances. Finally, it may simply abandon any effort to police itself and revert to the “law of the jungle,” which is to say to non-cooperative behavior.
Our general environment applies to a variety of problems including that of a standard externality with a Pigouvian tax and the Cournot setting of a cartel. One of the strengths of the approach is that by covering a broad range of settings it enables us to use data from one arena to make predictions about a less studied arena. That is: the problem of colluding business firms in a cartel faced with a negative demand shock is no different than that faced by a group facing a negative externality hit with a Pigouvian tax. We present evidence that a negative demand shock to a cartel can increase output - for exactly the same reason a city with local air pollution controls might increase pollution in response to a federal carbon tax. We should emphasize here that the punishments we consider are individual punishments: costly transfers or exclusion from benefits. We present evidence that (contrary to the repeated game analysis of cartels) this is in fact how cartels typically operate.

We first consider the case of a Pigouvian tax in a simple, specific model. Here we provide a complete analysis. If the size of the intervention is small the group does not respond at all. There is a threshold at which output jumps. If bargaining cost is small output jumps down with the new norm and remains lower than in the first period. This is the same as we would expect if individuals faced adjustment costs as in the widely used menu cost model of Calvo (1983). However if bargaining cost is large, for a range of interventions output jumps up, declining as the tax goes up to values lower than in the first period. Here as the intervention increases in size the first period norm becomes increasingly dysfunctional until it is better simply to revert to the law of the jungle; and as long as the tax is not too high non-cooperative behavior can result in higher output. This is the counterintuitive outcome: output can move in the wrong direction in response to an intervention. We provide evidence that such upward increases in output have been observed.

Unlike individualistic models, whether or not the tax is rebated lump sum to the group matters. In particular if an outside agency intervenes to set a naive Pigouvian tax and keeps the proceeds there will be underproduction as in the standard case. We also study welfare. If the group keeps the tax revenue and production increases this is evidence of a welfare improvement: it means the policy is a success notwithstanding the increase in production it brings about. The nature of the rebate also matters in the attitude of the group towards taxes. If the group keeps the tax revenue it is happy with higher taxes; if the outside agency keeps the taxes if the group is able to do so it may wish to take political action to repeal the tax notwithstanding the fact that the tax may be an efficient Pigouvian one.

In the tax setting there is a clear trade-off between public policy in the form of taxes and the use of social norms to mitigate the externality. To an extent this trade-off has been examined in the literature on regulation stemming from the work of Coase (1960): however the general tendency in that literature is to either argue that the private sector is able to solve the problem, or to argue, as for example Chari and Jones (2000), that the mechanism design problem is insurmountable, and that only public policy can solve the problem. Here we take a more nuanced approach.

The second part of the paper examines the question of when we might expect to see an increase in output in response to an intervention that from both an individualistic and social perspective
ough to lower output. Here we allow general functional forms that encompass cartels as well as tax externalities and general monitoring functions. We find that there are three features that lead to anomalous output increases. First, relatively high bargaining costs. This means that when an intervention takes place it is not worth reaching a new agreement. Second, an intermediate size of intervention. If the intervention is small it is not worth changing the existing social norm; if it is large even non-cooperative output will be less than the original quota. Finally, the monitoring function should exhibit left insensitivity: this means that decreasing output below the quota has little effect on the chances of an erroneous signal indicating the quota was violated. Roughly speaking, if we think of the quota as being like a speed limit, say seventy kilometers per hour, this means that the chances of getting a fine are pretty much the same regardless of whether you drive sixty five or forty five.

The main takeaway from our analysis is that changes in social mechanisms in response to unanticipated circumstances matters and that analyses that ignore this can be misleading. In addition to providing specific details about how it matters there is a broader message for field experiments: it is practical and important to measure social norms. An example is our analysis of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) in which a Pigouvian fine at a day care center resulted in parents picking up children later rather than earlier. This is consistent with our model, but we cannot tell from their field experiment whether our model is the correct one or if the change was due to psychological factors as in Benabou and Tirole (2006). We cannot tell because the experiment did not measure social norms before and after the intervention. Did teachers nag parents about picking up children late before fines were introduced but not after? This could have been ascertained either by direct observation or by survey. We think the desirability of measuring social norms before and after an intervention is an important message for the design of future field experiments.

2. The Model

In each period \( t = 1, 2 \) identical group members \( i \in [0, 1] \) engage in production choosing a real valued level of output \( X \geq x_i^t \geq 0 \). The utility of a member \( i \) in period \( t \) depends upon the real valued state \( \omega_t \geq 0 \), their own output, and the average output of the group \( x_t = \int x_i^t di \) according to \( u(\omega_t, x_t, x_i^t) \).

The presence of \( x_t \) represents an externality: we adopt the convention that the externality is negative. Because of the externality the group collectively faces a mechanism design problem, and we assume that incentives can be given to group members in the form of individual punishments based on monitoring: the group can set a production quota \( y_t \) and receives signals of whether or not individual output exceeds the quota. Based on these signals it can impose punishments. Specifically, monitoring generates a noisy signal \( z_i^t \in \{0, 1\} \) where 0 means “good, likely respected the quota” and 1 means “bad, likely exceeded the quota.” The probability of the bad signal is given by a weakly increasing function \( \Pi(x_i^t - y_t) \) defined on the real line. We assume that punishments must take place in the period in which the signal is received, and when the signal is bad the group
imposes an endogenous utility penalty of $P_t$. This may be in the form of social disapproval or even in the form of monetary penalties.\footnote{In principle punishments could be issued even for a good signal: as incentives depend only on the difference in punishment between the good and bad signal and punishments are costly this will not be part of an optimal mechanism, so for notational simplicity we rule it out.}

The social cost of the punishment $P_t$ is $\psi P_t$ where $\psi > 0$ could be greater or less than one. For example, if the punishment is that group members are prohibited from drinking beer with the culprit that might be costly to the culprit’s friends as well as the culprit. In this case $\psi > 1$. Or it might be that the punishment is a monetary fine most of which is shared among the group members. In that case there would be very little social loss so we would expect $\psi < 1$. In addition to the social cost of punishment there may also be a cost $\psi_0 \geq 0$ of operating the monitoring system - for example, sending spies to observe output. This cost is only incurred when $P_t > 0$ since if there is no punishment there is no need for monitoring.

The tools available for mechanism design in period $t$ consist of a quota $y_t$ and a punishment for a bad signal $P_t$. The overall period $t$ utility of a member $i$ is $u(\omega_t, x_t, x_i^t) - \Pi(x_i^t - y_t)P_t$. These utilities define a game for the group members. If the mechanism designer chooses $(y_t, P_t)$ we denote by $X(y_t, P_t)$ the set of $x_t$ such that $x_i^t = x_t$ is a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We refer to a triple $(x_t, y_t, P_t)$ with $x_t \in X(y_t, P_t)$ as an incentive compatible social norm. If an incentive compatible social norm issues no punishments ($P_t = 0$) we call it non-cooperative. The mechanism designer is benevolent and welfare from an incentive compatible social norm $(x_t, y_t, P_t)$ given by

$$W(x_t, y_t, P_t) \equiv u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - \psi \Pi(x_t - y_t)P_t - \psi_0 \cdot 1\{P_t > 0\}.$$  

2.1. Adjustment Costs and the Mechanism Design Problem

In the first period the state is a given $\omega_1$. In the second period there are two possibilities: it may be the same as the first period with $\omega_2 = \omega_1$, or an intervention may take place in which case $\omega_2 > \omega_1$. If an intervention occurs it is observed at the beginning of the second period. Our focus will be on the case where the chance of intervention is a priori regarded as low, that is, the intervention is “unanticipated” or that the mechanism designer is unaware of the possibility of intervention.\footnote{In principle the group might also impose downward quotas against underproduction. Because the externality is negative if there is any cost associated with this then the group prefers not to do so, so for notational simplicity we do not consider this possibility.}

In the initial period $t = 1$ the group solves the mechanism design problem of choosing an incentive compatible initial social norm $(x_1, y_1, P_1)$ as if the second period will be the same as the first. As there is limited commitment and no connection between the two periods, this amounts to ignoring the second period and maximizing period 1 welfare over incentive compatible social norms.

In period 2 if an intervention has occurred there are three possibilities:

\footnote{See, for example, Modica and Rustichini (1994).}
1. (status quo) The initial design \((y_1, P_1)\) can be costlessly maintained, with the designer choosing any \(x_2\) such that \((x_2, y_1, P_1)\) is incentive compatible at \(\omega_2\).

2. (non-cooperative) Any non-cooperative social norm \((x_2, y_2, 0)\) may be chosen.

3. (re-optimize) For a fixed cost of \(F > 0\) a new incentive compatible social norm \((x_2, y_2, P_2)\) may be chosen.

4. (revolution) For a fixed cost of \(G > F\) the state may be changed to \(\omega_3 \in \Omega \supset \{\omega_2\}\) and an incentive compatible social norm \((x_2, y_2, P_2)\) may be chosen. In many applications it is not possible to change the state so \(\Omega = \{\omega_2\}\) and this is the same as option #3.

The fixed costs of adjustment are in the spirit of menu costs in the macroeconomic literature as in Calvo (1983). Here our basic presumption is that reverting to the non-cooperative norm is costless while designing a new social norm is costly. Reverting to a non-cooperative social norm is a decentralized decision: if it is evident that the non-cooperative social norm is superior to the alternatives there is no need to get together to discuss this and reach an agreement, implicitly everyone has agreed in advance that in this case they will all go their own way. By contrast developing a new social norm cannot be decentralized and the group must be reconvened to agree upon a new social norm.

2.2. Costly Contemplation

In models of costly adjustment of plans the question always arises: why not plan for the contingency in advance? Instead of choosing a simple social norm \((x_1, y_1, P_1)\) in period one and waiting to see if there is reason to change in period two, why not also choose at the same time a plan \((x_2, y_2, P_2)\) conditional on whether or not there is an intervention? In this case there would be no stickiness.

This issue is not a new one: it is closely connected to the literature on incomplete contracts and on rational inattention. The incomplete contracting literature, such as Hart and Moore (1988), deals with a situation where it is expensive to specify a contingency in a way that can be enforced in court. The situation here is different in that the agreement is informal, so it is enough that everyone understands what the contingencies are. The literature on rational inattention, such as Sims (2003), recognizes that it is costly to acquire information about the right decision in the second period in order to make a plan. This differs from our model in one important respect: in a rational inattention model there is information, albeit noisy, about what the second period will be like and it will in general be optimal in the first period not to choose a social norm that is optimal in the absence of intervention but rather to hedge a little and choose a social norm that would do a little better in case of an intervention and a little less well in case of no intervention. We think that this type of hedging is costly because it requires active contemplation of what the future is like.

\(^8\)The fixed costs might well depend on the size of the group: for example Levine and Modica (2017) assume it is proportional to group size. Here we are keeping the size of the population fixed.
Our model is one of unawareness in the sense of Modica and Rustichini (1994) and in the spirit of Tirole (2009) and Dye (1985). It is based on the idea of costly contemplation studied by Ergin and Sarver (2010). The idea is that the second period is like a box: we can either open it and take account of what is in it, or we can simply leave it closed and ignore it. In the model of Ergin and Sarver (2010) as the subjective perception that the box contains an intervention grows small the subjective benefit of opening the box goes to zero. Since contemplation is costly it is best not to open the box at all: just optimize in the first period as if the second period will be the same. This is our model.

2.3. Why Do Social Mechanisms Break Down?

A key element of our theory is the possibility that in response to an unanticipated change in circumstances a social mechanism may be abandoned in favor of non-cooperative behavior. This can have counter-intuitive consequences: in particular an adverse intervention that would ordinarily reduce output might instead increase output. Is there evidence that social mechanisms do break down in response to unanticipated changes? Is this due to bargaining costs? One type of social mechanism that has been extensively studied by economists are cartels. Here we briefly review the evidence.

Our theory of cartels differs from standard repeated game theory. In Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) or Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) price wars are a disciplinary device and are the anticipated consequence of real or apparent cheating. In our account cartel discipline is achieved through modest individual penalties for real or apparent cheating and cartel breakdown occurs because of the cost of bargaining in the face of unanticipated changes in circumstances. In the empirical literature our model appears to be the more relevant one. Indeed, much of the empirical literature, for example the classical study of sugar cartels by Genesove and Mullin (2001) is devoted to debunking the repeated game model. The survey by Levenstein and Suslow (2006) gives a specific example: "after the adoption of an international price-fixing agreement in the bromine industry, the response to violations in the agreement was a negotiated punishment, usually a side-payment between firms, rather than the instigation of a price war... As repeatedly discovered by these cartel members, the threat of Cournot reversion is an inefficient way to sustain collusion."

Our account of cartels that collapse due to bargaining problems in the face of unanticipated changes indeed seems to be the relevant one. Again from Levenstein and Suslow (2006) "Bargaining problems were much more likely to undermine collusion than was secret cheating. Bargaining problems affected virtually every cartel in the sample, ending about one-quarter of the cartel episodes." Their overall conclusion is "cartels break down in some cases because of cheating, but more frequently because of entry, exogenous shocks, and dynamic changes within the industry."

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9 Or contains some other change: There may be many other things in the box besides an intervention $\omega_2$ - trade wars, new products, and so forth, and the intervention may not be the most important.
The evidence suggests that our model of cartels is the right one and that social mechanisms do revert to non-cooperative behavior because of the cost of bargaining in the face of changed circumstances. The literature has not addressed the issue of whether as a result, output increases in response to unanticipated adverse changes. Recently, however, there has been a rather striking natural experiment. In response to the unanticipated reduction in oil demand due to the covid-19 pandemic, OPEC+ attempted to negotiate reduced quotas. On March 8, 2020 bargaining broke down. Subsequently cartel members announced plans instead to increase output. It is anticipated\textsuperscript{10} that Saudi Arabia will increase output from 9.7 million barrels per day to 11.0 or more.\textsuperscript{11} As current OPEC output is about 30 million barrels per day this would be more than a 5\% increase in output, and some estimates of the overall increase range twice as high. These announcements were credible in the sense that they resulted in an immediate drop in spot oil prices of 25-30\%. In brief an unanticipated negative demand shock resulted in a substantial increase in cartel output.

3. Pigou

We give a detailed analysis of a Pigouvian tax in a simple quadratic framework. Each individual derives a private benefit from output \( U(x^i_t) = (V + 1)x^i_t - (V/2)(x^i_t)^2 \) up to the satiation point \( X = (V + 1)/V \) which we also take to be the upper limit on output. The negative externality reduces the benefit by \( x_t \). In addition, the state \( \omega_t \) represents a Pigouvian tax a fraction of which \( 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1 \) is rebated in a lump sum. Overall individual utility is therefore

\[
u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) = U(x^i_t) - \omega_t x^i_t - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)x_t
\]

\[
x^i_t [(V + 1 - \omega_t) - (V/2)x^i_t] - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)x_t
\]

We consider a simple monitoring technology: \( \Pi(x^i_t - y_t) = \pi > 0 \) if \( x^i_t \leq y_t \) and \( \Pi(x^i_t - y_t) = \pi_B > \pi \) if \( x^i_t > y_t \). Define the monitoring difficulty \( \theta = \pi/(\pi_B - \pi) \). We assume moreover that \( \psi_0 = 0 \) and \( \psi = 1 \).

To focus thinking, consider first the limiting case in which \( \pi = 0 \) and there are no monitoring costs so that members can be forced to meet any target \( y_t = x_t \). In this case the group simply maximizes the utility

\[
u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) = (V + 1 - \omega_t)x_t - (V/2)(x_t)^2 - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)x_t
\]

\[
x_t [V - (1 - \alpha)\omega_t - (V/2)x_t].
\]

As all the optimization problems in this section are quadratic we collect the calculations in the Online Appendix, and report the results here. The group chooses the first best \( x^f_t = (V - (1 - 10^\text{This was widely reported in the press including the New York Times, Bloomberg, the Financial Times, and the Economist. See in particular Mufton and Englund (2020).}

\textsuperscript{11}It should be noted that the marginal cost to Saudi Arabia of extracting a barrel of oil (see knoema.com) is estimated to be less than $3 while even with the substantial price fall, the price remains well above $20 so there is no issue here of a price war in the sense of producing below marginal cost.}
\(\alpha \omega_t / V\) with sufficiently large punishments to deter deviation, and the corresponding welfare is 
\(u_t^f = (V - (1 - \alpha)\omega_t)^2 / (2V)\). Note that this is increasing in \(V\). To avoid the uninteresting case where the first best is on the boundary we assume that \((1 - \alpha)\omega_t \leq V\). In the special case in which \(\alpha = 1\), so all the tax is rebated to the group this is the Pigouvian solution \(x^P = 1\) with \(u^P = V/2\).

Here we have a policy irrelevance result: when monitoring costs are low and most of the tax is rebated to the group tax policy will have little effect on output of an organized group.

3.1. Individual Optimality and Monitoring Costs

Consider next the problem of choosing an optimal first period social norm or re-optimizing in the second period, each for a given value of \(\omega_t\). It is useful to break the problem into two steps and consider first the problem for fixed \(x_t\) of choosing \((y_t, P_t)\) to minimize the monitoring cost 
\(M(x_t) = \pi P_t\) subject to incentive compatibility. With this simple monitoring technology if an individual decides to deviate from \(x_t\) there is a unique optimal deviation determined by ignoring the punishment: we denote this by \(x^B_t\). If \((x_t, y_t, P_t)\) is an optimal social norm then we call \(y_t\) an optimal quota.

**Theorem 1.** The optimal deviation is \(x^B_t = (V + 1 - \omega_t)/V\). If \(x_t < x^B_t\) then the optimal quota is \(y_t = x_t\) and monitoring cost is given by \(M_t(x_t) = \theta(u(\omega_t, x_t, x^B_t) - u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t))\).

Notice that the individual optimum in the absence of penalty is independent of \(x_t\): in other words the non-cooperative social norm also generates output \(x^N_t = x^B_t\). Note also that \(x^B_t\) decreases linearly in \(\omega_t\).

**Proof.** The only feasible quota is \(y_t = x_t\) because for any other quota group members can increase output without changing the probability of being punished. The optimal deviation \(x^B_t\) is the maximizer of \(u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^B)\) with respect to \(x_t^B\). Hence the greatest gain from deviating is 
\(u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^B) - u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)\). The incentive constraint is therefore \((\pi_B - \pi)p_t \geq u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^B) - u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)\). Monitoring cost is minimized when \(p_t\) is minimized, so the optimal punishment is determined when the incentive constraint holds with equality. Solving and plugging into the utility functions yields the result. \qed

3.2. Optimal Social Mechanisms

Our main interest is in the response in the second period when there is an intervention: which social norm is chosen and what is the consequence for output? We will initially assume that tax revolt (changing state) is not possible so that there are only three options: status quo, non-cooperative and reoptimize.

The first period and re-optimal second period problem can be conveniently expressed in terms of monitoring cost as the problem of choosing output \(x_t\) to maximize \(u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - M_t(x_t)\). Denote the solution to the problem by \(x^R_t, u^R_t\). The non-cooperative solution we denote by \(x^N_t, u^N_t\) where 
\(u^N_t = u(\omega_t, x^N_t, x^N_t)\). Finally, we must consider the status quo solution in the second period with solution \(x^S_t, u^S_t\). The situation is well described by a diagram. For each of the different social norms as a function of \(\omega_2\) we compute the utility gain over the non-cooperative social norm.
The red curve plots
\[ u^R_t - u^N_t = \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} (1 - \alpha \omega_t)^2 \]
showing how much utility is gained over the non-cooperative social norm by reoptimizing. As a function of \( \omega_2 \) the output \( x^R_t \) and \( x^N_t \) both decline linearly, with \( x^R_t < x^N_t \). Provided the tax rate is not too high the reoptimized output, compensating as it does for the externality, is lower than the non-cooperative output, and the two become equal at \( \omega_2 = 1/\alpha \). The utility difference is a convex quadratic and reaches a minimum there. Notice that for tax rates higher than \( 1/\alpha \) the non-cooperative output would actually be too low rather than too high and the group would wish to impose quotas in the opposite direction. Hence we restrict attention to \( \omega_2 \leq 1/\alpha \). As we have already assumed \( \omega_t \leq V/(1 - \alpha) \) we define \( \overline{\omega} = \min\{1/\alpha, V/(1 - \alpha)\} \) and restrict attention to lower tax rates.

The blue line which coincides with the x-axis is the net utility gain from the non-cooperative social norm over itself, therefore 0.

### 3.2.1. Status Quo versus Non-Cooperative

Utility gain from the status quo social norm is \( u^S_2 - u^N_2 \). This is shown by the green curve. To understand what is going on observe that at the status quo \( x_1 \) as \( \omega_2 \) is increased the incentive to deviate is reduced: from the envelope theorem the derivative of \( u(\omega_2, x_1, x^B_2) - u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) \) with respect to \( \omega_2 \) is \( x_1 - x^B_2 \), which is negative at \( \omega_1 \). Since initially members were at best indifferent to increasing output to \( x^B_2 \), given punishment fixed at \( P_1 \) they now strictly prefer not to. So the status quo output remains fixed at \( x_1 \), and the situation does not change as long as \( x^B_2 > x_1 \). Eventually \( x^B_2 < x_1 \) so at some \( \omega_2 = \omega^{SN} \) they become equal. For \( \omega_2 > \omega^{SN} \) since \( x^B_2 < x_1 \) the individual best response becomes incentive compatible therefore all produce \( x^B_2 = x^N_2 \).

What does this imply for \( u^S_2 - u^N_2 \)? At \( \omega_2 = \omega_1 \), that is, if the tax rate did not actually change, the status quo is the same as the reoptimized social norm, so as shown the green status quo utility and red reoptimized utility are the same at \( \omega_1 \). The status quo utility gain is also quadratic (it can be either concave or convex depending upon \( \alpha \)) and it must lie below the reoptimal utility. At \( \omega^{SN} \), where Nash output has fallen to \( x_1 \), \( u^S_2 - u^N_2 \) is strictly negative, since the same amount is being
produced by both the status quo and non-cooperative social norms, but in the status quo social norm there is a positive and costly level of punishment, and therefore \( u_S^2 - u_N^2 = -M_1(x_1) < 0 \). To the left of \( \omega^{SN} \) output at the status quo social norm is constant and equal to \( x_1 \); to the right the output at the status quo social norm is equal to that at the non-cooperative social norm \( x_2^N \).

Since at \( \omega^{SN} \) the non-cooperative norm is preferred to the status quo we see then that there is a unique point \( \omega^S < \omega^{SN} \) of indifference between the two norms. For tax rates \( \omega^2 < \omega^S \) the status quo gives higher group utility than the non-cooperative outcome, and vice versa for \( \omega^S < \omega^2 < \omega^{SN} \). In the latter range a switch from the first period norm to non-cooperative norm makes output increase.

3.3. The Role of Bargaining Costs

If \( u_R^t - u_N^t > F \) then it is better to reoptimize than use the non-cooperative social norm and conversely. Since \( u_R^t - u_N^t \) is downwards sloping, there is a unique tax rate \( \omega^F \) where \( u_R^t - u_N^t = F \). For lower tax rates \( \omega^2 < \omega^F \) it is better to reoptimize, for higher tax rates \( \omega^2 > \omega^F \) to use the non-cooperative social norm. If \( F \) is large enough that \( \omega^F \) itself is smaller than \( \omega^1 \) then it will never be optimal to reoptimize. The interaction of bargaining costs with the status quo social norm has two distinctly different cases depending upon whether \( F \) is high in the sense that \( \omega^F < \omega^S \) or low in the sense that \( \omega^F > \omega^{SN} \). Both cases are shown in the diagram, and we discuss each separately.

3.3.1. Large Bargaining Costs

The case of large \( F \) is illustrated by the \( \omega^F < \omega^S \) in the diagram. The orange arrows show the size of \( F \). Observe that in this case \( F \) is necessarily larger than \( u_R^t - u_N^t \) (the difference between the red and green curves) at \( \omega^F \), since \( u_S^2 - u_N^2 > 0 \) there. And the difference \( u_R^t - u_N^t \) shrinks going left. So for tax rates no greater than \( \omega^F \) the status quo social norm is better than re-optimizing. Since the non-cooperative social norm is better at higher tax rates it is never optimal to re-optimize. As \( \omega^2 \) increases from \( \omega^1 \) then we have the following consequences for choice of social norm and output. For \( \omega^1 \leq \omega^2 < \omega^S \) the status quo norm is chosen and output remains fixed at \( x_1 \). For higher values of \( \omega^2 > \omega^S \) it is optimal to switch to the non-cooperative social norm. In the range \( \omega^S < \omega^2 < \omega^{SN} \) output at the non-cooperative social norm is higher than \( x_1 \). This means that optimal output actually jumps up, then decreases until it again reaches \( x_1 \) at \( \omega^2 = \omega^{SN} \). After that it falls below \( x_1 \).

Output that increases in response to an intervention is the most unexpected and striking feature of our model: we will subsequently investigate how robust a phenomenon it might be. The idea, as indicated in the introduction, is a simple one: with high bargaining costs a change in circumstances can lead to a breakdown of the existing social norm and this can increase output.

3.3.2. Small Bargaining Costs

The case of small \( F \) is illustrated by the \( \omega^F > \omega^{SN} \) in the diagram. To the right the non-cooperative social norm is best. However, it may be that \( \omega^F > \omega \) so this point may never be reached: it depends upon \( \alpha \) as we shall discuss subsequently. In case \( \omega^F < \omega \) there will be a switch
from the reoptimized social norm to the non-cooperative social norm at \( \omega^F \) and output will jump up - but cannot rise so high as \( x_1 \) since \( \omega^F \) lies to the right of \( \omega^{SN} \). The point is that as the tax rate increases the non-cooperative equilibrium gets close to the first best anyway, so the gain to reoptimizing is small and not worth bargaining over.

To the left of \( \omega^F \) the non-cooperative social norm is never used. To see when the status quo social norm is used, we need to find the unique point \( \omega^R \) where \( u_i^R - u_i^S = F \), which as shown in the diagram is also the distance between the red and green curves. Since at \( \omega_2 = \omega_1 \) we have \( u_i^R = u_i^S \) this point always lies to the right of \( \omega_1 \) and from the fact that \( \omega^F \) lies to the right of \( \omega^{SN} \) it must also be that \( \omega^R \) lies to the left of \( \omega^S \) as shown in the diagram.

Initially then, for \( \omega_1 \leq \omega_2 < \omega^R \) the status quo is maintained and output remains fixed. As \( \omega_2 \) rises into the range \( \omega^R < \omega_2 < \omega^F \) the status quo is abandoned in favor of re-optimization. Output jumps down, then continues to declines. Eventually if \( \omega^F \) is reached it will jump up again to the non-cooperative level, although not as high as \( x_1 \), and then again start to decline.

### 3.3.3. Intermediate Bargaining Costs

The case in which \( \omega^S < \omega^F < \omega^{SN} \) is similar to the small bargaining cost case - in the sense that as \( \omega_2 \) goes up the transition is from status quo to reoptimization to non-cooperative - except that when \( \omega^F \) is reached and output jumps up it jumps to a level higher than the original level of output at \( \omega_1 \). It then declines, eventually falling below the original level.

What is striking in this case is what happens in the vicinity of \( \omega^F \). For slightly lower \( \omega_2 \) output has dropped. For slightly higher \( \omega_2 \) output has increased. Suppose that two different empirical studies were conducted, in different but very similar locations, for example. Never-the-less if in one location \( \omega_2 \) was just below \( \omega^F \) and in the other just above, the first study would conclude that intervention lowers output while the second would conclude that the intervention raises output. While this may not be a frequent occurrence it is good to be aware of the possibility.

### 3.4. The Lump Sum Rebate, Overshooting and Tax Repeal

A striking fact is that the lump sum rebate \( \alpha = 1 \) is not neutral for either behavior or welfare. In particular: when \( \alpha = 1 \) the group favors taxes over quotas up to the Pigouvian level - both taxes and quotas mitigate the externality, but taxes are superior to quotas because a tax unlike a quota can be enforced costlessly. With quotas production is at most at the non-cooperative level for the given tax, and possibly less, but always greater than the Pigouvian output of \( x^P = 1 \). Contrast this to the situation in which \( \alpha = 0 \) (say). Here a naive planner might set the Pigouvian tax. If bargaining cost is small and the group reoptimizes this will result in output

\[
x^R_2 = 1 - \frac{1}{V(1 + \theta)},
\]
that is the group will produce too little in an effort to avoid the tax loss.\footnote{Production is derived in the Pigou Appendix:} This undershooting result, however, underestimates the potential for error in setting a Pigouvian tax when it is not rebated to the group. Continuing to analyze $\alpha = 0$ suppose we add the possibility that the group not only faces low bargaining costs, but also a low cost of repealing the tax. At the re-optimal social norm with tax rate $\omega_3$ utility is given by

$$u^R_3 = \left[ V + \frac{1}{2V} \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} \right] - \omega_3 + \frac{1}{2V} \omega_3^2.$$ 

This is convex in the tax rate, so the optimal tax rate is either 0 or so high that output $x^R_3 = 0$. A calculation shows that zero output is strictly optimal if an only if

$$V < \frac{\theta}{1+\theta}.$$ 

The takeaway is that with $\alpha = 0$ the group will always repeal the tax: if $V$ is large relative to monitoring difficulty it will eliminate the tax. Perhaps more surprising, if less likely, is that if $V$ is small relative to monitoring difficulty it will set the tax high and shut down production - an extreme form of overshooting.

3.4.1. Yellow Vests

An interesting example of a group responding to the naive imposition of Pigouvian taxes by engaging in tax repeal is the case of the French “yellow vests.” Our account is based on Boyer et al (2019). In this instance output $x^t_i$ represents driving speed, while the intervention $\omega_2$ is the inverse of the speed limit. On July 1, 2018 the French Federal Government lowered the speed limit on secondary highways from 90 km/h to 80 km/h. The ostensible reason was to reduce highway accidents - that is this was intended as a Pigouvian tax, not a revenue raising measure. The bulk of the impact fell on rural communities where there are no primary highways and secondary highways are widely used. Although driving is to an extent anonymous, there are informal social norms, and drivers who are perceived to drive excessively fast are often punished, for example, by blocking their progress by intentionally slowing down, making it difficult to pass, or simply through obscene gestures. While fictional, the Damián Szifron film “Relatos Salvajes” illustrates the idea well. As drivers observe one another well, we may hypothesize that monitoring difficulty $\theta$ is relatively low. Two other facts are relevant. First, $\alpha < 1$: the speed camera revenue is not returned to rural drivers who receive only an indirect benefit, indeed $\alpha = 0$ is not a bad approximation. Second $F$ was quite low due to the advent of social media. Indeed we know that Facebook played a key role in the organization of the yellow vests. Hence our theory says that if the group could do so at low
cost it would organize not only a new driving speed norm, but also eliminate the tax.

Although it is perhaps less well known than the more publicized riots in Paris, the group did indeed act to “repeal” the tax. The rate of traffic camera destruction jumped by 400% and in the year following the speed limit change about 75% of all traffic cameras in France were destroyed.\(^{13}\) We refer the interested reader to Boyer et al (2019) who document both the link between the change in speed limit and the yellow vest movement, as well as the systematic way in which that group organized itself.

3.4.2. What is New?

Tax revolts are as old as recorded history: for example, in 184 CE the “yellow scarfs” anticipated the “yellow vests” by rebelling against the Han Dynasty in China - in part over high taxes. While this may be the case very few modern economic analyses of tax policy, especially those of Pigouvian tax policy, seem concerned with this possibility. Moreover: the picture is more subtle than that. Whether the tax is rebated to the group or not - something economists generally view as irrelevant - plays a key role in the reaction of the group. With a full rebate \(\alpha = 1\) as long as the tax is not set higher than the Pigouvian level there will be no tax revolt. Moreover, Pigouvian revolts depend upon monitoring costs: if these are low so the mechanism works well then a tax revolt is more likely. Besides highlighting the specific circumstances under which tax revolt is more or less likely, let us also observe that the ability to organize to repeal taxes is the same as the ability to organize to implement a mechanism to discourage production, and the greater the former ability the more attractive the option of a tax revolt.

3.5. Welfare and Late Parents

What is particularly striking is that with the full lump sum rebate \((\alpha = 1)\) welfare is unambiguously increasing in the tax rate (up to the Pigouvian level \(\omega_2 = 1\)). In particular if bargaining costs are non-negligible so that output jumps up - at \(\omega^F\) or \(\omega^S\) as the case may be - the increase in output nevertheless increases welfare. That is, despite the increased externality due to higher output welfare increases because of the decrease in monitoring costs.

An interesting case in point is the study of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). They studied the introduction of modest fine for picking up children late at a day-care center. They observed that this resulted in more parents picking up their children late - the opposite of the expected and intended effect. In our terminology the intervention is the level of the fine. Initially there was no fine \(\omega_1 = 0\), then one was imposed \(\omega_2 > 0\). As there was no prior warning or discussion of the fine, it is reasonable to think it was unanticipated. Moreover, as the fine was introduced suddenly and without explanation it might well have been anticipated to be of short duration (as in fact it was) so that it would not be worth renegotiating to identify the re-optimal social norm reducing lateness. Hence our theory predicts if \(\omega_2\) were chosen slightly larger than the switching point indeed more parents would pick up their children late.

\(^{13}\)Private communication from Pierre Boyer.
Authors including Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) who have discussed the increased lateness have assumed that this resulted in a drop in welfare. A day-care center, however, is a closed system in which the school is supported by fees from the parents and different schools compete with each other. Implicitly, the money from fines either reduces what parents have to pay, or increases the services they receive. In other words, in this setting we think $\alpha = 1$. If this is the case then the assumption that welfare decreased is wrong; in fact it went up. This highlights the importance of knowing whether social norms are involved and the role of the lump sum rebate.

Other theories than ours have been used to explain the increase in lateness: one of the best worked out is that of Benabou and Tirole (2006). Their idea is that in the absence of fines, picking up children on time serves a valuable self-signaling purpose of virtue. With fines, the signaling value of being on time is lowered enough that it becomes worthwhile to be a little late and pay the fine. In contrast in our account prior to the fine there was an informal system of enforcement. Teachers scolded parents who were late and complained to their peers and other parents about people who were persistently late. After the fines were introduced this stopped and parents simply paid their fines. That is, there was punishment before but not after. While this is plausible we do not know whether or not it was the case, and hence we do not have direct evidence about the merits of our theory versus that of Benabou and Tirole (2006). As the welfare analysis for the two theories is opposite it is of importance to know.

The key lesson here involves the way in which field experiments are conducted. It was possible for Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) to have arranged the experiment to observe punishment before and after. This could have been done by direct observation of teacher behavior at the pickup point - did they scold parents before, but not after? It could also have been done by a before and after survey instrument asking parents and teachers about their expectations of the response to late pickup. In other words: it would be desirable if field experiments where social norms might be involved attempted to ascertain the presence of informal punishments and if this was changed by intervention.

In existing analyses an upward jump in output in response to a Pigouvian tax is regarded as a failure of policy. The goal of the policy is to reduce output in the face of an externality. But that analysis may miss the mark. If there are informal punishments and $\alpha$ is large, increased output is an indication that the policy has a desirable effect. While the increase in output has a negative consequence for welfare, overall welfare goes up because by switching to the non-cooperative norm the cost of monitoring is avoided and this more than makes up for the loss from increased output.

3.6. Costly Bargaining in the First Period

Implicitly we have assumed that while there is a cost $F$ of introducing a re-optimal social mechanism in the second period there is no fixed cost of choosing the first period optimal social norm. In the the type of applications we have in mind we think this assumption makes sense. The “first period” represents a long ongoing situation while the “second period” represents an unanticipated break with the past. In an ongoing situation there is time for experimentation with
different mechanisms and discussion of what might be the best mechanism. Over time people meet for all sorts of reasons and it is of low cost to discuss among other things the implementation of a social mechanism. In the experimental research of Fehr and Gachter (2000) we see that the solution to a social mechanism problem develops slowly over time. All of this suggests that in the “first period” an optimal social mechanism is likely to be developed. By contrast in the immediate aftermath of an unanticipated change developing a re-optimal social mechanism would require crash meetings and leisurely experimentation would have to be replaced by more careful assessment of the situation. All of which suggests that it makes sense to think of re-optimization as more costly than the initial optimization. Note that this suggests there might be a “period three” after the unanticipated change in which the use of the status quo or non-cooperative mechanism in the second period is replaced by a reoptimal social norm.

While we think this assumption makes sense it is by no means crucial to the analysis. As shown in the diagram $u^R_2 - u^N_2$ is decreasing in the tax $\omega_2$. Suppose in fact that $F$ applies in the first period. It will be optimal to introduce the optimal social norm in the first period provided that $u^R_1 - u^N_1 \geq F$. This simply means that $\omega_F$ lies to the right of $\omega_1$ and this is exactly the case we have studied. That is: to the right of $\omega_F$ it is optimal to use the non-cooperative social norm in place of the reoptimal social norm, and to the left it is optimal to use the reoptimal social norm. As long as $\omega_1 < \omega_F$ it will be optimal to introduce the optimal social norm in the first period.

4. When Does Output Increase?

We now consider more general utility and monitoring functions. Our goal is to find conditions under which the key result holds that some range of interventions $\omega_2 > \omega_1$ designed to mitigate a negative externality induce a norm-abiding group to revert to non-cooperative behavior resulting in an increase rather than a fall in output. For this to be the case we know that $F$ must be reasonably large so that the switch when it takes place is to the non-cooperative equilibrium not to the re-optimal social norm. Second, we must consider the role of the fixed cost of monitoring $\psi_0$. If this is too large then it will already be optimal to use the non-cooperative equilibrium in the first period and the model is a standard one. We are interested in the case where $\psi_0$ is not too large. Hence by $F$ is large, $\psi_0$ not too large we mean that $F$ is large enough that it is not optimal to reoptimize and that $\psi_0$ is small enough that it is optimal to optimize in the first period. Incidentally, when we refer to the “re-optimal social norm” we mean conditional on choosing to pay the fixed cost of monitoring.

4.1. Regularity of Utility

We impose relatively standard conditions on $u(\omega_t, x_t, x^t_i)$ that incorporate the convention that the externality is negative and ensure that the Nash equilibrium and social optimization problem in the absence of monitoring are well-behaved.

To capture the convention that the externality is negative we assume that $D_2u(\omega_t, x_t, x^t_i) < 0$. To capture the convention that increasing $\omega_t$ mitigates the externality we assume that such increases
reduce the individual incentive to produce more, that is, \(D_{31}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^i) < 0\). These are conventions in the sense that we could work as well with positive externalities by changing the sign of \(x_t^i\) and in the sense that it does not matter which direction of change in \(\omega_t\) mitigates the externality.

We next make assumptions that guarantee that both the social planner problem and individual optimizations problems are well-behaved. As indicated these are standard.

First, we assume that the social objective \(u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)\) is concave, that is, \(D_{22}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) + 2D_{23}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) + D_{33}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) < 0\). In addition we assume that there is an interior social optimum \(0 < x_t^f < X\) where \(D_2u(\omega_t, x_t^f, x_t^f) + D_3u(\omega_t, x_t^f, x_t^f) = 0\). Because the objective is concave, this is unique.

Second, we ensure that the non-cooperative mechanism has a unique and well-behaved symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. For existence we require concavity in own action \(D_{33}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^i) < 0\). To ensure that the equilibrium is well-behaved we add the regularity condition that \(D_{33}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) + D_{23}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)\) has the same sign (negative) as \(D_{33}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)\) (it suffices that \(D_{23}(u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^f) \leq 0\)). This implies that the non-cooperative mechanism has a unique equilibrium output level and that it lies above the social optimum. Lastly, we assume that \(D_3u(\omega_1, X, X) < 0\) so that non-cooperative output is interior at \(\omega_1\).

Our final assumption is that there is a sufficiently large intervention \(\omega\) that the corresponding non-cooperative output is lower than at the social optimum in the first period. Specifically, we assume that \(D_3u(\omega, x_t^f, x_t^f) \leq 0\).

When these assumptions are satisfied we say that utility is regular. It is easily checked that this is the case in the Pigou analysis of the previous section. The next result is completely standard.

**Theorem 2.** If utility is regular then for \(\omega_t \geq \omega_1\) there is a unique non-cooperative output level \(x_t^N > x_t^f\) strictly decreasing in \(\omega_t\) when positive. Moreover the first best \(x_t^f\) is weakly decreasing in \(\omega_t\).

### 4.2. Cournot

We check that the standard Cournot model has regular utility. Utility is \(u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^i) = (p(x_t) - \omega_t) x_t^i - c(x_t^i)\). We suppose as standard that \(p'(x_t) < 0\), \(c'(x_t) > 0\), \(c''(x_t) < 0\), and for a monopolist the objective \((p(x_t) - \omega_t) x_t - c(x_t)\) is strictly concave. We list below the three assumptions that are “non-standard” and show that they are satisfied in the standard Cournot model: for comparison we show also that they are satisfied in Pigouian case where \(\alpha \omega_t < 1\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(D_{31}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t))</th>
<th>Cournot</th>
<th>Pigou</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(D_{22}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) &lt; 0)</td>
<td>(p'(x_t) x_t &lt; 0)</td>
<td>(-(1 - \alpha \omega_t) &lt; 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D_{33}u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) &lt; 0)</td>
<td>(-1 &lt; 0)</td>
<td>(-1 &lt; 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D_{23}(u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) \leq 0)</td>
<td>(p'(x_t) &lt; 0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3. Properties of Optimal Norms

Our goal is to study two properties. The first property is the existence of the relevant social norms.
Definition 1. Property (E) is said to hold if for all \( \omega_t \geq \omega_1 \) a reoptimal social norm \((x_t, y_t, P_t)\) exists and for any \((x_1, y_1, P_1)\) optimal with respect to \( \omega_1 \) and any \( \omega_2 \geq \omega_1 \) a unique welfare maximizing incentive compatible social norm \((x_2, y_1, P_1)\) exists. This is the status quo social norm.

The second and more interesting property is the upwards jump.

Definition 2. Property (U) is said to hold if property (E) holds and in addition for sufficiently large \( F \) and for any \((x_1, y_1, P_1)\) optimal with respect to \( \omega_1 \) there exists an open interval of \( \omega_2 \) defined by \( \omega_1 < \omega_a < \omega_2 < \omega_b \) such that for any such \( \omega_2 \) the optimal choice of social norm is the non-cooperative social norm and \( x_2^N > x_1 \).

Whether these properties hold depend upon the monitoring technology, which we discuss next.

4.4. Monitoring Technology

Recall that in the Pigou example we took monitoring to be represented by a step function: the probability of being caught was \( \Pi(x_t^i - y_t) = \pi \) for \( x_t^i - y_t \leq 0 \) and \( \pi_B > \pi \) for \( x_t^i > y_t \). To arrive at sensible generalizations we start with some concrete examples.

First, consider enforcing a quota on hours worked that is monitored by sending an inspector at a certain time to see if the lights are on (meaning the norm has been violated). Consider two types of error: the inspector goes to the wrong building, and the inspector arrives at the wrong time. The first we refer to as gross error, the second as measurement error. Let us assume that the probability of arriving at the wrong building is \( 0 < \pi/q < 1 \) and the probability the lights are on at the wrong building is \( q > 0 \), so that the probability of gross error is \( \pi \). Let us assume as well that the arrival time of the inspector is equal to the intended time \( y_t \) plus an error \( \eta_t \) that is independent of \( y_t \). In other words the actual arrival time is \( \tau_t = y_t + \eta_t \). If the inspector arrives early they simply wait until the right time and then examine the lights, so the time at which the measurement is made is actually

\[
\tilde{\tau}_t = \begin{cases} 
    y_t & \tau_t \leq y_t \\
    \tau_t & \tau_t > y_t
\end{cases}
\]

Denote the cdf of \( \tilde{\tau}_t - y_t \) by \( H(\tilde{\tau}_t - y_t) \). This is zero for \( \tilde{\tau}_t - y_t < 0 \) and strictly positive at \( \tilde{\tau}_t - y_t = 0 \) (the value of the probability that \( \tau_t \leq y_t \)). Let us assume that the probability of being late is more likely than the probability of being very late: this means that \( H(\tilde{\tau}_t - y_t) \) is concave for \( \tilde{\tau}_t - y_t > 0 \).

The actual time at which the lights are turned off is \( x_t^i \) and the quota is violated if \( x_t^i > y_t \). The bad signal occurs with probability \( \pi \) due to gross error. With probability \( 1 - \pi/q \) the correct building is observed and if lights are on after \( y_t \) (that is if \( x_t^i > y_t \)) this is observed if the inspector’s delay is not larger than \( x_t^i - y_t \), that is with probability \( H(x_t^i - y_t) \). This gives

\[
\Pi(x_t^i - y_t) = \pi + (1 - \pi/q) \cdot 1\{x_t^i > y_t\} H(x_t^i - y_t).
\]

Notice that \( \Pi(x_t^i - y_t) \) has a discontinuity at 0 since there is a positive probability of the inspector arriving early, and it is concave for \( x_t^i - y_t > 0 \). That it is flat for \( x_t^i - y_t \leq 0 \) will be called left insensitivity.
The same basic model applies to the enforcement of a speed limit with a radar system: again there is the possibility of gross error - the wrong car is identified, and we let $\pi$ and $q$ be as before. Now however if the actual speed is $x^i_t$ the observed speed is $x^i_t + \eta$. The radar system reports the driver if the observed speed exceeds a threshold $y_t$ that is if $x^i_t + \eta > y_t$ or $\eta > -(x^i_t - y_t)$. That is, if there is no gross error the bad signal occurs with probability $1 - H(-(x^i_t - y_t))$ where $H(\eta)$ is now the cdf of $\eta$. In this case $\Pi(x^i_t - y_t) = \pi + (1 - \pi/q) \left(1 - H(-(x^i_t - y_t))\right)$. If for example $\eta$ is uniform on $[-\gamma, \gamma]$ for $\gamma > 0$, then $\Pi(x^i_t - y_t)$ is continuous: it is constant and equal to $\pi$ for $x^i_t \leq y_t - \gamma$ (so it is again left insensitive), it is linear for $y_t - \gamma \leq x^i_t \leq y_t + \gamma$ and it is constant and equal to $\pi + 1 - \pi/q$ for $x^i_t \geq y_t + \gamma$. But while continuous it is not differentiable everywhere.

For our third example we suppose that the density function of $\eta$ is normal with mean 0. Then $\Pi(x^i_t - y_t)$ is smooth. More generally, if the measurement error has a continuous density then $\Pi(x^i_t - y_t)$ is continuously differentiable. It turns out this case is quite different from the other two.

We now want to make a general assumption about $\Pi(h)$ that captures these examples. We have seen concavity for positive values, possibly left insensitivity, and possibly discontinuity or non-differentiability at zero. Notice that unless $\Pi(h)$ is constant it cannot be either concave or convex since no non-constant function bounded below on the real line is concave and no non-constant function bounded above on the real line is convex. Indeed, the boundaries force in a certain sense convexity to the left and concavity to the right. The simplest assumption consistent with this is that there is a single inflection point: that to the left of the inflection point $\Pi(h)$ is convex and to the right concave. This corresponds to a measurement error that has a single-peaked density. We slightly weaken the single inflection point assumption to allow for uniform measurement error. Specifically:

**Definition 3.** We say monitoring is regular if $h = 0$ is the smallest number for which $\Pi(h)$ is concave to the right and for $h \leq 0$ we have $\Pi(h)$ smooth and weakly convex while for $h > 0$ it is smooth and weakly concave. We do not assume that the function is differentiable or even continuous at 0; we do assume that for $h > 0$ we have $\Pi(h) > \Pi(0)$ and that $\Pi(h) = \Pi^+(h)$ which is a smooth, weakly concave function with $\Pi^+(0) \geq \Pi'(0-)$. Finally, we define $\pi = \lim_{h \to -\infty} \Pi(h)$ and, this is crucial, require that $\pi > 0$.

The first and second example have an additional property:

**Definition 4.** We say that regular monitoring is left insensitive if for $h \leq 0$ we have $\Pi(h) = \pi$.

Observe that left insensitivity does not require that $\Pi(h)$ be discontinuous at zero, but does require (via concavity on the right) that the derivative be discontinuous at zero. The Pigou monitoring was regular and left insensitive.

In analyzing the mechanism design problem a key role is played by the monitoring cost function

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\footnote{\(\Pi'(0-)\) denotes left derivative. The assertion is essentially that $\Pi$ is steeper on the right than on the left, the auxiliary function $\Pi^+$ is needed because the right derivative of $\Pi$ is undefined.}
\[ M(x_t) \equiv \psi \min_{y_t, P} \Pi(x_t - y_t) \text{ subject to the incentive constraint that} \]

\[ u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - \Pi(x_t - y_t) \geq u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^1) - \Pi(x_t^1 - y_t) \]

for all \( 0 \leq x_t^1 \leq X \). With this function we can formulate the re-optimization problem as maximizing \( u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - M(x_t) \). However, even if \( \Pi(h) \) is smooth \( M(x_t) \) is not a particularly pleasant object: since \( \Pi(h) \) cannot be convex \( M(x_t) \) is not in general convex either, so that \( u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - M(x_t) \) is not in general concave or even single-peaked. Never-the-less we can establish that several of the key results from the quadratic Pigou model carry over to the general model.

4.5. Monitoring and Output

Our basic result does not depend on the assumption that \( F \) is large. We let \( \hat{x}_2(\omega_2) \) denote the optimal second period output (which recall can be status quo, re-optimal or non-cooperative for different values of \( \omega_2 \)). Propositions 1, 2, and 3 of the Appendix imply

**Theorem 3.** If utility and monitoring are regular then property (E) holds. Moreover, if \( x_1 \) is optimal first period output there is \( \omega_1 < \omega_a \leq \omega_b < \Omega \) such that if \( \omega_2 > \omega_b \) then \( \hat{x}_2 < x_1 \) and for generic \( \psi_0 \) if \( \omega_1 \leq \omega_2 \leq \omega_a \) then \( \hat{x}_2 \leq x_1 \).

This theorem leaves open the possibility of a gap between \( \omega_a \) and \( \omega_b \) where output is greater than \( x_1 \). And indeed our main result is that if there is enough left insensitivity and high bargaining costs \( F \) then this is necessarily the case, that is, property (U) holds.

**Theorem 4.** If utility and monitoring are regular and monitoring is left insensitive then property (U) holds. Moreover in the low intervention case of Theorem 3 where \( \omega_1 \leq \omega_2 \leq \omega_a \) then there is a right neighborhood of \( \omega_1 \) where \( \hat{x}_2 = x_1 \).

**Proof.** Left insensitivity forces \( x_1 = y_1 \). Indeed Lemma 3 in the Appendix shows that in general cost minimization forces \( x_1 \leq y_1 \); and in the left insensitive case, if \( x_1 < y_1 \) then for violations \( x_1 < x_1^1 < y_1 \) the punishment probability does not increase so incentive compatibility fails.

Proposition 2 and Lemma 4 in the Appendix establish that left insensitivity implies that for \( D_3 u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) \geq 0 \) we must have \( x_2^S = x_1 \), that is with left insensitivity the status quo does not change as long as the non-cooperative equilibrium lies to the right. This shows that there is a range \( \omega_1 \leq \omega_2 \leq \omega_a \) where \( \hat{x}_2 = x_1 \) as asserted. Indeed the status quo is better than non-cooperative by continuity because it is strictly better at \( \omega_1 \), and better than reoptimizing for \( F \) large enough. Define \( \omega_{SN} \) as the unique solution to \( D_3 u(\omega_{SN}, x_1, x_1) = 0 \). Because monitoring cost at the status quo is strictly positive the status quo is strictly worse than the non-cooperative social norm at \( \omega_{SN} \); and since utility from both the status quo and non-cooperative social norms are continuous in \( \omega_2 \) in \( \omega_1 \leq \omega_2 \leq \omega_{SN} \) it follows that there is sub-range of \( \omega_1 \leq \omega_2 \leq \omega_{SN} \) in which the non-cooperative social norm is strictly better. Finally, observe that for \( \omega_2 < \omega_{SN} \) we have \( x_2^N > x_1 \). This establishes property (U).

\[ \Box \]
As noted above left insensitivity is inconsistent with $\Pi(h)$ being smooth. Reflecting on our first example, observe that in practice lights are not turned out at a precise time, nor does an inspector who is on site necessarily observe the lights at a precise time. That is, if there is some small additive error of the type in our third example even though $\Pi(h)$ might to a good approximation exhibit left insensitivity it would never-the-less be smooth.

### 4.6. Smooth Monitoring

To focus thinking consider a regular $\Pi(h)$ and the family of monitoring technologies $\Pi(h/\sigma)$. For small $\sigma$ this amounts to a “small” additive error. In the limit with small additive error and fixed gross error we approach a model with purely gross error - that is, a model that has left insensitivity. We would like to know that our result, property (U) in particular, is robust to $\sigma > 0$.

We extend the idea of $\Pi(h/\sigma)$ with small $\sigma$ in the following way.

**Definition 5.** We say that $\Pi^n \rightarrow \Pi$ if

1. $\Pi^n$ and $\Pi$ are regular, $\Pi^n$ is smooth, and $\Pi$ is left insensitive and discontinuous
2. $\Pi^n(h) > \Pi(h)$ for $h < 0$ and $\Pi^n(h) < \Pi(h)$ for $h > 0$ and
3. for all $\epsilon > 0$ the functions $\Pi^n$ converge uniformly to $\Pi$ on the set $|h| \geq \epsilon$.

Part (1) says that the target is a left insensitive discontinuous monitoring technology such as that in our first example, or as in the case of the limit of $\Pi(h/\sigma)$. Part (2) says that $\Pi^n$ is a noisier technology than $\Pi$ and since it is smooth can be thought of as $\Pi(h)$ plus an additive error with a continuous density. Part (3) says that the additive error is “small.”

**Theorem 5.** If $F$ is large, $\psi_0$ not too large, utility is regular and $\Pi^n \rightarrow \Pi$ then for sufficiently large $n$ property (U) holds.

This result is proven as Theorem 8 in the Appendix. The following results from the Appendix provide additional insight into monitoring cost minimization. Lemma 3 shows that

**Lemma 1.** Any monitoring cost minimizing $y_t$ satisfies $y_t \geq x_t$.

This says that the choice of monitoring technology $y_t$ lies to the right of $x_t$, that is, the solution lies in the convex part of the $\Pi$ function. This is more subtle than it appears. If $y_t < x_t$ is cost minimizing then the first order condition $D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) = P_t\Pi'(x_t - y_t)$ must be satisfied. It is tempting to observe that for $x_t$ to the right of $y_t$ the objective function $\psi\Pi(x_t - y_t)D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)/\Pi'(x_t - y_t)$ is decreasing in $y_t$. Unfortunately this simple argument is not helpful since small values of $y_t$ may not be feasible: a correct proof may be found in Lemma 3 in the Appendix.

From Theorem 7 in the Appendix we also have

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15 An alternative would be to assert that for $h \neq 0$ we have $\Pi''(h) \rightarrow \Pi(h)$, that is, pointwise convergence. In fact because the functions in question are monotone and bounded this is equivalent to part (3). The uniform condition obviously implies the pointwise condition. That the converse is true is a technical fact outside the scope of this paper, but see Levine and Mattozzi (2019).
Theorem 6. Suppose that utility is regular and $\Pi^n \to \Pi$, $x_1^n \to x_1 < x_1^N$. If $y_1^n$ is cost minimizing then $y_1^n \to x_1$, $\Pi^n(x_1^n - y_1^n) \to \pi$, $\Pi^m(x_1^n - y_1^n) \to \Pi > 0$ and finite and the monitoring cost $M^n(x_1^n) \to M(x_1)$.

The slope condition $\Pi^m(x_1^n - y_1^n) \to \Pi$ highlights how smooth $\Pi^n$ is different than $\Pi$ even for very large $n$. With small additive error it is not a good idea to have punishment increasing very rapidly with respect to small violations of the social norm $x_1^n$: this would lead to frequent “accidental” and costly punishments. Rather at the social norm punishment should initially be somewhat forgiving to avoid large punishments for small errors. Notice that with smooth $\Pi^n$ it is necessary that the punishment satisfy the first order condition, that is $P^n\Pi^m(x_1^n - y_1^n) = D_3u(\omega_1, x_1^n, x_1^n)$. This shows how, in a certain sense, the problem with a smooth monitoring technology is harder than with left insensitivity: with a left insensitive monitoring technology the designer need worry only about deviations to higher output, and in the discontinuous case, only deviations to substantially higher output. By contrast with a smooth monitoring technology the designer must not choose the punishment too high because doing so would encourage individuals to deviate to lower output. This highlights a sense in which left insensitivity is desirable - lowering the probability of punishment for $h < 0$ simply makes the mechanism design problem harder.

The fact that the first order condition must be exactly satisfied with a smooth monitoring technology has a second consequence described in Lemma 4. It means that when $\omega_2 > \omega_1$ holding fixed $y_1^n, P_1^n$ since $D_3u(\omega_2, x_1^n, x_1^n) < D_3u(\omega_1, x_1^n, x_1^n)$ the status quo equilibrium must shift to the left - it is no longer constant as it is with a left insensitive monitoring technology. In other words for larger $\omega_2$ output in the status quo social norm declines: this means that it may remain better than the non-cooperative norm regardless of the size of the intervention, and even if there is a switch to the non-cooperative norm the increase in output may not be enough to raise output above $x_1$.

The key to proving Theorem 5 is to show that when there is “near” left insensitivity these things do not happen.

5. Conclusion

We have studied an environment in which groups self organize to overcome externalities. In such a setting we find that unanticipated interventions may have counter-intuitive consequences. In particular, adverse circumstances may cause output to go up rather than down when an existing social norm is abandoned and non-cooperative behavior takes its place. Never-the-less this increase in output may increase welfare.

We identify three conditions under which output increases rather than decreases. First, bargaining cost should be high. This means that when an intervention takes place it is not worth reaching a new agreement. We provide evidence from the cartel literature that this is often the case. Second, the intervention must be of intermediate size. If the intervention is small it is not worth changing

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16We are grateful to a referee who pointed this out in more or less these words.
the existing social norm; if it is large even the non-cooperative output will be less than the original quota. Third, monitoring cost should exhibit left insensitivity. This means that as long as the status quo is preserved output remains unchanged so that a switch to the non-cooperative norm leads to an increase in output.

In the specific context of Pigouvian taxes we have also studied welfare and tax revolts. What happens to the tax revenue plays a key role in the analysis. If the group keeps the tax revenue and production increases this is evidence of a welfare improvement: it means the policy is a success notwithstanding the increase in production it brings about. The group is also happy with higher taxes. By contrast if the tax authority keep the revenue the circumstances which favor reoptimization by the group also favor a tax revolt - not withstanding the fact that the tax may be an efficient Pigouvian one. The extent to which this is the case or not depends upon monitoring costs: when these are are low so the mechanism works well then a tax revolt is more likely.

Finally our model has a message for field experiments: it is practical and important to assess existence of social norms. The presence and role of self organized enforcement before and after an intervention can be ascertained either by direct observation or by survey. Without such information we cannot be certain about the policy implications of the response to an intervention.
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Appendix: The General Model

Regularity of utility and monitoring technology is assumed throughout this appendix.

Cost Minimization and the Reoptimal Social Norm

Lemma 2. For fixed $\omega_t, x_t$ the function $\psi\Pi(x_t - y_t)P_t$ has a minimum $M_t$ over incentive compatible $(x_t, y_t, P_t)$ and $M_t$ is lower semi-continuous in $\omega_t, x_t$.

Proof. Recall that incentive compatibility is given by the constraint

$$u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - P\Pi(x_t - y_t) \geq u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^i) - P\Pi(x_t^i - y_t).$$

First we show that for fixed $x_t$ the set of incentive compatible $(x_t, y_t, P_t)$ is not empty. To this end define $H \equiv \sup \{h \leq 0|\Pi'(h) = 0\}$ (possibly $-\infty$). We have three cases depending on $H$.

First $H = -\infty$. In this case take $y_t = X$. The objective $u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^i) - P\Pi(x_t^i - y_t)$ is then smooth and concave in $x_t$ so it is sufficient for a feasible solution that $D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) = P\Pi'(x_t - y_t)$. As by construction $\Pi'(x_t - y_t) \neq 0$ take $P = D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)/\Pi'(x_t - y_t)$.

Second $H = 0$. Take $y_t = x_t$; then we only have to check incentive compatibility for $x_t^i > x_t$. Also, we must have $\Pi^+(0) > 0$ because $\Pi$ is constant for $h \leq 0$ and $\Pi(h) > \Pi(0)$ for $h > 0$. The incentive constraint for rightward deviations may be written as

$$P \geq \frac{u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^i) - u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)}{\Pi(x_t^i - y_t) - \Pi(0)}.$$

As this has a finite limit at $x_t^i \downarrow y_t$ of $D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)/\Pi^+(0)$ the right-hand side is bounded, hence it is possible to choose $P$ sufficiently large that the constraint is satisfied for all $x_t^i$.

Third $-\infty < H < 0$. Choose $y_t$ such that $H < x_t - y_t < 0$. As in the second part, choose $P$ sufficiently large that the rightward deviation constraint is satisfied, and we can do so such that this is true for all $H \leq x_t - y_t \leq 0$. The leftward constraint is

$$u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^i) \geq P(\Pi(x_t - y_t) - \Pi(x_t^i - y_t))$$

and dividing both sides by $x_t - x_t^i$ we get $D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) \geq P\Pi'(x_t - y_t)$ in the limit. Consider then $D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)/\Pi'(x_t - y_t)$. As $y_t \uparrow x_t - H$ we have $\Pi'(x_t - y_t) \to 0$ continuously. Hence for some such $y_t$ we have $D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t)/\Pi'(x_t - y_t) \geq P$ so leftward deviation is unprofitable.

Next we show that the set of incentive compatible $(\omega_t, x_t, y_t, P_t)$ is closed, or equivalently that the correspondence $(\omega_t, x_t) \mapsto (y_t, P_t)$ has the closed graph property. This directly implies existence of $M_t(x_t)$ and since $\Pi$ is itself lower semi-continuous that $M_t$ is lower semi-continuous in $\omega_t, x_t$.

To show the set is closed observe that if $\Pi$ were continuous this would be immediate. However $\Pi$ may be discontinuous at 0. Let $(\omega_t^n, x_t^n, y_t^n, P_t^n)$ be an incentive compatible sequence converging to $(\omega_t, x_t, y_t, P_t)$. Suppose first that $x_t = y_t$. Since the only discontinuity is at 0 fixing $x_t^n$ it follows from incentive compatibility that $u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - P_t \limsup P(x_t^n - y_t^n) \geq u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^i) - P_t\Pi(x_t^i - y_t)$.
Since $\Pi$ can jump down but not up (lower semi-continuity) we also have $\limsup \Pi(x^i_t - y^i_t) \geq \Pi(x_t - y_t) = \Pi(0)$. Hence also $u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x_t - y_t) \geq u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x^i_t - y^i_t)$, the desired result.

Now suppose that $x_t \neq y_t$. A deviation $x^i_t \neq y_t$ cannot be profitable by continuity. For $x^i_t = y_t$ there are two cases depending on whether we choose a subsequence converging from the right or from the left. If $y^i_t \downarrow x^i_t$ the result is implied by left continuity of $\Pi$. Finally, if $y^i_t \uparrow x^i_t$ and $u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x_t - y_t) < u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x^i_t - y^i_t)$ then with $\tilde{x}^i_t \equiv x^i_t - 2(x^i_t - y^i_t)$ we have $\tilde{x}^i_t - y^i_t = y^i_t - x^i_t < 0$ so by left continuity of $\Pi$ and sufficiently large $n$ we have $u(\omega^n_t, x^n_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x^n_t - y^n_t) < u(\omega^n_t, x^n_t, \tilde{x}^i_t) - P_t \Pi(\tilde{x}^i_t - y^n_t)$ contradicting the fact that we assumed $u(\omega^n_t, x^n_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x^n_t - y^n_t) \geq u(\omega^n_t, x^n_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x^i_t - y^i_t)$ for any $x^i_t$.

**Proposition 1.** For all $\omega_t \geq \omega_1$ a reoptimal social norm $(x_t, y_t, P_t)$ exists and the set of all such norms is closed.

**Proof.** Follows directly from objective function $u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - M_t(x_t)$ being upper semi-continuous given in Lemma 2. □

**Lemma 3.** Any cost minimizing $y_t$ satisfies $y_t \geq x_t$.

**Proof.** Suppose that $y_t < x_t$ is cost minimizing. From the incentive compatibility of social norms it follows that $u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - P_t \Pi(x_t - y_t) = \max_{x^i_t} [u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x^i_t - y_t)]$ so that the necessary first order condition $D_3 u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) = P_t \Pi'(x_t - y_t)$ must be satisfied. It is tempting to observe that for $x_t$ to the right of $y_t$ the objective function $\psi \Pi(x_t - y_t) D_3 u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) / \Pi'(x_t - y_t)$ is decreasing in $y_t$ but this is not helpful since small values of $y_t$ may not be feasible. We show how to construct a $\hat{y}_t \geq x_t$ that satisfies incentive compatibility and has strictly lower cost than $y_t$. Specifically, if $\Pi'(0-) > \Pi'(x_t - y_t)$ we will find a $\hat{y}_t > x_t$ with $D_3 u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) = P_t \Pi'(x_t - \hat{y}_t)$ (since $\Pi$ is smooth and bounded below at 0) and if not, take $\hat{y}_t = x_t$ (which satisfies $D_3 u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) = P_t \Pi'(x_t - \hat{y}_t)$).

In both cases we keep the punishment fixed at $P_t$. Since necessarily $\Pi(x_t - \hat{y}_t) < \Pi(x_t - y_t)$, monitoring cost $\psi P_t \Pi(x_t - \hat{y}_t) < \psi P_t \Pi(x_t - y_t)$ is strictly lower. It remains to show that $\hat{y}_t$ is in fact incentive compatible. Consider $x^i_t \leq x_t$ so in particular $x^i_t \leq \hat{y}_t$. Then the objective function $u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x^i_t - \hat{y}_t)$ is concave for $x^i_t - \hat{y}_t \leq 0$ and the first order condition is satisfied at $x^i_t = x_t$ so there can be no profitable deviation to the left.

Consider a deviation to the right $x^i_t > x_t$. Since $y_t$ was incentive compatible we have $u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x_t - y_t) \geq u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) - P_t \Pi(x^i_t - y_t)$. We would like to show that the same holds for $\hat{y}_t$. A sufficient condition is $\Pi(x^i_t - \hat{y}_t) - P_t \Pi(x_t - \hat{y}_t) \geq \Pi(x^i_t - y_t) - P_t \Pi(x_t - y_t)$. Write $h_1 = \min\{x^i_t - x_t, \hat{y}_t - y_t\}$ and $h_2 = \min\{0, x^i_t - x_t - (\hat{y}_t - y_t)\}$ observing that $x^i_t - x_t = h_1 + h_2$. Then write

$$\Pi(x^i_t - \hat{y}_t) - P_t \Pi(x_t - \hat{y}_t) = \int_0^{h_1} \Pi'(h + x_t - \hat{y}_t) + \int_{h_1}^{h_1 + h_2} \Pi'(h + x_t - \hat{y}_t).$$

We claim that $\Pi'(h + x_t - \hat{y}_t) \geq \Pi'(h + x_t - y_t)$ which will give the desired result. For $0 \leq h \leq h_1$ we have

$$\Pi'(h + x_t - \hat{y}_t) \geq \Pi'(x_t - \hat{y}_t) \geq \Pi'(h + x_t - y_t).$$

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For $h \geq h_1$ we have $h \geq \hat{y}_t - y_t$ so that $h + x_t - \hat{y}_t \geq x_t - y_t > 0$. Hence $\Pi$ is concave between $h + x_t - \hat{y}_t$ and $h + x_t - y_t$ giving the desired result.

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**The Status Quo Social Norm**

**Lemma 4.** For any $(x_1, y_1, P_1)$ optimal with respect to $\omega_1$ and for any $\omega_2 \geq \omega_1$, in $0 \leq x_2 \leq x_1$ there is a unique incentive compatible social norm $(x_2^I, y_1, P_1)$. The left status quo, $x_2^I$ is either $x_1$ with\(^{17}\) $D_3u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) - P_1\Pi'(x_1 - y_1) > 0$ or it is the unique solution in $0 \leq x_2 \leq x_1$ of $D_3u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) - P_1\Pi'(x_2 - y_1) = 0$. $x_2^I \leq x_2^N$ and is decreasing and continuous in $\omega_2$. If $\Pi$ is smooth and $\omega_2 > \omega_1$ then $x_2^I < x_1$.

**Proof.** By Lemma 3 $x_1 \leq y_1$. Hence in $0 \leq x_2 \leq x_1$ $\Pi(x_2 - y_1)$ is smooth so any incentive compatible social norm $(x_2, y_1, P_1)$ must satisfy the first order condition. Hence we need only show that a solution exists and is incentive compatible. We have $D_3u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - P_1\Pi'(x_1 - y_1) \geq 0$ because it cannot be profitable to deviate to the left at $\omega_1$. If this holds with equality take $\hat{\omega}_2 = \omega_1$. Otherwise there is a unique value $\bar{\omega}_2 > \omega_1$ such that $D_3u(\hat{\omega}_2, x_1, x_1) - P_1\Pi'(x_1 - y_1) = 0$. Hence for $\omega_2 > \bar{\omega}_2$ we have $D_3u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) - P_1\Pi'(x_1 - y_1) < 0$, while for $\bar{\omega}_2 > \omega_2 > \omega_1$ we have $D_3u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) - P_1\Pi'(x_1 - y_1) > 0$.

Consider $g(\omega_2, x_2) \equiv D_3u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) - P_1\Pi'(x_2 - y_1)$. We have $D_1 g(\omega_2, x_2) = D_{31} u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) < 0$ and $D_2 g(\omega_2, x_2) = D_{32} u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) + D_{33} u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) - P_1\Pi''(x_2 - y_1) < 0$. For $\bar{\omega}_2 \geq \omega_2 \geq \omega_1$ we have $g(\omega, x_1) \geq 0$ so the unique solution of the first order condition is at $x_1$. If $\omega_2 > \bar{\omega}_2$ then $g(\omega_2, x_1) < 0$ so the first order condition is that either $g(\omega_2, x_2) = 0$ or that the derivative should be negative on the left boundary $g(\omega_2, 0) < 0$. It follows from the implicit function theorem that there is a unique solution $x_2^I$ of this first order condition and that this solution is decreasing in $\omega_2$. It follows also that it is smaller than $x_2^N$ since that solves the same problem with $\Pi' = 0$.

It remains to establish that $(x_2^I, y_1, P_1)$ is incentive compatible. It is incentive compatible for deviations $x_2^I$ to the left of $y_1$ because of concavity and the first order condition being satisfied. Since there can be no gain in deviating from $x_2^I$ to $x_1$ if there was a utility gain to deviating to $x_2^I > x_1$ there would have to be a utility gain to deviating from $x_1$ to $x_2^I$. Incentive compatibility of $(x_1, y_1, P_1)$ says that $u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - u(\omega_1, x_1, x_2^I) \geq P\Pi(x_1 - y_1) - P_1\Pi(x_2 - y_1)$. However $D_{31} u(\omega_t, x_1, x_t^I) < 0$, $x_2^I > x_1$ and the fundamental theorem of calculus imply $u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) - u(\omega_2, x_1, x_2^I) \geq u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - u(\omega_1, x_1, x_2^I)$ which is a contradiction.

Finally, if $\Pi$ is smooth then the first order condition $D_3u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - P_1\Pi'(x_1 - y_1) = 0$ must be satisfied with equality as must $D_3u(\omega_2, x_2^I, x_2^I) - P_1\Pi'(x_2^I - y_1) = 0$ and since $D_3u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - P_1\Pi'(x_t - y_1)$ is decreasing in $\omega_t$ and in $x_t$ for $x_t \leq y_1$ it follows that $x_2^I < x_1$. 

**Proposition 2.** For any $(x_1, y_1, P_1)$ optimal with respect to $\omega_1$ and for any $\omega_2 \geq \omega_1$ an incentive compatible social norm $(x_2, y_1, P_1)$ exists and the set of all such social norms is closed so that there is a status quo social norm. For $x_2^I \geq x_2^I^f$ it is uniquely given by $(x_2^I, y_1, P_1)$.

\(^{17}\)We always take $\Pi'(0)$ to be the left derivative.
Proof. Lemma 4 establishes existence of an incentive compatible social norm. Since any incentive compatible social norm to the right of \( x_1 \) must satisfy the first order condition with equality, hence the set is closed. That in turn implies existence of a status quo social norm (that is optimal within the class of incentive compatible norms). For \( x_2^L \geq x_2^f \) observe that any solution to the right of \( x_2^L \) has weakly lower social utility since both \( x_2^f \) and that solution lie to the right of \( x_2^f \) and the social objective function \( u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) \) is concave, and also has strictly higher monitoring costs since \( P_1 \) is fixed and \( \Pi(x_2 - y_1) \) must strictly increase in moving from non-negative to positive. \( \square \)

In the proof of Theorem 4 in the text we assert that the last two propositions imply that if \( \Pi \) is left insensitive and \( D_3 u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) \geq 0 \) we must have \( x_2^S = x_1 \). To see this observe that in this case 4 implies that \( x_2^L = x_1 \), since for any \( x_2 < x_1 \) the equation \( D_3 u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) - P_1 \Pi'(x_2 - y_1) = 0 \) has no solution \((D_3 u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) > 0 \) and \( \Pi'(x_2 - y_1) = 0 \)). Since \( x_2^L < x_1 \) Proposition 2 then implies \( x_2^S = x_2^L \).

Partial Monotonicity

**Proposition 3.** If \( x_1 \) is optimal first period output there is \( \omega_1 < \omega_a \leq \omega_b \leq \omega \) such that when \( \bar{x}_2 \) is a corresponding optimal second period output if \( \omega_2 > \omega_b \) then \( \bar{x}_2 < x_1 \) and for generic \( \psi_0 \) if \( \omega_1 \leq \omega_2 \leq \omega_0 \) then \( \bar{x}_2 < x_1 \).

**Proof.** Observe that in the second period we must have \( \bar{x}_2 \leq x_2^N \). As \( x_2^N \geq x_2^f \) and the social objective function \( u(\omega_2, x_2, x_2) \) is concave any \( x_2 > x_2^N \) would have no greater social utility and so would be strictly worse than \( x_2^N \) if it had any monitoring costs, that is, if it was reoptimal or status quo.

If \( \psi_0 \) is so large that the first period solution is non-cooperative simply observe that \( \omega_2 \geq \omega_1 \) implies \( x_2^N \leq x_1^N \) and in fact \( \bar{x}_2 < x_1 \) for all \( \omega_2 > \omega_1 \). The same applies as soon as \( \omega_2 \) is sufficiently large that \( x_2^N < x_1 \), giving the \( \omega_0 \) result.

Finally, for \( \omega_2 \) sufficiently close to \( \omega_1 \) the fact that \( F = 0 \) and reoptimal utility is upper semi-continuous in \( \omega_2 \) implies that it is not optimal to reoptimize. Moreover, as \( x_1 > x_1^f \) it follows that, again for \( \omega_2 \) sufficiently close to \( \omega_1 \), that \( x_2^L > x_2^f \) as both are continuous in \( \omega_2 \) so the status quo social norm involves no higher output than \( x_1 \) by Proposition 2 and Lemma 4. It remains then only to rule out the case where at \( \omega_1 \) there was indifference between the reoptimal social norm and the non-cooperative social norm. As that can happen for only one value of \( \psi_0 \) this is indeed non-generic. \( \square \)

Limit Monitoring

**Lemma 5.** Let \( v^n, w^n \) be sequences with \( v^n \to v > 0 \) and \( \liminf w^n > 0 \). If \( \Pi^n \to \Pi \) and for a sequence \( h^n < 0 \) it is the case that \( \Pi^{\alpha}(h^n) = w^n / v^n \) then we have \( h^n \to 0 \) and \( \Pi^{\alpha}(h^n) \to \pi \).

**Proof.** First we establish that for all \( \epsilon > 0 \) the functions \( \Pi^{\alpha} \) converge uniformly to 0 on the set \( h < -\epsilon \). This directly implies that \( h^n \to 0 \). Since \( \Pi^{\alpha} \) is nonnegative and increasing it suffices to show for any \( \epsilon > 0 \) we have \( \Pi^{\alpha}(-\epsilon) \to 0 \). To see this, since \( \Pi^{\alpha}(-\epsilon) \) is convex for \( \epsilon > 0 \) we may
write $\Pi^n(-\epsilon/2) - \pi \geq \Pi^n(-\epsilon) - \pi + \Pi'^n(-\epsilon)\epsilon/2$. Since the LHS goes to zero (recall that $\Pi$ is left insensitive by Definition 5), $\Pi^n(-\epsilon) - \pi$ is non-negative, and $\Pi'^n(-\epsilon) \geq 0$ by assumption it follows that $\Pi'^n(-\epsilon) \to 0$.

To establish the second assertion, if not then there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ and a subsequence in which $\Pi^n(h^n) > \pi + \epsilon$. Draw the tangent line to $\Pi^n$ at the point $h^n$, it has slope $w^n/v^n$ and as $\Pi^n$ is convex for negative $h$, it lies below $\Pi^n$ there. The tangent line intersects the constant function $\pi$ at $h^n - \gamma^n$ where $\Pi^n(h^n) - \gamma^n(w^n/v^n) = \pi$, which is to say at $\gamma^n = [\Pi^n(h^n) - \pi] v^n/w^n$. Consider then that $\Pi^n(h^n - \gamma^n/2) \geq \pi + \epsilon/2$, and $\Pi^n(-\gamma^n/2) \geq \Pi^n(h^n - \gamma^n/2) \geq \pi + \epsilon/2$. Unfortunately $\lim_{n \to \infty} \gamma^n/2 > 0$ so $\Pi^n(-\gamma^n/2) \to \pi$ which is a contradiction.

**Lemma 6.** If $\Pi^n \to \Pi$ then $\Pi'^n(0) \to \infty$.

**Proof.** This result is driven by $\Pi^+(0) > \pi$, which itself follows from definition 5 part 1. Suppose that there is a subsequence along which $\Pi'^n(0)$ is bounded above by $Q$. We cannot reconcile that with the discontinuity in the limit. To see this, choose a further subsequence along which $\Pi^n(0) \to q$. There are two cases: if $q < \Pi^+(0)$ then pointwise convergence is violated to the right. Specifically, define

$$h = \frac{\Pi^+(0) - q}{3Q}.$$ 

Then for large enough $n$ we have $\Pi^n(h) - q$ close to $\Pi^n(h) - \Pi^n(0)$ so $\Pi^n(h) - q \leq (1/2)(\Pi^+(0) - q)$, while $\lim \inf \Pi^n(h) \geq \Pi^+(0)$ a contradiction.

If $q = \Pi^+(0)$ then $q > \pi$ and pointwise convergence is violated to the left. Specifically, define

$$h = \frac{\pi - q}{3Q}.$$ 

Then for large enough $n$ we have $q - \Pi^n(h) \leq (1/2)(q - \pi)$ and therefore $\pi < (1/2)(q + \pi) \leq \Pi^n(h)$ while $\lim \sup \Pi^n(h) = \pi$, a contradiction.

We use these to show that

**Theorem 7.** Suppose that utility is regular and $\Pi^n \to \Pi$, $x^n_1 \to x_1 < x_1^N$. If $y^n_1$ is cost minimizing then $y^n_1 \to x_1$, $\Pi^n(x^n_1 - y^n_1) \to \pi$, $\Pi'^n(x^n_1 - y^n_1) \to \Pi > 0$ and finite and the monitoring cost $M^n(x^n_1) \to M(x_1)$.

**Proof.** Define $P = M(x_1)/(\psi \pi)$. Since $x_1 < x_1^N$ we have $D_3u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) > 0$ which implies in particular that $P > 0$ ($M(x_1)$ must be positive because with no punishment there is strict incentive to deviate), and for large enough $n$ we have $x^n_1 < x_1^N$ and $D_3u(\omega_1, x^n_1, x^n_1) > 0$.

Take $\hat{P} > P$. By Lemma 6 for all $n$ sufficiently large there exists an $h^n < 0$ with $\Pi'^n(h^n) > D_3u(\omega_1, x^n_1, x^n_1)/(P/2)$. Hence we may find a solution $\hat{h}^n$ to $\Pi'^n(h^n) = D_3u(\omega_1, x^n_1, x^n_1)/\hat{P}$ with $\hat{h}^n < 0$. By Lemma 5 (applied to the sequences $v^n = \hat{P}$ and $w^n = D_3u(\omega_1, x^n_1, x^n_1)\hat{h}^n \to 0$ and $\Pi^n(\hat{h}^n) \to \pi$. We claim in fact that for $n$ sufficiently large $x^n_1, y^n_1 = x^n_1 - \hat{h}^n, P$ is incentive compatible for the monitoring technology $\Pi^n$. This norm is not necessarily cost minimizing but will serve the purpose of showing that the minimum cost $M^n(x^n_1) \to M(x_1)$.
Observe first that it cannot be optimal to deviate to \( x_1^i \leq y_1^n \) since the objective function is concave and the first order condition is satisfied at \( x_1^n \). Moreover, it cannot be optimal to deviate to \( x_1^i > y_1^n \) with

\[
D_3u(\omega_1, x_1^i, x_1^n)(x_1^i - y_1^n) \leq \hat{P} \left( \Pi^n(x_1^i - y_1^n) - \Pi^n(x_1^n - y_1^n) \right)
\]

or

\[
x_1^i - y_1^n \leq \hat{P} \left( \frac{\Pi^n(x_1^i - y_1^n) - \Pi^n(x_1^n - y_1^n)}{D_3u(\omega_1, x_1^i, x_1^n)} \right) + \hat{h}_n.
\]

For \( n \) sufficiently large, however, the RHS is bounded below by \( \hat{\pi} \equiv (1/2)\hat{P} (\Pi^+(0) - \pi)/D_3u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) > 0 \). Hence if there is a profitable deviation it must be to \( x_1^i > y_1^n + \hat{\pi} \).

Let \( x_1^{i, m} \) be an optimal deviation in the range \( x_1^i \geq y_1^n + \hat{\pi} \). Since \( \hat{P} > P \) and \( x_1^i \geq y_1^n + \hat{\pi} \) we know - since \( \Pi(0) = \pi - \) that

\[
u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1^{i, m}) - u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - \hat{P} \left( \Pi(x_1^{i, m} - x_1) - \pi \right) \leq -\epsilon < 0.
\]

Hence since \( u \) is uniformly continuous and \( \Pi \) is for \( x_1^i \geq y_1^n + \hat{\pi} \) we have

\[
\limsup \left[ u(\omega_1, x_1^n, x_1^{i, m}) - u(\omega_1, x_1^n, x_1^n) - \hat{P} \left( \Pi(x_1^{i, m} - x_1^n) - \Pi(x_1^n - y_1^n) \right) \right] \leq -\epsilon.
\]

For \( x_1^i \geq y_1^n + \hat{\pi} \) we know that \( \Pi^n \) converges uniformly to \( \Pi \) so

\[
\limsup \left[ u(\omega_1, x_1^n, x_1^{i, m}) - u(\omega_1, x_1^n, x_1^n) - \hat{P} \left( \Pi^n(x_1^{i, m} - x_1^n) - \Pi^n(x_1^n - y_1^n) \right) \right] \leq -\epsilon.
\]

Hence for large enough \( n \) the deviation \( x_1^{i, m} \) is not profitable.

Observe that along this sequence monitoring cost is by construction \( M^n_P(x_1^n) = \psi \Pi^n(\hat{h}_n) \hat{P} \rightarrow \psi \pi \hat{P} \). Since the least monitoring cost \( M^n_P(x_1^n) \leq M^n_P(x_1^n) \) and \( \hat{P} > P \) was arbitrary we must have \( \limsup M^n_P(x_1^n) \leq \psi \pi P = M(x_1) \). Moreover since the \( \Pi^n \) technology is strictly inferior to the \( \Pi \) technology (part (2) of Definition 5), we have \( M^n(x_1^n) \geq M(x_1^n) \) and since \( M \) is lower semi-continuous, this implies in fact that \( M^n(x_1^n) \rightarrow M(x_1) \) as asserted.

For the rest, let \( P^n \) be a cost minimizing punishment corresponding to the optimal \( \hat{y}_1^n \). Observe that \( \Pi^n(x_1^n - \hat{y}_1^n) \geq \pi \). As we have just shown, monitoring cost must converge to \( \psi \pi P \), and this implies that \( P^n \) is bounded above and away from zero. Hence we may extract a subsequence along which \( P^n \rightarrow P > 0 \). From Lemma 3 we have \( x_1^n < \hat{y}_1^n \). Since \( P \) is discontinuous at 0 the first order condition \( \Pi^n(x_1^n - \hat{y}_1^n) = D_3(\omega_1, x_1^n, x_1^n)/P^n \) implies that in fact \( x_1^n < \hat{y}_1^n \) (since otherwise from Lemma 6 the slope would go to infinity). We may then apply Lemma 5 to reach the desired conclusion that \( \hat{y}_1^n \rightarrow x_1 \) and \( \Pi^n(x_1^n - y_1^n) \rightarrow \pi \).

\[\square\]

**Lemma 7.** Suppose that utility is regular and \( \Pi^n \rightarrow \Pi \), \( x_1^n \rightarrow x_1 \) with \( x_1^f \leq x_1 < x_1^N \) and that \( y_1^n \) is cost minimizing with corresponding punishment \( P_1^n \). Fix \( \omega_2 > \omega_1 \) such that \( x_2^N > x_1 \). Then the status quo \( x_2^S \rightarrow x_1 \) and \( \psi P_1^n \Pi^n(x_2^S - y_1^n) \rightarrow M(x_1) \).
Proof. It suffices to prove the result for \( x_{2n}^L \) the left status quo; if \( x_{2n}^L \to x_1 \) since \( x_1 \geq x_1^f > x_2^f \) then Proposition 2 implies that for large enough \( n \) the left status quo is the unique status quo.

From the first order condition \( P_n = D_3 u(\omega, x_1^n, x_1^n) / \Pi^n(x_1^n - y_1^n) \to D_3 u(\omega, x_1, x_1) / \Pi \) by Lemma 7. By definition \( x_{2n}^L \leq x_1^n \) so \( D_3 u(\omega, x_{2n}^L, x_2^n) \geq D_3 u(\omega, x_1^n, x_1^n) \). Moreover \( D_3 u(\omega, x_1, x_1) > 0 \) (from \( x_1 < x_{2n}^L \)) and \( D_3 u(\omega_2, x_1^n, x_1^n) \to D_3 u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) \) so \( D_3 u(\omega_2, x_{2n}^L, x_2^n) \) is bounded away from zero. From Lemma 4 we have \( x_{2n}^L < x_1^n \leq y_1^n \) and since \( \Pi^n(x_{2n}^L - y_1^n) = D_3 u(\omega, x_{2n}^L, x_2^n) / P_n \) we may apply Lemma 5 to get \( x_{2n}^L \to x_1 \) and \( \Pi^n(x_{2n}^L - y_1^n) \to \pi^* \).

By Lemma 7 we also have \( \Pi^n(x_1^n - y_1^n) \to \pi \) and \( \psi P_1^n \Pi^n(x_1^n - y_1^n) \to M(x_1) \). Hence \( \psi P_1^n \Pi^n(x_{2n}^L - y_1^n) \to M(x_1) \).

**Definition 6.** Property (V) is said to hold at \((x_1, y_1, P_1)\) incentive compatible with respect to \( \omega_1 \) if there exists an \( \omega_2 > \omega_1 \) such that \( x_2^N > x_1 \) and the non-cooperative social norm is strictly better than any status quo social norm \((x_2, y_1, P_1)\).

**Lemma 8.** Suppose that utility is regular and \( \Pi^n \to \Pi \), \( x_1^n \to x_1 \) with \( x_1^f \leq x_1 < x_2^N \) and that \( y_1^n \) is cost minimizing with corresponding punishment \( P_1^n \). Then for all sufficiently large \( n \) property (V) is satisfied at \((x_1^n, y_1^n, P_1^n)\).

**Proof.** Let \( \omega_2^{SN} \) be the unique solution of \( D_3 u(\omega_2^{SN}, x_1, x_1) = 0 \). Then there exists an \( \omega_2^{SN} > \omega_2 > \omega_1 \) such that property (V) holds for \( \Pi \) at \((x_1, y_1, P_1)\); the proof is identical to that of Theorem 4. This is to say that \( u(\omega_2^{SN}, x_1, x_1) - M(x_1) < u(\omega_2^{SN}, x_2^N, x_2^N) \). From Lemma 7 and the continuity of \( u \) the utility from the status quo at \( n \) given by \( u(\omega_2^{SN}, x_2^N, x_2^N) - \psi P_1^n \Pi^n(x_2^N - y_1^n) \to u(\omega_2^{SN}, x_1, x_1) - M(x_1) \) giving the desired result.

The next two lemmas show that \( x_1^N > \lim sup x_1^n \geq \lim inf x_1^n \geq x_1^f \). The argument is that this is true in the limit for \( \Pi \) so by Lemma 7 holds for sufficiently large \( n \).

**Lemma 9.** Suppose that utility is regular and \( \Pi^n \to \Pi \). Then for every \( \omega_1 \) and any \((x_1^n, y_1^n, P_1^n)\) optimal with respect to \( \omega_1 \) we have \( \lim inf x_1^n \geq x_1^f \).

**Proof.** If not we can find a sequence \((x_1^n, y_1^n, P_1^n)\) optimal with respect to \( \omega_1 \) with \( \lim x_1^n = x_1 < x_1^f \). By Theorem 7 this implies \( M^n(x_1^n) \to M(x_1) \) and \( M^n(x_1^f) \to M(x_1^f) \). Hence it must be that \( u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - M(x_1) \geq u(\omega_1, x_1^f, x_1^f) - M(x_1^f) \), and since \( u(\omega_1, x_1^f, x_1^f) > u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) \) that \( M(x_1^f) > M(x_1) \). Consider a cost minimizing \( y_1, P_1 \) at \( x_1 \). Then \( y_1 = x_1 \) since \( \Pi \) is left insensitive, and for \( x_1^f > x_1^f \) we have

\[ P_1 \left( \Pi(x_1^f - x_1) - \pi \right) \geq u(\omega_1, x_1^f, x_1^f) - (x_1^f - x_1) \]

\[ \geq u(\omega_1, x_1^f, x_1^f - (x_1^f - x_1)) + (x_1^f - x_1) - u(\omega_1, x_1^f, x_1^f) \]

\[ = u(\omega_1, x_1^f, x_1^f) - u(\omega_1, x_1^f, x_1^f) \]

(the second inequality from the regularity property \( D_{33}u(\omega_2, x_1, x_1) + D_{23}u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) < 0 \)) so that in fact \( x_1^f, x_1^f, P_1 \) is incentive compatible. Then \( M(x_1^f) > M(x_1) = \psi P_1 \geq M(x_1^f) \) a contradiction.

\[ \square \]
Lemma 10. Suppose that utility is regular and $\Pi^n \to \Pi$. Then for every $\omega_1$ and any $(x^n_1, y^n_1, P^n_1)$ optimal with respect to $\omega_1$ we have $\limsup x^n_1 < x_1^N$.

Proof. Certainly $x^n_1 \leq x_1^N$ for if $x^n_1 > x_1^N$ social welfare would strictly increase and monitoring cost would be at the minimum of zero by moving to $x_1^N$. Suppose in fact that for some subsequence $\lim x^n_1 = x_1^N$. By Lemma 7 this implies $M^n(x^n_1) \to 0$. Letting $u^n_1$ be the optimal utility we have so $u^n_1 \to u_1^N$.

Now consider $\Pi$. Set

$$P_1 = \frac{1}{\Pi^+(0) - \pi} \left( \max_{x \geq x_1^N} u(\omega_1, x, x_1) - u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) \right)$$

so that $x_1, y_1 = x_1, P_1$ is incentive compatible. Then the maximum social utility is bounded below by $v(x_1) = u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - \psi P_1 x_1$ where $v(x_1^N) = u_1^N$ (at $x_1 = x_1^N$ we have $P_1 = 0$). Moreover $v'(x_1^N) = D_2 u(\omega_1, x_1^N, x_1^N) + D_3 u(\omega_1, x_1^N, x_1^N) < 0$ since $x_1^N > x_1^f$. Hence there is $x_1 < x_1^N$ and $\epsilon > 0$ with $u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - M(x_1) > u_1^N + \epsilon$. However by Lemma 7 we have $M^n(x_1) \to M(x_1)$ so for all large enough $n$ it must be that $u(\omega_1, x_1, x_1) - M^n(x_1) > u_1^N + \epsilon/2$ contradicting $u^n_1 \to u_1^N$. 

Theorem 8. If $F$ is large, $\psi_0$ not too large, utility is regular and $\Pi^n \to \Pi$ then for sufficiently large $n$ property (U) holds.

Proof. We need only show that property (V) holds for all sufficiently large $n$ and all corresponding optimal first period optimal norms (for $F$ large enough reoptimizing is out of the question): continuity of utility with respect to the status quo and non-cooperative social norms yields the desired range. Hence if the result fails there must be a sequence along which property (V) fails. Then extract a convergent subsequence and apply Lemmas 9, 10 and 8 to get a contradiction.

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Online Appendix: Pigou

The monitoring technology is $\Pi(x^i_t - y_t) = \pi > 0$ if $x^i_t \leq y_t$ and $\Pi(x^i_t - y_t) = \pi_B > \pi$ if $x^i_t > y_t$. As in the text $\theta = \pi/\pi_B$, and the punishment cost parameters are $\psi_0 = 0$ and $\psi = 1$.

We shall repeatedly use the fact that the solution of a quadratic optimization problem $Ax_t - (B/2)(x_t)^2 = x_t [A - (B/2)x_t]$ is given by $x_t = A/B$ and the resulting optimum is $A^2/(2B)$.

Individual direct utility is $U(x^i_t) = (V + 1)x^i_t - (V/2)(x^i_t)^2$ up to the satiation point $X = (V + 1)/V$. Overall individual utility is

$$u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) = U(x^i_t) - \omega_t x^i_t - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)x_t$$
$$= (V + 1 - \omega_t)x^i_t - (V/2)(x^i_t)^2 - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)x_t.$$ 

The first best $x^f$ is defined as the maximum of

$$u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t) = (V + 1 - \omega_t)x^i_t - (V/2)(x^i_t)^2 - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)x_t$$
$$= x_t |(V - (1 - \alpha)\omega_t) - (V/2)x_t|.$$ 

We always assume $\omega_t \leq 1/\alpha$ which will be seen to imply that $x^N_t \geq x^f_t$ and $\omega_t \leq V/(1 - \alpha)$ which will imply that $x^f_t \geq 0$.

**Proposition 4.** The first best is $x^f_t = (V - (1 - \alpha)\omega_t)/V$ with corresponding welfare $u^f_t = (V - (1 - \alpha)\omega_t)^2/(2V)$.

When $\alpha = 1$ this is the called the Pigouvian solution and is $x^P = 1$ with corresponding welfare $u^P = V/2$. The Pigouvian tax is $U'(x^P) = 1$. Note that as indicated for $\omega_t \leq V/(1 - \alpha)$ this is non-negative.

**Proposition 5.** The individual optimum in the absence of penalty - that is the maximum of $u(\omega_t, x_t, x^i_t)$ with respect to $x^i_t$ - is $x^B_t = (V + 1 - \omega_t)/V$ with utility $u^B_t(\omega_t, x_t, x^B_t) = (V + 1 - \omega_t)^2/(2V) - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)x_t$.

As the optimum is independent of $x_t$ this is also the noncooperative social norm: $x^N_t = x^B_t$.

**Proposition 6.** The noncooperative social norm has $x^N_t = (V + 1 - \omega_t)/V$ with corresponding welfare

$$u^N_t = u(\omega_t, x^N_t, x^i_t) = \left[\frac{V}{2} - \frac{1}{2V}\right] + \left[\frac{\alpha(V + 1) - V}{V}\right] \omega_t + \left[\frac{1 - 2\alpha}{2V}\right] \omega_t^2.$$ 

For $\omega_t \leq \bar{\omega} \equiv 1/\alpha$ it is $x^N_t \geq x^f_t$.

**Proof.** The value of $u^N$ is given by direct computation of

$$u(\omega_t, x^N_t, x^N_t) = (V + 1 - \omega_t)^2/(2V) - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)(V + 1 - \omega_t)/V.$$ 

Similar elementary computation gives $x^N_t \geq x^f_t$ if and only if $\omega_t \leq 1/\alpha$.  

\[\square\]
Given $\omega_t$ and a quota $y_t = x_t$ made incentive compatible by punishment

$$P_t = \left[ u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^B) - u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) \right] / (\pi_B - \pi)$$

yields monitoring cost $\pi P_t$ hence social utility

$$u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - \theta \left[ u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^B) - u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) \right].$$

We have denoted by “re-optimal” the norm maximizing this function.

**Proposition 7.** The re-optimal social norm has

$$x_t^R = \frac{(1 + \theta)V + \theta - (1 + \theta - \alpha)\omega_t}{V(1 + \theta)}$$

when this is non-negative and the corresponding welfare is

$$u_t^R = \left[ \frac{V}{2} - \frac{1}{2V} \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right] + \left[ \frac{\alpha}{V} \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} - (1 - \alpha) \right] \omega_t + \frac{1}{2V} \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \left[ (1 - \alpha)^2 + \theta(1 - 2\alpha) \right] \omega_t^2$$

$$= u_t^N + \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} (1 - \alpha \omega_t)^2.$$  

**Proof.** The objective function is

\begin{align*}
&u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - \theta \left[ u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^B) - u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) \right] = (1 + \theta)u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t) - \theta u(\omega_t, x_t, x_t^B) \\
&= (1 + \theta)x_t \left[ (V - (1 - \alpha)\omega_t) - (V/2)x_t \right] - \theta \left[ ((V + 1 - \omega_t)^2/(2V) - (1 - \alpha \omega_t)x_t \right] \\
&= x_t \left[ (1 + \theta)(V - (1 - \alpha)\omega_t) - (1 + \theta)(V/2)x_t + \theta(1 - \alpha \omega_t) \right] - \theta(V + 1 - \omega_t)^2/(2V) \\
&= x_t \left[ (1 + \theta)(V - (1 - \alpha)\omega_t) + \theta(1 - \alpha \omega_t) - (1 + \theta)(V/2)x_t \right] - \theta(V + 1 - \omega_t)^2/(2V) \\
&= x_t \left[ (1 + \theta)V + \theta - (1 + \alpha + \theta)\omega_t - (1 + \theta)(V/2)x_t \right] - \theta(V + 1 - \omega_t)^2/(2V)
\end{align*}

whence $x_t^R$. As to $u_t^R$ we have

\begin{align*}
u_t^R &= \frac{((1 + \theta)V + \theta - (1 - \alpha + \theta)\omega_t)^2}{2(1 + \theta)V} - \frac{\theta(V + 1 - \omega_t)^2}{2V} \\
&= \frac{1}{2(1 + \theta)V} \left[ ((1 + \theta)V + \theta - (1 - \alpha + \theta)\omega_t)^2 - \theta(1 + \theta)(V + 1 - \omega_t)^2 \right] \\
&= \frac{1}{2(1 + \theta)V} \left[ ((1 + \theta)V + \theta)^2 - 2((1 + \theta)V + \theta)(1 + \theta - \alpha)\omega_t \right. \\
&\quad + (1 + \theta - \alpha)^2 \omega_t^2 - \theta(1 + \theta) \left( (V + 1)^2 - 2(V + 1)\omega_t + \omega_t^2 \right) \\
&\quad \left. + (1 + \theta - \alpha)^2 \omega_t^2 - \theta(1 + \theta) \left( (V + 1)^2 - 2(V + 1)\omega_t + \omega_t^2 \right) \right].
\end{align*}

We examine the constant, linear, and quadratic coefficients separately to get the expression in the
Theorem. The constant term is
\[
\frac{1}{2(1+\theta)} \left[ ((1+\theta)V + \theta)^2 - \theta(1+\theta) (V+1)^2 \right]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2(1+\theta)} \left[ (1+\theta)^2 V^2 + 2\theta(1+\theta)V + \theta^2 - (1+\theta)\theta (V^2 + 2V + 1) \right]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2(1+\theta)} \left[ ((1+\theta)^2 - (1+\theta)\theta) V^2 + \theta^2 - (1+\theta)\theta \right] = \frac{1}{2(1+\theta)} [ (1+\theta)V^2 - \theta]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2V} \frac{\theta}{1+\theta}
\]

The linear coefficient is
\[
\frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1+\theta} \left[ -2 ((1+\theta)V + \theta) (1+\theta - \alpha) + 2\theta(1+\theta)(V+1) \right]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{V} \frac{1}{1+\theta} \left[ ((1+\theta)V + \theta) (\alpha - (1+\theta)) + \theta(1+\theta)(V+1) \right]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{V} \frac{1}{1+\theta} \left[ \alpha ((1+\theta)V + \theta) - (1+\theta)V \right] = \frac{\alpha ((1+\theta)V + \theta)}{(1+\theta)V} - 1
\]
\[
= \frac{\alpha}{V} \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} - (1-\alpha)
\]

The quadratic coefficient is
\[
\frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1+\theta} \left[ (1+\theta - \alpha)^2 - \theta(1+\theta) \right]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1+\theta} \left[ (1-\alpha)^2 + \theta(1-2\alpha) \right].
\]

These give \( u^R \) as in the statement. Lastly we compute \( u^R - u^N \). Recall that \( u^N = \left[ \frac{V}{2} - \frac{1}{2V} \right] \omega_t + \left[ \frac{\alpha(V+1)-V}{V} \right] \omega_t^2 \). The difference in the constants is
\[
\frac{V}{2} \frac{1}{2V} \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} - \left[ \frac{V}{2} - \frac{1}{2V} \right] = -\frac{1}{2V} \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} + \frac{1}{2V} = \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1+\theta}
\]

For the linear coefficients we have
\[
\frac{\alpha}{V} \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} - (1-\alpha) - \left[ \frac{\alpha(V+1)-V}{V} \right] = \frac{\alpha}{V} \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} - \frac{\alpha}{V} \frac{1}{1+\theta}
\]

and for the quadratic
\[
\frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1+\theta} \left[ (1-\alpha)^2 + \theta(1-2\alpha) \right] - \left[ \frac{1-2\alpha}{2V} \right]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1+\theta} \left[ (1-\alpha)^2 + \theta(1-2\alpha) - (1-2\alpha)(1+\theta) \right]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1+\theta} \cdot \alpha^2
\]
Therefore

\[ u^R - u^N = \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} - \frac{\alpha}{V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} \omega_t \left( 1 + \theta - \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} \alpha^2 \omega_t^2 \right) \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} - \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} 2\alpha\omega_t + \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} (\alpha\omega_t)^2 \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2V} \frac{1}{1 + \theta} (1 - \alpha\omega)^2 \]

as claimed. \qed

We verify a claim made in the text:

**Proposition 8.** \( x_1^N > x_1 > x_2^N(\omega_2) \) when \( \omega_2 = 1/\alpha \)

**Proof.** The inequality \( x_1^N > x_1 \) reads

\[ \frac{V + 1 - \omega_t}{V} > \frac{(1 + \theta)V + \theta - (1 + \theta - \alpha) \omega_1}{(1 + \theta)V} \]

that is

\[ 1 - \omega_t > \theta - (1 + \theta - \alpha) \omega_1 \]

At \( \omega_2 = \omega_1 \) this is

\[ -(1 + \theta)\omega_1 > -1 - (1 + \theta - \alpha) \omega_1 \]

\[ 1 > (1 + \theta)\omega_1 - (1 + \theta - \alpha) \omega_1 = \alpha\omega_1 \]

which is true. At \( \omega_2 = 1/\alpha \) the reverse inequality \( x_1^N < x_1 \) reads

\[ -\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} = 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} < \frac{\theta - (1 - \alpha + \theta) \omega_1}{(1 + \theta)} \]

\[ -\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} < \frac{\theta - (1 - \alpha + \theta) \omega_1}{(1 + \theta)} \]

where the right hand side is larger than

\[ \frac{\alpha \theta - (1 - \alpha + \theta)}{\alpha (1 + \theta)} = \frac{\alpha \theta - (1 - \alpha) - \theta}{\alpha (1 + \theta)} = -\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \]

so in fact \( x_2^N < x_1 \) when \( \omega_2 = 1/\alpha \). \qed