

DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

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
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE, SALIENCE AND COORDINATION

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SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1291

July 2008
Revised September 2009

Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination*

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August 7, 2009

Abstract

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of monotone games with imperfect information. Players are located at the nodes of a network and observe the actions of other players

*This research was supported by the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and the UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab). The paper has benefited from suggestions by the participants of seminars at several universities. We acknowledge The National Science Foundation for support under grants SBR-0095109 (Gale), SES-0617955 (Gale and Kariv), and SES-0617820 (Palfrey) and The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Palfrey). Kariv is grateful for the hospitality of the School of Social Science in the Institute for Advanced Studies.

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only if they are connected by the network. These games have many sequential equilibria; nonetheless, the behavior of subjects in the laboratory is predictable. The network architecture makes some strategies *salient* and this in turn makes the subjects' behavior predictable and facilitates coordination on efficient outcomes. In some cases, modal behavior corresponds to equilibrium strategies.

JEL Classification Numbers: *D82, D83, C92.*

Key Words: *experiment, monotone games, imperfect information, networks, coordination, strategic commitment, strategic delay, equilibrium selection, salience.*

1 Introduction

A perennial question in economics concerns the conditions under which individuals cooperate and coordinate to achieve an efficient outcome. In a series of papers, Gale (1995, 2001) showed that, under certain conditions, cooperation arises naturally in the class of *monotone games*. A monotone game is like a repeated game except that actions are irreversible: players are constrained to choose stage-game strategies that are non-decreasing over time. This irreversibility structure allows players to make commitments. Every time a player makes a commitment, it changes the structure of the game and the incentives for other players to cooperate.

Choi et al. (2008), henceforth CGK, conduct a theoretical and experimental study of a class of simple monotone games that are naturally interpreted as step-level, or threshold, public good games. Each player has an endowment of tokens E that he can either keep for himself or contribute toward the cost of an indivisible public good. The good costs K tokens to complete. The players make irreversible contributions to the public good at a sequence of dates. At the end of T periods, the public good is provided if and only if the sum of the contributions is large enough to meet the cost of the good. Each player assigns the value V to the good, so his utility if the good is provided is equal to V plus his endowment minus his contribution. If the good is not provided, his payoff equals his endowment minus his contribution.

The main theoretical result in CGK is that, if the length of the game T is greater than the cost of the good K (and certain side constraints are satisfied), then players must cooperate and provide the good with positive probability (probability one in a pure-strategy equilibrium). Thus, the timing and irreversibility of decisions can help avoid uncooperative equilibria.

However, the coordination problem remains a potential obstacle to efficiency.

A central assumption in CGK is that information is *perfect*: every player is assumed to be informed about the entire history of actions that have already been taken. Perfect information and sequential choice can make it easier for players to coordinate their actions if they are so inclined. Clearly, *imperfect* information can be an obstacle to cooperation. In the extreme case where no player has any information about the other players' prior actions, the situation is essentially the same as in the one-shot game, where players contribute simultaneously to the provision of the public good. For intermediate cases, with partial information, the central result of CGK continues to hold: under weak conditions, sequential rationality implies provision of the public good with positive probability. Our motivation for the present study is to determine the effect of the information structure in this intermediate range – between the cases of zero and perfect information – on coordination, dynamics, and efficiency.

The imperfect information structure is represented by a directed graph that specifies the information flows in the group, i.e., who observes whose past actions. Each player is located at a node of the graph. Player i can observe player j if and only if there is an edge leading from node i to node j . The network architecture is common knowledge to the players. The experiments reported here involve the benchmark three-person empty and complete networks, and all three-person networks with one or two edges. We call the unique 1-edge network the one-link network. There are four 2-edge networks, called the line, the star-in, the star-out, and the pair network. The complete set of networks is illustrated in Figure 1, where an arrow pointing from player i to player j indicates that player i can observe player j . The set of networks illustrated in Figure 1 is essentially complete in the sense that any other network *with one or two edges* is simply a re-labeling of these networks.

[Figure 1 here]

This set of networks has several non-trivial architectures, each of which gives rise to its own distinctive information flows. To keep the scope of our study within reasonable bounds, we exclude the large set of networks with three, four and five edges. For practical purposes, the networks with zero, one or two edges provide a sufficiently rich set of networks, reveal important features of the game, and provide a reasonable test of the theory.

The games that make up the various treatments in our experiments differ only with respect to their network architecture. The other parameters are

the same for all treatments. There are three players, each of whom has an endowment consisting of a single token ($E = 1$). The cost of the public good is two tokens ($K = 2$), so that some coordination is required to provide the public good and there is an opportunity for one player to free-ride. There are three periods in the game ($T = 3$). The value of the public good is two tokens ($V = 2$), so it is always efficient for the good to be provided.

Although the multiplicity of sequential equilibria means that standard theory makes only weak predictions about the outcome of the game, the actual behavior we observe is predictable and sensitive to the network architecture. We emphasize that even if subjects do not “play” an equilibrium strategy profile, the specific architecture of the network clearly induces some patterns of contributions more than others, both with regard to the identity of contributors and the timing of their contributions. Such coordination may not only lead to more predictable behavior, it can also improve the efficiency of the outcome. Note that even if the public good is provided, the outcome may be inefficient because subjects contribute too much. And, of course, if the good is provided with probability less than one, it is of considerable interest to know how often it is provided and why.

The main regularities we observe can be summarized under four headings:

- **Strategic commitment:** There is a tendency for subjects in certain network positions to make contributions early in the game in order to encourage others to contribute. Clearly, commitment is of strategic value only if it is observed by others. Strategic commitment tends to be observed among *uninformed-and-observed* subjects, i.e., subjects in positions where (i) they cannot observe other positions and (ii) they are observed by another position.

We observe strategic commitment in the laboratory in position B in the one-link network, position C in the line network, and position A in the star-in network. The effect is strongest for position C in the line network and appears to be associated with the high level of efficiency in that network.

- **Strategic delay:** There is a tendency for subjects in certain network positions to delay their decisions until they have observed a contribution by a subject in another position. Obviously, there is an option value of delay only if the decision depends on the information. Strategic delay tends to be observed among *informed-and-unobserved* subjects,

i.e., subjects in positions where (i) they can observe other positions and (ii) they are not observed by another position.

We observe strong evidence of strategic delay among all subjects in positions where they can observe another subject, particularly in position A of the one-link network, position B of the line network, and position A of the star-out.

- **Mis-coordination:** We also identify situations in which there are problems coordinating on an efficient outcome. Mis-coordination tends to arise in networks where two players are *symmetrically* situated. In symmetric situations, it becomes problematic for two players to know who should go first or, if only one is to contribute, which of two should contribute.

There is evidence of coordination failure in networks where two subjects, such as B and C in the star-out and star-in networks and A and B in the pair network, are symmetrically situated.

- **Equilibrium:** In some cases, the modal behavior corresponds with easily identifiable salient equilibria. This is not to claim that subjects are actually playing equilibrium strategies, just that the modal behavior corresponds to what some equilibria would predict.

The modal behavior of subjects in the line and star-out networks corresponds to the strategies that would be chosen in equilibria that involve strategic commitment by observed and uninformed players and strategic delay by informed and unobserved players.

Thus, our experiment finds empirical support for these ideas: there is strategic delay; there is strategic commitment; symmetry leads to mis-coordination (with some caveats); and in some networks where the degree of coordination is high, the modal behavior of the subjects corresponds to a single equilibrium or class of equilibria. There are anomalies, of course, and in those cases we investigate behavior at the level of the individual subject to determine whether these anomalies are systematic or attributable to only a few individuals.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A discussion of the core literature on salience and other related literatures is provided in Section 2. Section 3 describes the theoretical model and Section 4 outlines the research

questions that we attempt to answer in the rest of the paper. Section 5 summarizes the experimental design and procedures. The results are gathered in Section 6 and Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.

2 Related literature

Our use of the term salient refers to structural properties of the game, particularly the dominance of strategic delay for some players and the effects of strategic commitment on other players. In somewhat related papers, Cooper et al. (1990), Van Huyck et al. (1990, 1991), and Straub (1995) studied coordination via payoffs-based notions, including risk- and payoff-dominance. Our concept of salience, based on structural properties of the game, is closer to the one explored by these authors than it is to the concept of “psychological” salience introduced by Schelling (1960) as part of his theory of focal equilibria.

In Schelling’s account, what makes an equilibrium focal is its psychological “frame,” rather than its structural properties. He argued that, in the description of a pure coordination game with multiple equilibria, the labels of the strategies may have an effect on the players’ behavior. When there is no other reason to choose among a set of strategies, players will choose the strategy with the most salient label. The resulting equilibrium is called a *focal point*. Lewis (1969) used the concept of salience as an element of his theory of conventions (see also Cubitt and Sugden, 2003). Tests of Schelling’s notion of salience in the context of one-shot coordination games are provided by Crawford and Haller (1990), Mehta et al. (1994), Sugden (1995), Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997), Blume (2000), Bardsley et al. (2006) and Crawford et al. (2008).

Our paper is also related to the large literature on coordination games in experimental economics (see Crawford, 1997, Camerer, 2003, and Devetag and Ortmann, 2007 for comprehensive discussions). Of particular interest are several articles that examine the effect of sequential timing in resolving coordination problems under conditions of imperfect information. The first such paper of which we are aware is Cooper et al. (1993) who examine strategic behavior in a “blinded” sequential battle of the sexes game, where the first player’s move is not revealed to the second player but the timing is common knowledge. They find much higher rates of coordination and higher efficiency compared to a simultaneous-play version of the game. Rapoport

(1997) investigates similar issues in a three-person battle of the sexes game and Budescu et al. (1997) report results from a similar information treatment applied to common-pool resource dilemmas. Weber et al. (2004) provide a summary of experimental findings about these effects, which they call “virtual observability,” and run some additional coordination-game experiments, in which they observe similar effects. These studies are different from ours in several respects. First, they consider only the no-information case, where previous moves were completely unobservable by later players. Second, a single player moves in each stage of the game, whereas, in our study, all players move simultaneously in each stage of the game.

There is a small body of work on monotone games *with perfect information*. Admati and Perry (1991) introduced the basic concepts and their work was extended by Marx and Matthews (2000). Gale (1995, 2001) developed the theory applied in this paper in two different environments. Duffy et al. (2007) investigate the model of Marx and Matthews (2000) experimentally and show that positive provision can be supported in a dynamic laboratory setting.

Following the seminal paper of Erev and Rapoport (1990), a number of experimental papers analyzed the effect of the information structure on public-good provision. Most recently, Ngan and Au (2008) extended Erev and Rapoport (1990) to investigate the effect of information in a real-time, step-level, public good game. While the games we study share some of the features of these games, we address different questions. Most importantly, the previous literature mainly focuses on the sensitivity of provision in different information treatments whereas we focus on the impact of network architecture on the salience of equilibrium behavior.

There is a large and growing literature on the economics of networks (see Jackson, 2008). Although network experiments in economics are recent, there is now a large experimental literature on the economics of networks. (see Kosfeld, 2004, Goyal, 2005, and Jackson, 2005, for excellent, if now already somewhat dated, surveys). To the best of our knowledge, all of the previous experimental work on networks have quite different focuses than ours.

3 Equilibrium properties

Next, we define the game and discuss the properties of the equilibrium set for the different networks, paying particular attention to incentives for strategic commitment, strategic delay, and mis-coordination and the existence of salient equilibria.

3.1 The game

We study a dynamic game in which there are three players indexed by $i = A, B, C$, and three periods indexed by $t = 1, 2, 3$. Each player has an endowment of one token that he can contribute to the production of a public good. The contribution can be made in any of the three periods, but the decision is irreversible: once a player has committed his token, he cannot take it back. Let x_{it} denote the amount contributed by player i at the end of period t . Then we can represent the state of the game in period t by a vector

$$x_t = (x_{At}, x_{Bt}, x_{Ct}) \in \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\}.$$

The fact that the players' decisions are irreversible implies that $x_{it+1} \geq x_{it}$ for each player i ; or, in vector notation, $x_{t+1} \geq x_t$. The initial state of the game is defined to be $x_0 = (0, 0, 0)$.

The players' payoffs are functions of the final state of the game $x_3 = (x_{A3}, x_{B3}, x_{C3})$. We assume that the public good is indivisible and costs two tokens to produce. The good is provided if and only if the total contribution is at least two tokens. If the public good is provided, each player receives a payoff equal to two tokens *plus* his initial endowment of one token *minus* his contribution. If the public good is not provided, each player receives a payoff equal to his initial endowment *minus* his contribution. Then the payoff of player i is denoted by $u_i(x_3)$ and defined by

$$u_i(x_3) = \begin{cases} 2 + (1 - x_{i3}) & \text{if } X \geq 2 \\ 1 - x_{i3} & \text{if } X < 2, \end{cases}$$

where $X \equiv x_{A3} + x_{B3} + x_{C3}$ denotes the total contribution at the end of the game. Note that the aggregate endowment and the aggregate value of the public good are greater than its cost, so that provision of the good is always feasible and efficient. However, as will be shown below, the coordination problem cannot necessarily be solved if each player has imperfect information about the actions of players in the same network.

To complete the description of the game, we have to specify the information available to each player. The information structure is represented by a directed graph or network. The network architecture is common knowledge. A player i can observe the actions of another player j , if and only if there is a directed edge leading from player i to player j . If player i can observe player j then i will know, at the beginning of period $t + 1$, the history of j 's contributions up to period t .

The seven networks we study are illustrated in Figure 1 above and are used as treatments in the experimental design. Each of these networks has a different architecture, a different set of equilibria, and different implications for the play of the game. The games defined by the networks possess multiple equilibria, so theoretical analysis alone does not tell us which outcomes are likely to be observed; for that we need experimental data. Nonetheless, thinking about the equilibrium set does help us make some intuitive guesses about which outcomes might “stand out” or “suggest themselves” to human subjects. To illustrate the implications for equilibrium behavior of the different networks and information structures, we consider a series of theoretical examples of the underlying game. We begin with the empty network, which serves mainly as a benchmark to which the other networks can be compared.

3.2 The empty network

In the empty network, no player can observe any other player. Although a player can make his contribution in any of the three periods, the fact that no one receives any information in any period makes the timing of the decision irrelevant. This game is essentially the same as the one-shot game in which all players make simultaneous, binding decisions. More precisely, for each equilibrium of the one-shot game, there is a set of equilibria of the dynamic game that have the same outcome (probability distribution over the vector x_3). Conversely, for every equilibrium of the dynamic game, there is an equilibrium of the one-shot game with the same outcome (probability distribution over the vector x_1).

The one-shot game has multiple equilibria: There are three pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which two players contribute and one does not and the good is provided with probability one. To see that this is an equilibrium strategy profile, note that the players who contribute would be worse off choosing not to contribute (since the public good would not be provided) and the one player who does not contribute would be worse off contributing

(since his contribution would not increase the provision of the public good). Conversely, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which no player contributes and the good is not provided. Obviously, if a player thinks that no one else will contribute, it is not optimal for him to contribute. Finally, the one-shot game possesses a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium where each player contributes with probability $1/2$ because each player is indifferent between contributing and not contributing.¹

Each of the equilibria of the one-shot game has its counterpart in the dynamic game. For example, consider the pure-strategy equilibrium in which A and B contribute and C does not. In the dynamic game A and B can choose different periods in which to contribute or even randomize over periods. But as long as they contribute with probability one before the end the game, their strategies constitute an equilibrium of the dynamic game. Theory alone cannot provide convincing guesses about which of these multiple equilibria will occur.

3.3 The one-link network

In the empty network all players are symmetrically situated. Adding one link to the empty network creates a simple asymmetry among the three players. Now A can observe B 's past contributions and condition his own decision on what B does, while B and C observe nothing. The addition of a single link eliminates one of the equilibrium outcomes present in the empty network. The pure-strategy sequential equilibrium with zero provision is not an equilibrium in the one-link network. To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium in which no one contributes and consider what happens if B deviates from this equilibrium strategy and contributes in period 1. At the beginning of period 2, A knows that B has contributed and he knows that C does not know this. Then A knows that C will not contribute (C believes he is in the original equilibrium) and it is a dominant strategy for A to contribute. Anticipating this response, B will contribute before the final period of the game, thus upsetting the equilibrium.

The remaining equilibria of the one-shot game have their counterparts in the dynamic game with the one-link network (as well as in dynamic games

¹Positive provision of the good in equilibrium depends crucially on the fact that each contributing player is *pivotal* in the sense that, *at the margin*, his contribution is necessary and sufficient for provision (see, Bagnoli and Lipman, 1992 and Andreoni, 1998).

with two-link networks, discussed below). These equilibria can be implemented if players simply wait until the final period and then use the strategies from the one-shot game. In addition to these simple replications of the one-shot equilibria, there are variations in which the players choose to contribute in different periods or randomize their strategies. Nevertheless, the salient feature of the one-link network is the fact that A observes B . Therefore, although there are many sequential equilibria, those in which B contributes first and A contributes after observing B contribute, seem salient. Whether or not we observe equilibrium play in the laboratory, the natural asymmetry suggests that A has an incentive to delay in order to observe whether B contributes and, conversely, B has an incentive to commit in order to encourage a contribution by A .

3.4 The two-links networks

The two-links networks can each be obtained by adding a single link to the one-link network. Each of these networks has a variety of sequential equilibria, but all of them are characterized by a positive probability of the provision of the public good. Besides the one-link network, the line network is the only network where all players are asymmetrically situated. The difference between the line and the one-link networks is that B can now observe C . As a result, A is now forced to make inferences about what B has observed, which makes the reasoning required to identify the optimal strategy quite subtle. As in the one-link network, there is an incentive for one player to contribute in order to encourage the player observing him, but there are two possible pairs that can do this: either B contributes first to encourage A or C contributes first to encourage B . Both possibilities are consistent with equilibrium. Among others, there are pure-strategy equilibria in which B contributes first, A contributes second and C does not contribute. There are also pure-strategy equilibria in which C contributes first, B contributes second and A does not contribute. Hence, the asymmetry alone cannot fully identify which of the many equilibria are likely to emerge.

In the other two-link networks, two players are symmetrically situated, which may intensify the coordination problem. In the star-out network, A is the center of the star and observes the behavior of the two peripheral players, B and C , while the peripheral players observe nothing. For A , it is weakly dominant to wait until the last period of the game to see whether his contribution is necessary to provide the public good. For B and C , there is a

tension between their desire to contribute in order to encourage A and the desire to be a free rider and let the other peripheral player contribute. It is only necessary for one of the peripheral players, B or C , to encourage A . If both contribute, there is no need for A to contribute at all. The tension between encouragement and free-riding presents B and C with a coordination problem. In general, mis-coordination can result in either *under-contribution*, where total contribution is less than two tokens and the good is not provided, or *over-contribution*, where the total contribution is strictly greater than the cost of the good. In the star-out network, over-contribution is less likely to occur, since player A will not contribute if he sees both B and C contribute. Under-contribution may well occur, however, since B and C might each expect the other to contribute.

The star-in network is like the preceding one, but with the direction of the edges reversed. Now A observes nothing and is observed by B and C . A has an opportunity to encourage contribution by B and C , but this puts B and C in a quandary. Only one of them needs to contribute. Which one should it be? Alternatively, A might feel that if he refuses to contribute, it will be common knowledge and the two peripheral players will be forced to contribute. Either way, the difficulty of coordinating when neither peripheral player can observe the other may result in a coordination failure, leading either to over-contribution or under-contribution. Finally, in the pair network, A and B observe each other, while C neither observes nor is observed by A and B . This network is obtained by adding the edge leading from B to A to the one-link network. This may cause a kind of coordination problem which is different from those in the star-in and -out networks. Because A and B observe each other, each has an incentive to go first (to encourage the other) and to delay (to see what the other will do). This could result in under-contribution and non-contribution.

3.5 The complete network

In the complete network, all players are symmetrically situated so the coordination problem has no salient solution. This game has a variety of sequential equilibria, but the public good is always provided with positive probability. The pure-strategy equilibria all involve provision of the good with probability one whereas the mixed strategies obviously allow for a positive probability that the good is not provided. CGK conduct a comprehensive theoretical and experimental study of the complete network using a number of examples

that “span” the set of parameters that define the game.

4 Research questions

In this section, we use the equilibrium properties described in the previous section to identify questions that can be explored using the experimental data. Because each of the networks we study has a large number of equilibria, the theory does not make strong predictions. Which of these equilibria is the most plausible and whether equilibrium play is observed in the laboratory are empirical questions. Even if the experimental data do not conform exactly to one of the multiple equilibria, the data may suggest that some equilibria are empirically more relevant than others.

A subject who observes one or more other subjects is called *informed*; otherwise he is called *uninformed*. We have suggested that a subject who is uninformed and observed by one or more other subjects, has an incentive to contribute early in order to encourage the other subjects to contribute. In the one-link network, the subject in position B can contribute early in order to encourage A to contribute. Similarly, in the line network, C can encourage B . In the star-in network A can encourage B and C , and vice-versa in the star-out network. Hence, we are led to the following question:

Question 1 (strategic commitment) *Do subjects who are uninformed and observed by one or more subjects make a contribution early in the game to encourage other subjects to contribute?*

An informed subject has an incentive to delay his contribution until the final period of the game in order to gain information about the contributions of the subjects he observes. In the one-link network, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for the subject in position A to wait to see whether B has contributed. In the line network, A has an incentive to wait until he has observed B contribute, but B has a similar incentive to wait until he has observed C . In the star-out network, A has an incentive to wait until he has observed whether the subjects in position B and C contribute, and vice-versa in the star-in network. This raises the following question:

Question 2 (strategic delay) *Do informed subjects delay their contributions until they have observed another subject contribute?*

When two subjects are symmetrically situated in a network, the symmetry may give rise to coordination problems. In the star-out network, the subjects in positions B and C are symmetrically situated; as a result, each has an incentive to commit early in order to encourage A , but each subject also has an incentive to be a free rider. In the star-in network, B and C are symmetrically situated; as a result, they both have an incentive to delay in order to observe A , but each of them also has an incentive to be a free rider if A contributes. In the pair network, B and C are symmetrically situated; as a result, both have an incentive to commit in order to encourage the other and both have an incentive to delay; the difficulty of deciding who goes first may lead to a coordination failure. This raises our next question:

Question 3 (mis-coordination) *Do subjects who are symmetrically situated in a network have difficulty coordinating on an efficient outcome?*

The first two questions above are based on *local* properties of the networks, that is, on the edges into and out of a particular position. The third question is based on *global* properties. In general, one expects global properties to matter. For example, position C is locally the same in the empty network and the one-link network, but we expect different behavior for a subject in these positions precisely because the network structures differ with respect to positions A and B . This observation can be applied to any pair of networks and leads to the following question:

Question 4 (global properties) *Do subjects who are otherwise similarly situated behave differently in different networks?*

Finally, we raise a question about the relationship between equilibrium and empirical behavior. It is very difficult to establish that subjects are behaving consistently with equilibrium, partly because there are so many equilibria and partly because individual behavior is heterogeneous. However, it is worth asking whether, in some cases, the modal behavior in each position constitutes an equilibrium strategy profile. This raises the following question:

Question 5 (equilibrium behavior) *Does the profile of modal behaviors constitute an equilibrium strategy profile for some networks?*

5 Design and procedures

The experiment was run at the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and at the UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab). The subjects in this experiment were Princeton University and UC Berkeley students. After subjects read the instructions, the instructions were read aloud by an experimental administrator.² Throughout the experiment we ensured anonymity and effective isolation of subjects in order to minimize any interpersonal influences that could stimulate cooperation. Each experimental session lasted about one and a half hours. Payoffs were calculated in terms of tokens and then converted into dollars, where each token was worth \$0.50. A \$10 participation fee and subsequent earnings, which averaged about \$22, were paid in private at the end of the session.

Aside from the network structure, the experimental design and procedures described below are identical to those used by CGK. We studied the seven network architectures depicted in Figure 1 above. The network architecture was held constant throughout a given experimental session. In each session, the network positions were labeled *A*, *B*, or *C*. A third of the subjects were designated type-*A* participants, one third type-*B* participants and one third type-*C* participants. The subject's type, *A*, *B*, or *C*, remained constant throughout the session.

Each session consisted of 25 independent rounds and each round consisted of three decision turns. The following process was repeated in all 25 rounds. Each round started with the computer randomly forming three-person groups by selecting one participant of type *A*, one of type *B* and one of type *C*. The groups formed in each round depended solely upon chance and were independent of the networks formed in any of the other rounds. Each group played a dynamic game consisting of three decision turns.

At the beginning of the game, each participant has an endowment of one token. At the first decision turn, each participant is asked to allocate his tokens to either an *x*-account or a *y*-account. Allocating the token to the *y*-account is irreversible. When every participant in the group has made his decision, each subject observes the choices of the subjects to whom he is connected in his network. This completes the first of three decision turns in the round.

²Sample experimental instructions, including the computer program dialog windows are available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/CGKP_I_A1.pdf.

At the second decision turn, each subject who allocated his token to the x -account is asked to allocate the token between the two accounts. At the end of this period, each subject again observes the choices of the subjects to whom he is connected in his network. This process is repeated in the third decision turn. At each date, the information available to subjects includes the choices they observed at the previous dates.

When the first round ends, the computer informs subjects of their payoffs. The earnings in each round are determined as follows: if subjects contribute at least two tokens to their y -accounts, each subject receives two tokens plus the number of tokens remaining in his x -account. Otherwise, each subject receives the number of tokens in his x -account only. After subjects are informed of their earnings, the second round starts by having the computer randomly form new groups of participants in networks. This process is repeated until all the 25 rounds were completed.

There were three experimental sessions for each network, except for the complete network which is thoroughly studied by CGK. For each network treatment, two small sessions (1 and 2) comprising 12, 15, 18, or 21 subjects were run at Princeton and one large sessions (3) comprising 27, 33, or 36 subjects was run at Berkeley. The three sessions for each treatment were identical except for the number of subjects and the *labeling* of the nodes of the graphs, which we changed in order to see whether the labels were salient (and as far as we could tell, they were not). Overall, the experiments provide us with a very rich dataset. The diagram below summarizes the experimental design and the number of observations in each treatment (the entries have the form a / b where a is the number of subjects and b the number of observations per game).

Session	Networks						
	Empty	One-link	Line	Star-out	Star-in	Pair	Complete
1	12 / 100	15 / 125	15 / 125	18 / 150	15 / 125	18 / 150	--
2	15 / 125	12 / 100	21 / 175	15 / 125	15 / 125	12 / 100	--
3	33 / 275	27 / 225	36 / 300	36 / 300	36 / 300	36 / 300	33 / 275
Total	60 / 500	54 / 450	72 / 600	69 / 575	66 / 550	66 / 550	33 / 275

6 Results

In this section, we present the experimental results. To organize the results, we draw a distinction between two types of analysis.

- We begin our analysis with a purely descriptive overview of some important features of the experimental data, concerning the provision of the public good and the efficiency of the contribution level. Sufficient statistics for these two properties are the contribution rates in the various network treatments. In this stage of the analysis we are interested in describing the data rather than providing a formal test of predictions or of equilibrium behavior. The experiment was not designed to compare aggregate behavior across network treatments, and the multiplicity of equilibria makes such comparative static properties scarce.
- We then move to a non-parametric analysis of the relationship between the strategic behavior suggested by our discussion of the theory (in the form of strategic commitment, strategic delay, and mis-coordination) and the data. The analysis is mainly focused on qualitative shifts in subjects' behavior resulting from changes in the network architecture. In particular, we want to see whether the implications of the theory are reflected in subjects' behavior and to uncover discrepancies between the data and the predictions of any equilibrium.

Our analysis pools the data from all rounds of all sessions. Broadly speaking, the data from the experiments at Princeton and the data from the experiments at Berkeley present a qualitatively similar picture, with some relatively small differences across subject pools in some networks. We discuss the robustness of these results to subject pools, individual behavior, and learning effects later in this section.

6.1 Overview

The top panel of Table 1 reports the total contribution rates across networks. From these data we can immediately infer the provision rates and the efficiency of contributions. Efficiency depends on the total number of contributions, not just the provision rate. More precisely, inefficiency can arise from under-contribution ($X < 2$) and from over-contribution ($X > 2$). In order to highlight the differences in efficiency across networks, we tabulate the rates

of under-contribution, efficient contribution ($X = 2$), and over-contribution. In the bottom panel of Table 1, the average total contributions from each pair of networks are compared using the Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank-sum test. In the last column, the provision rate in each network is compared to the empty network.³

[Table 1 here]

In Table 1, significant differences in subjects' behavior can be identified across the different networks. The highest provision rate (0.762) is observed in the star-out network and the smallest (0.518) is observed in the empty network. The empty network is isomorphic to the one-shot game in which players choose their strategies simultaneously. The provision rate in the symmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game is $1/2$, which is similar to the empirical provision rate in the empty network.

There are also considerable variations in efficiency across networks. The star-out network is the most efficient (0.687), whereas the empty (0.420) and pair (0.450) networks are the least efficient. In all networks, the public-good provision rate is significantly higher than in the empty network. This suggests that there is something about the structure of some networks that allows subjects to coordinate efficiently. We return to this question later.

The highest rate of under-contribution is observed in the empty network (0.482). Again, the predicted under-contribution rate in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game is $1/2$, which is similar to the empirical under-contribution rate in the empty network. The highest over-contribution rate (0.202) is found in the one-link network, which also has a high under-contribution rate (0.336). We also observe high under-contribution and over-contribution rates in the pair network (0.415 and 0.142), which appears to indicate a mis-coordination problem, discussed further later in the paper. The complete network in which each subject can observe the other two subjects also has high under-contribution and over-contribution rates (0.302 and 0.193). Thus, subject behavior is *not* more efficient in the

³These tests assume independence, which would be satisfied, for example, if the subjects in a given session use identical mixed strategies. If there is heterogeneity among subjects, however, the outcomes of games in which the same subjects appear will not be independent. This biases the standard errors downwards, increasing the likelihood of finding a significant treatment effect. There is no simple adjustment to the standard test that will take care of the possible dependence so we have used the null of independence while recognizing that it may not be satisfied in this case.

complete network, which highlights the central role of the network architecture in solving the coordination problem.

Next, Table 2 presents the timing of contributions across network positions. Recall that a subject in a position where he can observe other positions is called *informed*; otherwise, he is called *uninformed*. Also, a subject is called *observed* if he is in a position where he is observed by another position; otherwise, he is called *unobserved*. The contribution rates are defined as the ratio of the number of contributions to the number of uncommitted subjects, i.e., the number of subjects who still have a token to contribute. We sometimes refer to these as *conditional* contribution rates. The number in parentheses in each cell represents the number of uncommitted subjects (subjects who have an endowment left for contribution). The last column of Table 2 reports total contribution rates.

[Table 2 here]

For uninformed-and-observed subjects (top panel), most contributions were made in the first period. The tendency of uninformed subjects to make early contributions is found in all networks, but the contribution rates in the first period and the total contribution rates vary considerably across networks and positions. For informed subjects (middle panels), by contrast, there is a general tendency to delay, especially if they are unobserved. For example, the modal behavior of subjects in position *B* of the line network is to contribute in the second period. Given the early contribution behavior of position-*C* subjects in this network, this indicates that position-*B* subjects delay their contribution until they observe that *C* has contributed. Finally, the uninformed-and-unobserved subjects (bottom panel) in the one-link and pair networks maintained low contribution rates across the three periods of the game, but they are much more likely to contribute in the Berkeley data than in the Princeton data (see Section 6.7).

In the remainder of this section, we use the experimental data to explore the questions that we identified in Section 4. The analyses focus on the evolution of contributions over time in the different network treatments. This allows us to identify further qualitative shifts in subjects' behavior resulting from changes in the network architecture. In particular, we investigate whether the qualitative features of equilibrium match the data and discuss the implications of the data for equilibrium selection. Throughout, we attempt to explain the experimental data using a single class of equilibria. To

this end, as a working hypothesis, we assume that all players are fully rational and symmetric, and we do not allow for the possibility that different equilibria are played in different instances of the same game.

6.2 Strategic commitment

Result 1 (strategic commitment) *There is a strong tendency for subjects who are uninformed and observed by others to contribute early. Specifically, subjects in positions B (one-link), C (line), and A (star-in) exhibit strategic commitment. This effect is strongest for position C (line) and is associated with a high level of efficiency in that network.*

In Section 3, we suggested that an uninformed-and-observed subject has an incentive to make an early contribution in order to encourage others to contribute. In particular, subjects occupying positions B (one-link), C (line), and A (star-in) should contribute in the first period according to this reasoning. In contrast, the uninformed-and-observed subjects occupying positions B (star-out) and C (star-out) face a coordination problem that complicates the analysis of incentives for strategic commitment. We return to them later.

The support for Result 1 comes from Figure 2 (below), which shows the frequencies of contributions across time by *uncommitted* subjects occupying position B (one-link), C (line), and A (star-in). We also include subjects in position B (line). This position is different from the others included in Figure 2, because it is both observed by position A and observes position C . Thus, in the line network, subjects in position B may be torn between the incentive to contribute early and the incentive to delay.

The number above each bar in the histogram represents the number of observations. The histograms in Figure 2 show that subjects in positions B (one-link), C (line), and A (star-in) all exhibit a tendency toward early contributions, but the actual contribution rates vary. Most noticeably, C (line) has a higher contribution rate than the other two positions – the contribution rate in the first period is 0.657 for C (line), whereas the corresponding rates for B (one-link) and A (star-in) are 0.578 and 0.571, respectively – but the differences are not statistically significant.⁴

⁴Where appropriate, we test for the difference of means by estimating probit and logit models that account for the statistical dependence of observations caused by the repeated appearance of the same subjects in our sample.

[Figure 2 here]

The high contribution rate for C (line) is another reflection of the greater efficiency of the line network. Given the strategic commitment of C (line), we note that subjects in position B (line) have more in common with informed subjects than with subjects who are uninformed and observed: most subjects in position B (line) contribute in the second and third periods, although there are a few subjects contributing in the first period. Another interesting feature of the data is the similarity of the contribution rates at positions B (one-link) and A (star-in). Unlike B (one-link), A (star-in) may have an incentive to delay if he thinks that he can signal to B (star-in) and C (star-in) that he is determined to be a free rider and force the other two to contribute. Thus, coordination in the star-in network would appear to be more difficult than in the one-link network. The fact that efficiency is higher in the star-in network than in the one-link network (0.500 versus 0.452) supports this conclusion. Nonetheless, we observe very similar contribution rates at the two positions and similar provision rates in the two networks.

6.3 Strategic delay

Result 2 (strategic delay) *There is strong evidence of strategic delay by informed subjects. In particular, subjects at position A (one-link), B (line), and A (star-out), tend to delay their decisions until another subject has contributed.*

As we argued in Section 3, informed subjects have an incentive to delay making a decision to contribute until they observe that another subject has contributed. According to this argument, subjects in positions A (one-link), A and B (line), and A (star-out) should exhibit strategic delay. Informed subjects in positions A , B and C (complete), B and C (star-in), and A and B (pair) also have an incentive to delay but, because of the symmetry of these positions in their respective network structures, the incentive to delay is confounded with the coordination problem. For this reason, we deal with these positions separately in the following section.

The support for Result 2 comes from Figure 3 below. For the network positions of interest here, we present the subjects' contribution rates, conditional on their information states. The information state is 1 if a contribution has been observed and is 0 otherwise. The number above each bar of the

histogram represents the number of observations. There is a strong incidence of strategic delay for subjects in positions A (one-link), B (line) and A (star-out) where observing a contribution significantly increases the subject's contribution rate. By contrast, the contribution rates for position A (line) are low in both states. This suggests that the behavior of subjects in position A (line) can be best described as free riding. But note that given the tendency of subjects in positions B and C (line) to contribute, the behavior of position- A subjects is optimal and efficient.

[Figure 3 here]

6.4 Mis-coordination

Result 3 (mis-coordination) *There is evidence of coordination failure in networks where two subjects, such as B and C (star-out, star-in) and A and B (pair), are symmetrically situated. Coordination failure explains the majority of inefficient outcomes in the star-out, star-in and pair networks.*

We have delayed the discussion of positions B and C (star-out, star-in) and A and B (pair), because they involve a coordination problem that complicates the analysis of incentives for strategic delay and strategic commitment. The common feature of these pairs of positions is that they are symmetrically situated in their respective networks. In the star-out network, B and C have an incentive to encourage A but, at the same time, they have an incentive to be free riders and let the other encourage A . In the star-in network, B and C have an incentive to delay in order to see whether A contributes but, once A has contributed, they have an incentive to be free riders and let the other provide the public good. In the pair network, A and B have both an incentive to encourage the other and an incentive to delay. This conflict may lead to inefficient outcomes. From the same reason, the symmetry of the complete network architecture makes it difficult for subjects to coordinate their contributions to the provision of the public good. In fact, there is no salient solution to the coordination problem in the complete network. We next investigate the coordination problem in the star-out, star-in and pair networks. We begin with the star-out network.

6.4.1 The star-out network

We first investigate the coordination problem by revisiting the efficiency results presented in Table 1 above. The star-out network has the lowest rate of over-contribution (0.078) among all networks. This result is not surprising. Subjects in position A play the role of a central coordinator in the star-out network. The position- A subject waits to see whether the peripheral positions, B and C , contribute and only contributes himself, if necessary, in the last period. It is less obvious how much of the under-contribution rate (0.238) is attributable to mis-coordination between B and C . To answer this question, Figure 4 depicts the total contributions made by subjects in positions B and C in each period. The numbers $\frac{a}{b}$ above each bar of the histogram represents the rates of (a) under-contribution and (b) over-contribution after this state the game.

[Figure 4 here]

It is interesting that the frequency of no contribution by subjects in positions B and C during the first two periods (0.205) is quite close to the rate of under-contribution (0.238). This suggests that the under-contribution outcomes in the star-out network are mainly caused by a coordination failure between position- B and position- C subjects. We can check this by focusing on the 118 (out of 575) games in which neither B nor C contributed by the end of the second period. The public good was provided in only four of those games. This implies that 83.2% ($= 0.198/0.238$) of the total under-contribution rate is attributable to a failure by subjects in positions B and C to coordinate their contributions.

6.4.2 The star-in network

In the star-in network, we distinguish two types of coordination failures, one that occurs when position- A subjects contribute first and one that occurs when they try to free ride. We divide the sample according to the timing of contributions of position- A subjects, and re-calculate the efficiency results. The new results are presented in Figure 5 below. The numbers represent the total number of observations. One interesting feature of the data presented in Figure 5 is that, even when the subjects in position A contribute in the first two periods, the under- and over-contribution rates are relatively high (0.188 and 0.241, respectively) purely because of a coordination failure between the

subjects in positions B and C . On the other hand, when position- A subjects do not contribute, the under-contribution rate is very high (0.822), which strongly suggests that the coordination between B and C becomes more difficult when A does not contribute. Of course, the failure to coordinate depends on A 's refusal to commit, so this could be interpreted as a failure of A to coordinate with B and C . In any case, the under-contribution rate when position- A subjects do not contribute is much higher than the under-contribution rate in the benchmark empty network (0.482).

[Figure 5 here]

6.4.3 The pair network

In the pair network, the salient solution to the coordination problem is for A and B to contribute. According to this hypothesis, under-contribution should be attributed to coordination failure between the subjects in positions A and B , whereas over-contribution is attributable to contributions from subjects isolated in position C . In order to investigate the coordination failure between subjects in positions A and B , we simply compute the relative frequency that subjects in positions A and B fail to contribute two tokens. This turns out to be surprisingly high (0.418). The uncoordinated contributions of position- C subjects sometimes lead to over-contribution and sometimes compensate for under-contribution by subjects in positions A and B . On average, as one would expect, these contributions have no effect on efficiency. In fact, the under-contribution rate (0.415) is almost identical to the frequency of under-contribution by subjects in positions A and B . So we can argue that under-contribution in the pair network is driven by the coordination failure between subjects in positions A and B . Over-contribution, on the other hand, is clearly the result of uncoordinated contributions by position- C subjects.

6.5 Global properties

Result 4 (global properties) *There is strong evidence that the global properties of the networks, as well as the local properties, are important determinants of subjects' behavior. One example is the behavior of isolated subjects in the empty, one-link and pair networks.*

Strategic interaction between subjects is often influenced by the local properties of the networks, that is, by the links into and out of a particular position. On the other hand, there are instances where the global properties of the network have a large influence on the behavior of subjects. One easy test of the importance of global properties is a comparison of the behavior of isolated subjects, that is, uninformed-and-unobserved subjects in positions A , B , or C (empty), C (one-link), and C (pair). These positions have no inward or outward links, so if only the local properties matter, the behavior of the subjects in these positions should be identical in all three networks. However, we observe considerable differences in contributions across the three networks at both the aggregate level and the individual level. From the last column of Table 2 above, the contribution rate in the empty network is significantly higher than that of subjects in positions C (one-link) and C (pair) (0.513 compared to 0.367 and 0.369, respectively), although the empirical provision rates in these positions in the Berkeley data are very similar (see Section 6.7).

Next, we compare the patterns of contribution behavior of subjects in positions A and B (one-link) with either positions A and B (line) or B and C (line). It is interesting to observe how subjects' behavior changes as the result of one additional link from B to C . In Figures 2 and 3 above, we observe that subjects in position C (line) have qualitatively the same behavior as the subjects in position B (one-link), since in both positions subjects make their contribution in the first period. Similarly, subjects in position B (line) exhibit strategic delay just as subjects in position A (one-link) do. Nonetheless, the efficiency of the line network is at least as high as the efficiency of the one-link network, even though the presence of two informed positions, A and B , and two observed positions, B and C , in the line network suggests the possibility of coordination problems.

6.6 Equilibrium

Result 5 (equilibrium) *The modal behavior of subjects in the one-link, line and star-out networks corresponds to what some equilibria would predict. In addition, there are considerable differences in the modal behavior of subjects in these networks, indicating that different equilibria might be plausible or salient.*

Because of the large number of equilibria in the games we studied, the theory does not have much to say about the kinds of behavior we should expect to see in the laboratory. Instead, we have emphasized the usefulness of experimental data for identifying which equilibria might be plausible or salient. Now we consider three cases in which the subjects' behavior approximates a salient equilibrium.

One has to be very careful in making claims that individual subjects are playing equilibrium strategies. Given the multiplicity of equilibria and the heterogeneity of individual behavior, it is unlikely that all subjects coordinate on a single equilibrium. The most that we can claim is that the modal behavior of the subjects bears a striking resemblance to a particular equilibrium, while noting that there are substantial deviations from equilibrium play on the part of some subjects. We have already alluded to the coordination problems found in the pair and star-in networks. We will thus not attempt to reconcile subjects' behavior in these networks with equilibrium behavior. Instead, we focus on the one-link, line, and star-out networks. We begin by considering the line network.

6.6.1 The line network

In the line network, the degree of coordination reflected by the efficiency of outcomes appears to be very high. The frequencies of contributions in different positions and information states are tabulated in Table 3. The states 0 and 1 in the table refer to the number of contributions observed by subjects in positions A and B in periods 2 and 3. Note that in order to reduce the number of states, we pool the data corresponding to a given number of contributions, regardless of when the contributions were made. The number in parentheses in each cell represents the number of observations.

[Table 3 here]

The first thing to note is the high contribution rate (0.657) of subjects in position C in period 1. Secondly, subjects in position B contribute mainly after they observe a contribution by the subject in position C . More precisely, the contribution rate in position B , conditional on observing no contribution by C , is 0.120 in period 2 and 0.333 in period 3. By contrast, the contribution rate in position B , conditional on observing a contribution by C , is 0.542 in period 2 and 0.506 in period 3. Finally, the total contribution rate by subjects

in position A is only 0.267. This regularity suggests (an equivalence class of) equilibria in which C contributes in period 1, B contributes after observing C contribute, and A does not contribute at all. There are deviations from this equilibrium pattern, notably the contributions by subjects in position B when they have not observed any contribution by the subject in position C . But these deviations are not large and the behaviors of subjects in positions C and A are quite close to those predicted by this class of equilibria. Finally, we note that the overall behavioral tendencies predicted by this class of equilibria are more closely replicated in the Princeton experimental data. In fact, the relative frequencies of contributions in the last two periods are surprisingly close to the corresponding equilibrium predictions (see Section 6.7).

There are some interesting cases in the data where subjects deviate from the suggested equilibrium behavior. In period 2, position- A subjects are much more likely to contribute if they observe that the subject in position B has contributed in period 1, that is, before he can observe the subject in position C contribute. Subjects in position A may have reasoned that this behavior was intended to encourage them to contribute and, in any case, preempts any possible revelation of the behavior of the subject in position C . Given the high probability that subjects in position C contribute in period 1, such reasoning by subjects is faulty, but it is interesting nonetheless. In period 3, we notice that subjects in position A are less likely to contribute if the subject in position B has contributed in periods 1 or 2; most of these observations are cases in which B contributed in period 2, thus signaling an earlier contribution by C . These observations suggest some rationality, even if they do not correspond exactly to the proposed equilibrium.

6.6.2 The star-out network

The next case we consider is the star-out network. The frequencies of contributions in different positions and information states are summarized in Table 4 below. The states 0, 1, and 2 refer to the number of contributions observed by subjects in positions A and B in periods 2 and 3. Again, in order to reduce the number of states, we pool the data corresponding to different histories that lead to the same information state. The number in parentheses in each cell represents the number of observations.

[Table 4 here]

Here we see a good illustration of strategic delay by position-*A* subjects: out of 575 observations, there are only 119 contributions in the first two periods, of which 55 (46.2% of the time) occur in period 2 after one of the peripheral subjects in positions *B* or *C* has contributed. Although further delay would be optimal, the deviation from rational behavior seems small. By contrast, subjects in positions *B* and *C* have an incentive to contribute early to encourage the subject in position *A*, and on average they contribute in the first two periods 51% of the time. In the last period, their contribution rate falls precipitously to 0.066. The patterns here suggest (an equivalence class of) equilibria in which *B* and *C* contribute in the first two periods with probability 1/2 and contribute with probability 0 in the last period, while *A* waits until the last period and contributes only if he observes exactly one contribution by *B* or *C* in the preceding periods.

Also notice that the timing of contributions by the subjects in positions *B* and *C* matters only to the extent that the total probability of contribution in the first two periods must be 1/2 in equilibrium; the contribution probability in *individual* periods is immaterial. Thus, the fact that subjects contribute in one of the two periods with probability 0.510 is what matters; the contribution rates in period 1 and in period 2 are irrelevant. Position-*A* subjects match the prescribed behavior very closely in period 1 and period 3. Only in period 2 is there a significant deviation. In three cases, subjects in position *A* contributed in period 2 after observing two contributions in the previous period. The numbers are very small and should be attributed to the ‘trembling hand.’

6.6.3 The one-link network

Next, we consider the one-link network. Table 5 below summarizes the frequencies of contributions in different positions and information states in the one-link network. The number in parentheses in each cell represents the number of observations. Note that conditional on observing the subject in position *B* contribute, the contribution rates of subjects in position *A* are 0.359 and 0.456 in periods 2 and 3, respectively. It appears that subjects are randomizing, but the contribution rate of subjects in position *C* (0.367) is too low to make subjects indifferent between contributing and not contributing. Likewise, when subjects in position *A* do not observe the subject in position *B* contribute, it cannot be optimal for them to randomize in periods 2 and 3: the contribution rates of subjects in position *C* and subjects in position

B in period 3 are too low.

[Table 5 here]

In conclusion, the data summarized in Table 5 are mixed, with several features that are difficult to reconcile with equilibrium behavior. By analogy with our findings in the line network, one might expect the salient equilibrium to be one in which B contributes first, A contributes after observing B contribute, and C never contributes. The bare facts appear inconsistent with this prediction. Overall, the isolated subjects in position C contribute on average 0.367 of the time. Similarly, subjects in position A contribute 0.233 of the time *without* having observed a contribution by the subject in position B . Even when they have observed a contribution by the subject in position B , the contribution rate of subjects in position A is only 0.406. One anomaly here appears to be the contribution behavior of subjects in position C . Since they can neither observe nor be observed, they have no ability to coordinate and yet they make a significant number of contributions. Since subjects learn the outcome of the game at the end of each round, subjects in position A may become aware of the contribution behavior of subjects in position C and decide to free ride to some extent.

What cannot be ascertained from the information given in Table 5 is whether these anomalies are endemic or caused by a few subjects. To pursue this question, it is necessary to investigate behavior at an individual level. The failure to match the predictions of the salient equilibrium cannot be blamed entirely on a couple of outliers. A study of individual behavior in the one-link network shows that the failure to match the predictions of the salient equilibrium cannot be blamed entirely on a couple of outliers. In most experiments, there is evidence of heterogeneity among subjects and this experiment is no different – some subjects have an above-average tendency to contribute to the public good and some are very unwilling to contribute. At any rate, whatever the explanation, it is hard to argue that the average behavior of subjects in position A is optimal.

6.6.4 The complete, star-in and pair networks

Overall, the preceding analysis of the line, star-out and one-line networks suggests that the salient equilibria we identify account for much of the large-scale features of the data. The picture is somewhat different for the complete, star-in, and pair networks.

In the complete network, where all subjects are symmetrically situated, there is no salient equilibrium, in the sense we have used the term. CGK investigate the complete network, using a set of parameter profiles (E, K, T, V) that allow them to test the robustness of the results to changes in individual parameters. The basic regularities from the CGK experiments are that the theory can account for the behavior observed in the laboratory in most of the treatments, and that several key features of the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium are replicated in the data.

In the star-in network, as noted before, we observe two kinds of coordination failures, due to the difficulty of position- A subjects (the center of the star) to coordinate with the subjects in positions B and C (the two peripheral subjects). One such difficulty arises if the position- A subject contributes first; because the subjects in positions B and C are symmetrically situated, it results in a game of chicken between those two. The other kind of coordination failure arises when the position- A subject fails to contribute.

The pair network is one case where the apparently salient equilibria do not capture the actual behavior of subjects in practice. The data indicate that this arises for two reasons: first, the isolated subjects in position C contribute a significant amount, even though it is impossible for them to coordinate their actions with the other subjects; second, subjects in positions A and B , where coordination is possible in theory, fail to coordinate in practice, possibly because of the significant contribution pattern of the position- C subjects.

For the sake of completeness, Tables 6, 7, and 8 below tabulate the frequencies of contributions in the complete star-in, and pair networks, respectively.

[Table 6 here]

[Table 7 here]

[Table 8 here]

6.7 Robustness

We next turn to a finer analysis of the data by breaking the data down by subject pool. Overall, the data from the experiments at Princeton and the data from the experiments at Berkeley present a qualitatively similar picture. The differences are restricted to the behavior of isolated subjects (uninformed-and-unobserved) in the one-link and pair networks and the behavior of subjects

in the line network. The behavior of the isolated subjects in the one-link and pair networks does not affect the modal behavior in these networks, and so we draw the same conclusions from both subject pools separately as from the pooled analysis.

The differences between the Princeton and Berkeley data are more substantial in the line network. In the first decision turn, the position-*A* subjects are more likely to contribute (0.173) and the position-*C* subjects are less likely to contribute (-0.320) in the Berkeley data than in the Princeton data. These differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.⁵ There is also a marginally significant difference in the second decision turn, where position-*B* subjects in the Berkeley sample are less likely to contribute (-0.318) if they observe a contribution by a position-*C* subject. Finally, in the third decision turn, both position-*A* and position-*B* subjects are more likely to contribute (0.153 and 0.275, respectively) if they have not observed a contribution in the Berkeley sample as compared to the Princeton sample.

Both of these findings suggest that in the line network the subjects in the Berkeley sample developed different expectations about the actions of the other subjects in the same network, and this seems to lead them to converge in the direction of a different equilibrium. As we have argued, it is not clear to us which of two equilibria is the more salient, the one in which the *A* and *B* contribute or the one in which *B* and *C* contribute. Perhaps it is not surprising that we do not get a clear answer from both samples. There was also more coordination failure in the Berkeley data – the efficiency ($X = 2$) of the line network in the Berkeley sample was 0.487 compared to 0.653 the Princeton sample. Apart from the differences in the line network, we observe the same regularities in both subject pools, which gives us some confidence that our conclusions are robust.

When we look at the other networks, only few quantitative differences in contribution rates are significant and none change the main findings from the full analysis of the pooled data. One of these quantitative differences is that the isolated subjects in the one-link and pair networks are more likely to contribute in the Berkeley data than in the Princeton data. In the empty network, where all subjects are uninformed and unobserved, the contribution rate is higher, though not significantly so, in the Princeton data than in the

⁵To estimate the size and significance of the subject pool effects, we ran probit regressions of the empirical averages on a campus dummy with cluster-robust standard errors. The numbers in brackets are percentage points.

Berkeley data. So it is in the asymmetric situations — where salience would seem to suggest that isolated subjects, who cannot coordinate with the other subjects, should not contribute — that the Berkeley subjects are more likely to contribute. In fact, the contribution rates of the isolated Berkeley subjects in the one-link and the pair networks are similar to the contribution rates of subjects in the empty network. This could suggest an altruistic, non-strategic behavior on the part of the Berkeley subjects though, given the large number of equilibria, there may be other equally plausible explanations.⁶

In the one-link network, there are also significant differences between the Berkeley and Princeton data in the behavior of the subjects in positions *A* and *B*: a lower contribution rate (-0.311) by position-*A* subjects at the second decision turn after observing a contribution and a lower contribution rate (-0.247) by position-*B* subjects at the third decision turn. These lower rates may be a response to the higher contributions by subjects in position *C*. In the pair network, we observe two significant differences: the contribution rates of subjects in positions *A* and *B* in the Berkeley sample are lower at the second and third decision turns (-0.211 and -0.293 , respectively) after observing a contribution. Again, this could be a response to the higher contributions of the isolated subjects at position *C*. These differences are all significant at the 5 percent level.

Finally, in the star-out network we observe a few differences in contribution rates, but the differences are quantitatively small. The Berkeley subjects in position *A* are slightly more likely to contribute (0.107) in the first decision turn. The other differences are explained by the “trembling hand,” the small numbers of contributions made by subjects in position *A* who have already observed two contributions. So both sets of data seem to support our conclusions about salience and equilibrium in the star-out network. Finally, in the star-in network, there are no significant differences between the Berkeley data and the Princeton data.

To examine robustness to learning, we conducted a parallel analysis of the data using only the last 15 rounds of each session. The findings are very similar to the all-round pooled data, with some small improvements in coordination rates over time. We also investigated behavior at the level of the individual subject. Not surprisingly, there is some heterogeneity across

⁶The fact that the isolated subjects in the Berkeley experiments have similar contribution rates in different networks weakens the support for our claim that global as well as local properties of network architecture matter (Result 4), but the claim is supported by the behavior of isolated subjects in the Princeton experiments and by other observations.

subjects. Nevertheless, the choices made by most of our subjects reflect cleanly classifiable strategies which are stable across decision-rounds. As far as we could tell, “session effects” were caused by a few subjects in a session.

7 Conclusion

Our main conclusion is that different network architectures lead to different outcomes in coordination games. Moreover, asymmetry in the network architecture is an important factor in creating the salience of certain strategies that lead to these different outcomes. Asymmetric networks give different roles to different subjects, making their behavior more predictable and aiding the coordination of their actions.⁷ We identify several ways in which this predictability occurs in our data from monotone games. Two persistent types of behavior are *strategic commitment* in some network positions and *strategic delay* in other positions. We observe passivity in some positions, particularly isolated subjects, who can neither observe others’ actions nor have their choices observed by anyone else: such subjects are less likely to contribute. As a result, the structure of observability in the network architecture seems to make certain behaviors – and possibly certain equilibria – salient. The bottom line is that asymmetry gives rise to salience which, in turn, is an aid to predictability and coordination. These regularities do not yet have a rigorous theoretical explanation, of course, but the regularity of our findings suggests an intriguing set of open questions that are ripe for theoretical research.

There is clearly a lot more to be done and the uses of our data set are far from exhausted. We varied the informational network for one specific three-person, three-period voluntary contribution game. The game was chosen because of the richness of the equilibrium set and because observability seemed intuitively to be an important factor in selecting among equilibria. To determine more precisely which factors are important in explaining strategic behavior in dynamic coordination games, it will also be useful to investigate a larger class of games in the laboratory. The methodology and approach we use could be applied to other versions of dynamic coordination games where theory makes weak (or no) predictions about equilibrium selection,

⁷Recent theoretical work about the relationship between symmetries and focal points suggest a possible connection between asymmetries and equilibrium selection. See Alos-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2008).

and observability could plausibly be a critical selection factor.

While the present paper does not propose a specific theoretically-grounded structural model that might be applied to the data, we view that as the key next step to understanding the effect of observational networks in multiplayer coordination games. We attempted to explore the application of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) analysis (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998) of these games, but there were problems of tractability because of the multiplicity of equilibria and bifurcations in the logit equilibrium correspondence. In fact, in the presence of imperfect information and simultaneous moves, even in the case of three-person networks, characterizing the set of QRE is computationally intensive. Another possible approach is to consider models with cognitive hierarchies, such as level- k theory, but the application of these approaches to complex multistage games with repeated play is bedeviled by the problem of specifying the behavior of 0-level type. We hope the results that reported here open up future theoretical and experimental research on these questions. We believe that our approach can be applied to study the role of network architecture in other kinds of games.

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Table 1. The total number of contributions and provision rate by network

Network	Total contributions				Under contribution	Provision
	0	1	2	3		
Empty	0.092	0.390	0.404	0.114	0.482	0.518
One-link	0.071	0.264	0.462	0.202	0.336	0.664
Line	0.087	0.215	0.570	0.128	0.302	0.698
Star-out	0.146	0.092	0.683	0.078	0.238	0.762
Star-in	0.087	0.276	0.462	0.175	0.364	0.636
Pair	0.098	0.316	0.444	0.142	0.415	0.585
Complete	0.076	0.225	0.505	0.193	0.302	0.698

Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank-sum test - under (white) / over (gray)

	Empty	One-link	Line	Star-out	Star-in	Pair	Complete	Provision
Empty	--	0.000	0.469	0.046	0.006	0.179	0.003	--
One-link	0.000	--	0.001	0.000	0.264	0.011	0.756	0.000
Line	0.000	0.243	--	0.005	0.029	0.504	0.013	0.000
Star-out	0.000	0.001	0.015	--	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
Star-in	0.000	0.355	0.026	0.000	--	0.137	0.523	0.000
Pair	0.028	0.011	0.000	0.000	0.084	--	0.059	0.028
Complete	0.000	0.346	0.996	0.048	0.078	0.002	--	0.000

Table 2. The evolution of contributions over time by uninformed and informed types

A. Uninformed and observed					
Network	Position	Period			Contribution rate
		1	2	3	
One-link	<i>B</i>	0.578 (450)	0.432 (190)	0.213 (108)	0.811
Line	<i>C</i>	0.657 (600)	0.121 (206)	0.160 (181)	0.747
Star-out	<i>B, C</i>	0.395 (1150)	0.191 (696)	0.066 (563)	0.543
Star-in	<i>A</i>	0.571 (550)	0.250 (236)	0.175 (177)	0.735
Average		0.517 (2750)	0.225 (1328)	0.117 (1029)	0.669

B. Informed and unobserved					
Network	Position	Period			Contribution rate
		1	2	3	
One-link	<i>A</i>	0.140 (450)	0.248 (387)	0.409 (291)	0.618
Line	<i>A</i>	0.100 (600)	0.046 (540)	0.146 (515)	0.267
Star-out	<i>A</i>	0.096 (575)	0.123 (520)	0.507 (456)	0.609
Star-in	<i>B, C</i>	0.165 (1100)	0.176 (919)	0.266 (757)	0.495
Average		0.132 (2725)	0.147 (2365)	0.310 (2019)	0.489

C. Informed and observed					
Network	Position	Period			Contribution rate
		1	2	3	
Line	<i>B</i>	0.187 (600)	0.406 (488)	0.434 (290)	0.727
Pair	<i>A, B</i>	0.255 (1100)	0.306 (819)	0.283 (568)	0.630
Complete	<i>A, B, C</i>	0.179 (825)	0.260 (677)	0.349 (501)	0.605
Average		0.214 (2525)	0.315 (1984)	0.340 (1359)	0.645

D. Uninformed and unobserved					
Network	Position	Period			Contribution rate
		1	2	3	
Empty	<i>A, B, C</i>	0.351 (1500)	0.084 (973)	0.181 (891)	0.513
One-link	<i>C</i>	0.244 (450)	0.065 (340)	0.104 (318)	0.367
Pair	<i>C</i>	0.265 (550)	0.064 (404)	0.082 (378)	0.369
Average		0.313 (2500)	0.076 (1717)	0.142 (1587)	0.455

() - # of obs.

Table 3. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the line network

		A		B		C
1	State	--		--		--
	Freq.	0.100 (600)		0.187 (600)		0.657 (600)
2	State	0	1	0	1	--
	Freq.	0.023 (444)	0.156 (96)	0.120 (158)	0.542 (330)	0.121 (206)
3	State	0	1	0	1	--
	Freq.	0.204 (250)	0.091 (265)	0.333 (120)	0.506 (170)	0.160 (181)

() - # of obs.

Table 4. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the star-out network

		A			B,C
1	State	--			--
	Freq.	0.096 (575)			0.395 (1150)
2	State	0	1	2	--
	Freq.	0.033 (183)	0.206 (267)	0.043 (70)	0.191 (696)
3	State	0	1	2	--
	Freq.	0.067 (105)	0.894 (246)	0.038 (105)	0.066 (563)

() - # of obs.

Table 5. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the one-link network

		A		B	C
1	State	--		--	--
	Freq.	0.140 (450)		0.578 (450)	0.244 (450)
2	State	0	1	--	--
	Freq.	0.102 (167)	0.359 (220)	0.432 (190)	0.065 (340)
3	State	0	1	--	--
	Freq.	0.294 (85)	0.456 (206)	0.213 (108)	0.104 (318)

() - # of obs.

Table 6. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the complete network

		<i>A,B,C</i>		
1	State	--		
	Freq.	0.179 (825)		
2	State	0	1	2
	Freq.	0.325 (453)	0.126 (206)	0.167 (18)
3	State	0	1	2
	Freq.	0.220 (132)	0.470 (300)	0.072 (69)

() - # of obs.

Table 7. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the star-in network

		<i>A</i>	<i>B,C</i>	
1	State	--	--	
	Freq.	0.571 (550)	0.165 (1100)	
2	State	--	0	1
	Freq.	0.250 (236)	0.101 (397)	0.234 (522)
3	State	--	0	1
	Freq.	0.175 (177)	0.234 (265)	0.283 (492)

() - # of obs.

Table 8. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the pair network

		<i>A,B</i>		<i>C</i>
1	State	--		--
	Freq.	0.255 (1100)		0.265 (550)
2	State	0	1	--
	Freq.	0.295 (614)	0.341 (205)	0.064 (404)
3	State	0	1	--
	Freq.	0.252 (310)	0.322 (258)	0.082 (378)

() - # of obs.

Figure 1: The networks




Figure 2. The frequencies of contributions across time for selected positions




Figure 3. The frequencies of contribution at payoff-relevant states for selected positions




Figure 4. The total contributions across time in the star-out network by subjects in positions *B* and *C*




Figure 5. Efficiency in the star-in network conditional on the timing of contribution of position-A subjects

