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EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

John E. Roemer and Alain Trannoy

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1	"Equality of opportunity""		
2			
3	by		
4	John E. Roemer		
5	and		
6 7	Alain Trannoy		
8	1. Introduction		
9	In the welfarist tradition of social-choice theory, egalitarianism means equality of		
10	welfare or utility ¹ . Conservative critics of egalitarianism rightly protest that it is highly		
11	questionable that this kind of equality is ethically desirable, as it fails to hold persons		
12	responsible for their choices, or for their preferences, or for the way they process		
13	outcomes into some interpersonally comparable currency that one can speak of		
14	equalizing. In political philosophy, beginning with John Rawls (1958, 1971), this		
15	critique was taken seriously, and a new approach to egalitarianism transpired, which		
16	inserted personal responsibility as an important qualifier of the degree of equality that is		
17	ethically desirable. Thus, the development of egalitarian theory,	since Rawls, may be	
18	characterized as an effort to replace equality of outcomes with equ	ality of opportunities,	
19	where opportunities are interpreted in various ways. Metaphors	associated with this	
20	view are 'leveling the playing field,' and 'starting gate equality.'	The main	
21	philosophical contributions to the discussion were, following Rawls, from Amartya Sen		
22	(1980), Ronald Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Richard Arneson (1989) and G.A. Cohen		

^{*} We thank Tony Atkinson, François Bourguignon, Marc Fleurbaey, and Erik Schokkaert for their comments on previous drafts of his chapter.

¹ Welfarism is the view that social welfare (or the social objective function) should be predicated only on the utility levels of individuals; that is, that the only information required to compare social alternatives is that summarized in the utility-possibilities sets those alternatives generate. It is a special case of consequentialism. See chapter 3 for further discussion.

(1989)². The debate is said to be about 'equality of what,' and the philosophical view is
sometimes called 'luck egalitarianism,' a term coined by Elizabeth Anderson (1999).

25 Economists (besides Sen) have been involved in this discussion from 1985 26 onwards. John Roemer (1993, 1998) proposed an algorithm for calculating policies that 27 would equalize opportunities for achievement of a given objective in a population. Marc 28 Fleurbaey and François Maniquet contributed economic proposals beginning in the 29 1990s, and recently summarized in Fleurbaey (2008). Other authors who have 30 contributed to the theory include Walter Bossert (1995, 1997), Vito Peragine (2004), and 31 Dirk Van de gaer (1993). An empirical literature is rapidly developing, calculating the 32 extent to which opportunities for the acquisition of various objectives are unequal in 33 various countries, and whether people hold views of justice consonant with equality of 34 opportunity.

35 There are various ways of summarizing the significance of these developments 36 for the economics of inequality. Prior to the philosophical contributions that ignited the 37 economic literature that is our focus in this chapter, there was an earlier skirmish around 38 the practical import of equalizing opportunities. Just prior to the publication of Rawls's 39 magnum opus (1971), contributions by Arthur Jensen (1969) and Richard Herrnstein 40 (1971) proposed that inequality was in the main due to differential intelligence (IQ), and 41 so generating a more equal income distribution by equalizing opportunities (for instance, 42 through compensatory education of under-privileged children) was a chimera. 43 Economists Samuel Bowles (1973) and John Conlisk (1974) disagreed; Bowles argued 44 that inequality of income was almost all due to unequal opportunities, not to the 45 heritability of IQ. Despite this important debate on the degree to which economic 46 inequality is immutable, prior to Rawls, economists' discussions of inequality were in the 47 main statistical, focusing on the best ways of measuring inequality. 48 The post-Rawls-Dworkin inequality literature changed the focus by pointing out

49 that only some *kinds* of inequality are ethically objectionable, and to the extent that

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² The philosophical literature generated by these pioneers is to large to list here. Booklength treatments that should be mentioned are Rakowski (1993), Van Parijs (1997), and Hurley (2003).

50 economists ignore this distinction, they may be measuring something that is not ethically 51 salient. This distinction between morally acceptable and unacceptable inequality is 52 perhaps the most important contribution of philosophical egalitarian thought of the last 53 From the perspective of social-choice theory, equal-opportunity theory has forty years. 54 sharply challenged the welfarist assumption that is classically ubiquitous, maintaining 55 that more information than final outcomes in terms of welfare is needed to render social 56 judgment about the ranking of alternative policies - in particular, one must know the 57 extent to which individuals are responsible for the outcomes they enjoy -- whether those 58 outcomes were determined by social (and perhaps genetic) factors beyond their control, 59 or not – and this is non-welfare information.

60 One must mention that another major non-welfarist theory of justice, but an 61 inegalitarian one, was proposed by Robert Nozick (1973) who argued that justice could not be assessed by knowing only final outcomes; one had to know the process by which 62 63 these outcomes were produced. His neo-Lockean view, which proposed a theory of the 64 moral legitimacy of private property, can evaluate the justness of final outcomes only by 65 knowing whether the history that produced them was unpolluted by extortion, robbery, 66 slavery, and so on. Simply knowing the distribution of final outcomes (in terms of 67 income, welfare, or whatever) does not suffice to pass judgment on the distribution's 68 moral pedigree. So the period since 1970 has been one in which, in political philosophy, 69 non-welfarist theories flourished, on both the right and left ends of the political spectrum.

70 In this chapter, we begin by summarizing the philosophical debate concerning 71 equality since Rawls (section 2), presenting economic algorithms for computing policies 72 which equalize opportunities – or, more generally, ways of ordering social policies with 73 respect to their efficacy in opportunity equalization (sections 3, 4 and 5), application of 74 the approach to the conceptualization of economic development (section 6), discussion of 75 dynamic issues (section 7), a preamble to a discussion of empirical work (section 8), 76 evidence of population views from surveys and experiments concerning conceptions of 77 equality (section 9), and a discussion of measurement issues, and summary of the 78 empirical literature on inequality of opportunity to date (section 10). We conclude with 79 mention of some critiques of the equal-opportunity approach, and some predictions 80 (section 11).

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82 2. Egalitarian political philosophy since Rawls

83 John Rawls (1958) first published his ideas about equality over fifty years ago, 84 although his magnum opus did not appear until 1971. His goal was to unseat utilitarianism as the ruling theory of distributive justice, and to replace it with a type of 85 86 egalitarianism. He argued that justice requires, after guaranteeing a system which 87 maximizes civil liberties, a set of institutions that maximize the level of 'primary goods' 88 allocated to those who are worst off in society, in the sense of receiving the least amount 89 of these goods. Economists call this principle 'maximin primary goods;' Rawls often 90 called it the difference principle. Moreover, he attempted to provide an argument for the 91 recommendation, based upon construction of a 'veil of ignorance' or 'original position,' 92 which shielded decision makers from knowledge of information about their situations 93 that was 'morally arbitrary,' so that the decision they came to regarding just allocation 94 would be impartial. Thus Rawls's (1971) project was to derive principles of justice from rationality and impartiality. 95

96 Rawls did not advocate maxi-minning utility (even assuming interpersonal utility 97 comparisons were available), but rather maxi-minning (some index of) primary goods. 98 This was, in part, his attempt to embed personal responsibility into the theory. For Rawls, 99 welfare was best measured as the extent to which a person is fulfilling his plan of life: but 100 he viewed the choice of life plan as something up to the individual, which social 101 institutions had no business passing judgment upon. Primary goods were deemed to be 102 those inputs that were required for the success of any life plan, and so equalizing 103 primary-goods bundles across persons (or passing to a maximin allocation which would 104 dominate component-wise an equal allocation) was a way of holding persons responsible 105 for their life-plan choice. The question of how to aggregate the various primary goods 106 into an index that would allow comparison of bundles was never successfully solved by 107 Rawls (and some skeptical economists said that the subjective utility function was the 108 obvious way to aggregate primary goods).

Rawls defended the difference principle by arguing that it would be chosen by
decision makers who were rational, but were deprived of knowledge about their own
situations in the world, to the extent that this knowledge included information about their

physical, social, and biological endowments, which were a matter of luck, and therefore whose distribution Rawls described as morally arbitrary. He named the venue in which these souls would cogitate about justice the 'original position.' In the original position, souls were assumed to know the laws of economics, and to be self-interested. They were, moreover, to be concerned with the allocation of primary goods, because they did not know their life plans, or even the *distribution* of life plans in the actual society. Nor were they to know the *distribution* of physical and biological endowments in society.

119 Here we believe Rawls made a major conceptual error. If the veil of ignorance 120 is intended to shield decision makers from knowledge of aspects of their situations that 121 are morally arbitrary, and only of those aspects, they *should* know their plans of life, 122 which, by hypothesis, are not morally arbitrary, because Rawls deems that persons are 123 responsible for their life plans. Secondly, although a person's *particular* endowment of resources, natural and physical, might well be morally arbitrary (to the extent that these 124 125 were determined by the luck of the birth lottery), the *distribution* of these resources is a 126 fact of nature and society, and should be known by the denizens in the original position, just as they are assumed to know the laws of economics. Therefore, Rawls constructed 127 128 his veil too thickly, on two counts, given his philosophical views.

Given the paucity of information available to the decision makers in the original position, it is not possible to use classical decision theory to solve the problem of the desirable allocation of primary goods. Indeed, the only precise arguments that Rawls gives for the conclusion that the difference principle would be chosen in the original position occur at Rawls (1999[1971], p. 134), and they essentially state that decision makers are extremely risk averse. For example:

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136 The second feature that suggests the maximin rule is the following: the person choosing has a conception of the good such 137 138 that he cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain about 139 the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the maximin rule. It is not worthwhile for him to take a chance 140 141 for the sake of further advantage, especially when it may turn out 142 that he loses much that is important to him. The last provision 143 brings in the third feature, namely, that the rejected alternatives 144 have outcomes one can hardly accept. The situation involves 145 grave risks.

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- But extreme risk aversion, which Rawls here depends upon for his justification ofmaximin, is certainly not an aspect of rationality.
- 149 Thus, despite its enormous influence in political philosophy, Rawls's argument 150 for maximin is marred in two ways: first, its reliance on deducing the principle of justice 151 from the original position was crucially flawed in depriving the denizens of that position 152 of knowledge of features of themselves (life plans) and of the world (the distributions of 153 various kinds of resources, including genetic ones, and ones possessed by families into which a person is born) which were *not* morally arbitrary³, and second, for its assumption 154 155 (despite claims to the contrary by Rawls and others) that decision makers were extremely 156 risk averse. The value of Rawls's contribution is in stating a radical egalitarian position 157 about the injustice of receiving resources through luck – and, in particular, the luck of the 158 birth lottery – and that it shifted the equalisandum from utility to a kind of resource, 159 primary goods. In our view, however, the project of deducing equality or maximin from 160 rationality and impartiality alone was a failure. Indeed, Moreno-Ternero and Roemer 161 (2008) argue that some solidaristic postulate is necessary to deduce maximin or, more 162 generally, to deduce some kind of egalitarianism as the ordering principle for social 163 choice. Although egalitarians might wish to deduce their view from postulates that can 164 garner universal approval (like rationality and impartiality), this is not possible. 165 Therefore, an egalitarian theory of justice cannot have *universal* appeal, if the solidaristic 166 postulate, which we believe necessary, is contentious.

Although Rawls is usually viewed as the most important egalitarian political
philosopher of the twentieth century, one may challenge the claim that his view is
egalitarian: to wit, the just income distribution, for Rawls, allows incentive payments to
the highly skilled in order to elicit their productive activity, even though this produces
inequality. The main philosopher who challenges Rawls's acceptance of incentive-based
income inequality is G.A. Cohen, upon which more below.

³ We reiterate it is the distribution of traits which is a fact of nature, and hence not morally arbitrary, while the endowment of a given individual may well be morally arbitrary, in the sense of being due to luck.

173 In 1981, Ronald Dworkin published two articles that essentially addressed the 174 problems in the Rawlsian argument that we have summarized, although he did not use the 175 Rawlsian language (original position, primary goods). His project was to define a 176 conception of equality that was ethically sound. In the first of these articles, he argued 177 that 'equality of welfare' was not a sound view, mainly because equality of welfare does 178 not hold persons responsible for their preferences. In particular, Dworkin argued that if 179 a person has expensive tastes, and he identifies with those tastes, society does not owe 180 him an additional complement of resources to satisfy them. (The only case of expensive 181 tastes, says Dworkin, that justifies additional resources are those tastes that are addictions 182 or compulsions, tastes with which the person does not 'identify,' and would prefer he did 183 not have.) In the second article, Dworkin argues for 'equality of resources,' where 184 resources include (as for Rawls) aspects of a person's physical and biological 185 environment for which he should not be held responsible (such as those acquired through 186 birth).

187 But how can one 'equalize resources,' when these comprise both transferable 188 goods, like money, and inalienable resources, like talents, families into which persons are 189 born, and even genes? Dworkin proposed an ingenious device, an insurance market 190 carried out behind a veil of ignorance, where the 'souls' participating represent actual 191 persons, and know the preferences of those whom they represent, but do not know the 192 resources with which their persons are actually endowed in the world. In this insurance 193 market, each participant would hold an equal amount of some currency, and would be 194 able to purchase insurance with that currency against bad luck in the birth lottery, that is, 195 the lottery in which nature assigns souls to persons in the world (or resource endowments 196 to souls). Dworkin argued that the allocation of goods that would be implemented after 197 the birth lottery occurred, the state of the world was revealed, and insurance policies 198 taken behind the Dworkinian veil were settled, was an allocation that 'equalized 199 resources.' It held persons responsible for their preferences – in particular, their risk 200 preferences—and was egalitarian because all souls were endowed, behind the veil, with 201 the same allotment of currency with which to purchase insurance. Impartiality with 202 respect to the morally arbitrary distribution of resources was accomplished by shielding 203 the souls from knowledge of their endowments in the actual world associated with the

birth lottery (genetic and physical). Thus, Dworkin retained Rawls's radical egalitarian
view about the moral arbitrariness of the distribution of talents, handicaps, and inherited
wealth, but implemented a mechanism that held persons responsible for their tastes that
was much cleaner than discarding preferences and relying on primary goods, as Rawls
had done.

209 Despite the cleverness of Dworkin's construction, it can lead to results that many 210 egalitarians would consider perverse. To illustrate the problem, consider the following 211 example. Suppose there are two individuals in the world, Andrea and Bob. Andrea is 212 lucky: she has a fine constitution, and can transform resources (wealth) into welfare at a 213 high rate. Bob is handicapped; his constitution transforms wealth into welfare at exactly 214 one-half of Andrea's rate. We assume, in particular, that Andrea and Bob have 215 interpersonally comparable welfare. The internal resource that Andrea possesses and 216 Bob lacks is a fine biological constitution (say, a healthy supply of endorphins).

We assume that Bob and Andrea have the same risk preferences over wealth: they are each risk averse and have the von Neumann – Morgenstern utility function over wealth $u(W) = \sqrt{W}$. Suppose that the distribution of (material) wealth in the world to (Andrea, Bob) would be (W^A, W^B) , with no further intervention. Thus each individual is endowed with an internal constitution and some external resource.

We construct Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market as follows⁴. Behind the veil of ignorance, there is a soul Alpha who represents Andrea, and a soul Beta who represents Bob. These souls know the risk preferences of their principals, and the constitutions of Andrea and Bob, but they do not know which person they will become in the birth lottery. Thus, from their viewpoint, there are two possible states of the world, summarized in the table:

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State 1	Alpha becomes Andrea	Beta becomes Bob
State 2	Alpha becomes Bob	Beta becomes Andrea

⁴ Dworkin did not propose a formal model, but relied on intuition. The model here is a version of an Arrovian market for contingent claims.

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Each state occurs with probability one-half. *We* know that state 1 will indeed occur, but the souls face a birth lottery with even chances, in which they can take out insurance against bad luck (that is, of becoming Bob).

234 There are two commodities in the insurance market: a commodity x_1 , a unit of which pays the owner \$1 if state 1 occurs, and a commodity x_2 a unit of which pays \$1 if 235 236 state 2 occurs. Each soul can either purchase or sell these commodities: selling one unit 237 of the first commodity entails a promise to deliver \$1 if state 1 occurs. Each soul 238 possesses, initially, zero income (behind the veil) with which to purchase these 239 commodities. In particular, they have equal wealth endowments behind the veil in the 240 currency that is recognized in that venue. Thus, the insurance market acts to redistribute 241 tangible wealth in the actual world to compensate persons for their natural endowments, 242 which cannot be altered, in that way which the souls, who represent persons, would 243 desire, had they been able to insure against the luck of the birth lottery. It is an institution 244 that transforms what Dworkin calls 'brute luck' into 'option luck.' The former is luck 245 which is not insurable; the latter is luck whose outcome is protected by insurance, or the 246 outcome of a gamble one has chosen to take.

247 An equilibrium in this insurance market consists of prices (1, p) for commodities 248 (x_1, x_2) , demands $(x_1^{\alpha}, x_2^{\alpha}), (x_1^{\beta}, x_2^{\beta})$ by souls Alpha and Beta for the two contingent 249 commodities, such that

250 (1)
$$(x_1^{\alpha}, x_2^{\alpha})$$
 maximizes $\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{W^A + x_1^{\alpha}} + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\frac{W^B + x_2^{\alpha}}{2}}$
subj. to $x_1^{\alpha} + px_2^{\alpha} = 0$

251 (2)
$$(x_1^{\beta}, x_2^{\beta})$$
 maximizes $\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{W^B + x_1^{\beta}} + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2(W^A + x_2^{\beta})}$
subj. to $x_1^{\beta} + px_2^{\beta} = 0$

252 (3) $x_s^{\alpha} + x_s^{\beta} = 0$ for s = 1, 2.

Let us explain these conditions. Condition (1) says that Alpha chooses her
demand for contingent commodities optimally, subject to her budget constraint – that is,

255 she maximizes her expected utility. Her utility if she becomes Andrea (state 1), will be $\sqrt{W_1^A + x_1^{\alpha}}$. Now if Alpha becomes Bob (state 2), her wealth will be $W^B + x_2^{\alpha}$; 256 however, from the viewpoint of her principal, Andrea, that will generate only half as 257 much welfare, so she evaluates this wealth as being worth, in utility terms, $\sqrt{\frac{W^B + x_2^{\alpha}}{2}}$. 258 259 Condition (2) has a similar derivation, but this time, soul Beta takes the benchmark 260 situation as becoming Bob. Condition (3) says that both markets clear. 261 The equilibrium is given by $p = 1, \quad (x_1^{\alpha}, x_2^{\alpha}) = (\frac{2W^B - W^A}{3}, \frac{W^A - 2W^B}{3}), \quad (x_1^{\beta}, x_2^{\beta}) = (\frac{-2W^B + W^A}{3}, \frac{-W^A + 2W^B}{3}).$ 262 263 Now state 1 occurs. Therefore Andrea, after the insurance contracts are settled, ends up with wealth $W^A + x_1^{\alpha} = \frac{2}{3}(W^A + W^B)$ -- two-thirds of the total wealth—and Bob ends up 264 265 with one-third of the total wealth. The result is perverse because, Bob is the one with the 266 low resource endowment, that is, with a low ability to transform money into welfare. It 267 is Bob, putatively, whom an equal-resource principle should compensate, but it is Andrea who ends up the winner.⁵ Even should state 2 have occurred, the outcome would have 268 269 been the same – two-thirds of the wealth would end up being Andrea's.

⁵ This perversity of the Dworkin insurance mechanism was first pointed out by Roemer (1985). Dworkin never proposed a model of the insurance market, but conjectured that it would re-allocate wealth in a way to compensate those with a paucity of non-transferable resources. He continued to use the insurance-market thought experiment to justify social policies (e.g., in the case of national health insurance for the United States), even though his thought experiment did not necessarily produce the compensatory redistributions that he thought it would implement.

270 Why does this happen? Because, even though both souls are risk averse, they are 271 not sufficiently risk averse to induce them to shift wealth into the bad state (of being born 272 Bob); it is more worthwhile (in terms of expected utility) to use wealth in the state when it can produce a lot of welfare (when a soul turns out to be Andrea). If the agents were 273 274 sufficiently risk averse, this would not occur. (If the utility function were $u(W) = W^c / c$, 275 and c < 0, then, post-insurance, Bob would end up with more wealth than Andrea. If the 276 utility function is $u(W) = \log W$, then the agents split the wealth equally.) But the 277 example shows that in general the hypothetical insurance market does not implement the 278 kind of compensation that Dworkin desires: for Bob is the one who suffers from a deficit 279 in an internal resource – from morally arbitrary bad luck. For Dworkin's insurance 280 market to avoid this kind of perversity, individuals would have to be sufficiently risk 281 averse, and this it is inappropriate to assume, for the theory should surely produce the 282 desired result (of compensating those with a paucity of internal resources) in the special 283 case that all agents have the same risk preferences⁶.

284 In the model just presented of the hypothetical insurance market, note that it was 285 necessary to make interpersonal welfare comparisons. Alpha, Andrea's soul, has to 286 contemplate how she would feel, if she were to be born as Bob, and with a given amount 287 of wealth. She does this by transforming Bob's wealth into a *welfare-equivalent wealth* 288 for Andrea. And soul Beta has to make a similar interpersonal comparison. We 289 maintain that it is impossible to construct a veil-of-ignorance thought experiment without 290 making such comparisons. The point is simple: if a soul has to compare how it would 291 feel when being incarnated as different persons, it must be able to make interpersonal

⁶ When Dworkin was confronted with this example at a conference in Halifax in 1985, he responded that he would not use the insurance device in cases where it produced the 'pathological' result. This is, however, probably an unworkable position, for how does one characterize *a priori* the set of admissible economic environments?

This is not the first time that insufficient concavity of preferences causes problems for economic analysis. See, for example, the discussion of money-metric utility in chapter 3. welfare comparisons. Without the ability to compare the lives of different persons in
different circumstances, an investment in insurance would have no basis⁷.

294 Despite the problem we have exhibited with Dworkin's proposal, it was 295 revolutionary, in the words of G.A. Cohen, in transporting into egalitarian theory the 296 most powerful tool of the anti-egalitarian Right, the importance of personal responsibility. 297 One might argue, after seeing the above demonstration, that Dworkin's insurance market 298 is an appealing thought experiment, and therefore one should give up on the egalitarian 299 impulse of compensating persons for features of their situations for which they are not 300 responsible: that is, instead of rejecting Dworkin's model as inadequate, one should reject 301 his egalitarian desideratum. Moreno and Roemer (2008) consider this, and argue instead 302 that the veil of ignorance is an inappropriate thought experiment for ascertaining what 303 justice requires. Although their arguments for this are new, the position is not: it was also 304 advocated earlier by Brian Barry (1991).

305 In the example we have given, there is, for egalitarians, a moral requirement to 306 transfer tangible wealth from Andrea to Bob, because Bob lacks an inalienable resource 307 that Andrea possesses, the ability to transform effectively goods into welfare, a lack 308 which is beyond his control, and due entirely to luck. Dworkin also focused upon a 309 different possible cause of unequal welfares, that some persons have expensive tastes, 310 while others have cheap ones. His view was that persons with expensive tastes do not 311 merit additional wealth in order to satisfy them, as long as those persons were satisfied 312 with their tastes, or, as he said, identified with them. There is no injustice in a world 313 where wealth is equal, but those with champagne tastes suffer compared to those with 314 beer tastes, due to the relative consumptions of champagne and beer that that equal 315 wealth permits. So the 'pathology' that we have illustrate with the Andrea-Bob example

⁷ Readers may recall that Harsanyi (1955) claimed to construct a veil-of-ignorance argument for utilitarianism without making interpersonal comparisons. But his argument fails – not as a formal mathematical statement, but in the claim that utilitarianism is what has been justified. (See, for an early discussion, Weymark (1991), and for a more recent one, Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2008).)

depends upon the source of Bob's relative inefficiency in converting wealth into welfarebeing a handicap, rather than an expensive taste.

318 Slightly before Dworkin's articles were published, Amartya Sen (1980) gave a 319 lecture in which he argued that Rawls's focus on primary goods was misplaced. Sen 320 argued that Rawls was 'fetishist' in focusing on goods, and should instead have focused 321 on what goods provide for people, which he called 'functionings' – being able to move 322 about, to become employed, to be healthy, and so on. Sen defined a person's *capability* 323 as the set of vectors of functionings that were available to him, and he called for equality 324 of capabilities⁸. Thus, although a rich man on a hunger strike might have the same (low) 325 functioning as a poor man starving, their capabilities are very different. While not going 326 so far as to say utilities should be equalized. Sen defined a new concept between goods 327 and welfare – functionings—which G.A. Cohen (1993) later described as providing a 328 state of being that he called 'midfare.' For Sen, the opportunity component of the theory 329 was expressed in an evaluation not of a person's actual functioning level, but of what 330 functionings were *available* to him, his 'capability.'

Sen's contribution led to both theoretical and practical developments. On the
theoretical level, it inspired a literature on comparing opportunity (or feasible) sets: if one
desires to 'equalize' capabilities, it helps to have an ordering on sets of sets. See James
Foster's (2011) summary of this literature. On the practical side, it led to the human
development index, published annually by the UNDP. For development of Sen's
capability approach, see chapter 3.

337 Later in the decade, further reactions to Dworkin came from philosophers, notably 338 Richard Arneson (1989) and G.A. Cohen (1989). Arneson argued that Dworkin's 339 expensive-taste argument against equality-of-welfare was correct, but his alternative of 340 seeking equality of resources was not the only option: instead, one should seek to 341 equalize opportunities for welfare. This, he argued, would take care of the expensive-342 tastes problem. Rather than relying on the insurance mechanism to define what resource 343 egalitarianism means, Arneson proposed to distribute resources so that all persons had 344 equal opportunity for welfare achievement, although actual welfares achieved would

⁸ Sen has not proposed an ordering of sets that would enable one to compare capabilities.

differ because people would make different choices. There are problems with
formalizing Arneson's proposal (see Roemer (1996)), but it is notable for not relying on
any kind of veil of ignorance, in contrast to the proposals of Rawls and Dworkin.

348 Cohen (1989) criticized Dworkin for making the wrong 'cut' between resources 349 and preferences. The issue, he said, was what people should or should not be held 350 responsible for. Clearly, a person should not be held responsible for his innate talents 351 and inherited resources, but it is not true that a person should be fully responsible for his 352 preferences either, because preferences are to some (perhaps large) degree formed in 353 circumstances (in particular, those of one's childhood) which are massively influenced by 354 resource availability. Indeed, if a person has an expensive taste for champagne due to a 355 genetic abnormality, he would merit compensation under an egalitarian ethic⁹. Cohen's 356 view was that inequality is justified if and only if it is attributable to choices that are ones 357 for which persons can sensibly he held responsible -- so if a person who grows up poor, 358 develops a 'taste' against education, induced by the difficulty of succeeding in school due 359 to lack of adequate resources – a taste with which he even comes to 'identify' – then 360 Cohen would not hold him responsible for the low income due to his consequently low 361 wage, while Dworkin presumably would hold him responsible. Cohen does not propose 362 a mechanism or algorithm for finding the just distribution of resources, but provides a 363 number of revealing examples (see, for example, Cohen (1989, 2004)). He calls his 364 approach 'equal access to advantage.'

Besides criticizing Dworkin for his partition the space of attributes and actions into ones for which compensation is, or is not, due, Cohen (1997), importantly, critiqued Rawls's difference principle, as insufficiently egalitarian. The argument is based upon Rawls's restriction of the ambit of justice to the design of social institutions – in particular, that ambit does not include personal behavior. Thus, the Rawlsian tax system should attempt to maximize the welfare of the least-well-off group in society, under the assumption that individuals choose their labor supplies to maximize their personal utility.

⁹ This is not a crazy example. There is a medically recognized syndrome in which people who sustain a certain kind of brain injury come to crave expensive foods: see Cohen (2011, p. 81).

372 Suppose the highly skilled claim that if their taxes are raised from 30% to 50%, they will 373 reduce their labor supply so much that the worst-off group would be less well off than it 374 is at the 30% tax rate. If 30% is the tax rate that maximizes the welfare (or income) of 375 the least well off, given this self-interested behavior of the highly skilled, then it is the 376 Rawlsian-just rate. But Cohen responds that, as long as the highly skilled are at least as 377 well off as the worst off at the 50% tax rate, then justice requires the 50% tax rate. This 378 difference of viewpoint between Rawls and Cohen occurs because Cohen requires 379 individuals to act, in their personal choices, according to the commands of the difference 380 principle (that is, to take those actions that render those who are worst off as well off as 381 possible), and Rawls does not. Indeed, Rawls stipulates that one requirement of a just 382 society is that its members endorse the conception of justice. It is peculiar, Cohen 383 remarks, that that conception should apply only to the design of social institutions, and 384 not to personal behavior.

385 A question that arises from the discussion of responsibility is its relationship to 386 freedom of the will. If responsibility has become central in the conceptualization of just 387 equality, does one have to solve the problem of free will before enunciating a theory of 388 distributive justice? Different answers are on offer. We believe the most practical 389 answer, which should suffice for practicing economists, is to view the degree of 390 responsibility of persons as a parameter in a theory of equality. Once one assigns a value 391 to this parameter, then one has a particular theory of equality of opportunity, because one 392 then knows for what to hold persons responsible. The missing parameter is supplied by 393 each society, which has a concept of what its citizens should be held responsible for; 394 hence there is a specific theory of equality of opportunity for each society, that is, a 395 theory that will deliver policy recommendations consonant with the theory of 396 responsibility that that society endorses. This is a political approach, rather than a 397 metaphysical one.

Another answer to the free-will challenge is to make a distinction prevalent among philosophers. 'Compatibilists' are those philosophers who believe that it is consistent both to endorse determinism (in the sense of a belief in the physical causation of all behavior) *and* the possibility of responsibility; incompatibilists are those who believe that determinism precludes responsibility. Most philosophers (who think about 403 the problem) are probably, at present, compatibilists. For instance, Thomas Scanlon 404 (1986) believes that the determinist causal view is true, but also that persons can be held 405 responsible for their behavior, as long as they have contemplated their actions, weighed 406 alternatives, and so on. (The issue of sufficient contemplation is independent of the 407 issue of the cause of expensive tastes, raised above.) From a practical viewpoint, the 408 problem of free will therefore does not pose a problem for designing policies motivated 409 by the idea that persons should not be held accountable for aspects of their condition that 410 are due to circumstances beyond their control.

The philosophical literature on 'responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism' continues
beyond the point of this quick review, but enough summary has been provided to proceed
to a discussion of economic models.

414

415 3. <u>A model and algorithm for equal-opportunity policy</u>

416 Consider a population, whose members are partitioned into a finite set of *types*. A 417 type comprises the set of individuals with the same circumstances, where *circumstances* 418 are those aspects of one's environment (including, perhaps, one's biological 419 characteristics) which are beyond one's control, and influence outcomes of interest. 420 Denote the types t = 1, ..., T. Let the population fraction of type t in the population be 421 f^{t} . There is an *objective* for which a planner wishes to equalize opportunities. The 422 degree to which an individual will achieve the objective is a function of his circumstances, 423 his *effort*, and the social policy: we write the value of the objective as $u^t(e, \phi)$, where e 424 is a measure of effort and $\varphi \in \Phi$, the set of social policies. Indeed, $u^t(e,\varphi)$ should be 425 considered the average achievement of the objective among those of type t expending 426 effort *e* when the policy is φ . Here, we will take effort to be a non-negative real number. 427 Later, we will introduce luck into the problem.

u^t is not, in general, a subjective utility function: indeed *u^t* is assumed to be
monotone *increasing* in effort, while subjective utility is commonly assumed to be
decreasing in standard conceptions of effort. Thus, *u* might be the adult wage,
circumstances could include several aspects of childhood and family environment, and *e*could be years of schooling. Effort is assumed to be a choice variable for the individual,

although that choice may be severely constrained by circumstances, a point to which we will attend below. The final data for the problem consist of the distributions of effort within types as a function of policy: for the policy φ , denote the distribution function of effort in type *t* as $G_{\varphi}^{t}(\cdot)$. We would normally say that effort is chosen by the individual by maximizing a preference order, but preferences are not the fundamentals of this theory: rather, the data are $\{T, G_{\varphi}^{t}, f^{t}, u, \Phi\}$, where we use *T* to denote, also, the set of types.

440 Defining the set of types and the conception of effort assumes that the society in 441 question has a conception of the partition between responsible actions and circumstances, 442 with respect to which it wishes to compute a consonant approach to equalizing 443 opportunities. We describe the approach of Roemer (1993, 1998). The verbal statement 444 of the goal is to find that policy which nullifies, to the greatest extent possible, the effect 445 of circumstances on outcomes, but allows outcomes to be sensitive to effort. Effort 446 comprises those choices that are thought to be the person's responsibility, and hence they 447 are consequences of his choices – but not all such consequences, since effort may itself 448 be influenced by one's circumstances. In particular, the *distribution* of effort in a type at a policy, G_{α}^{t} , is not due to the actions of any person (assume here a continuum of agents), 449 but is a characteristic of the type. If we are to indemnify individuals against their 450 451 circumstances, we must not hold them responsible for being members of a type with a 452 poor distribution of effort.

453 We require a measure of *accountable* effort, which, because effort is influenced by circumstances, cannot be the raw effort e. (Think of years of education - raw effort— 454 455 which is surely influenced in a major way by social circumstances.) Roemer proposed to 456 measure accountable effort as the rank of an individual on the effort distribution of her type: thus, if for an individual expending effort e, $G_{0}^{t}(e) = \pi$, we say the individual 457 458 expended the *degree* of effort π , as opposed to the *level* of effort *e*. The rank provides a 459 way of making inter-type comparisons of the efforts expended by individuals. A person 460 is judged accountable, that is to say, by comparing his behavior only to others with his 461 circumstances. In comparing the degrees of effort of individuals across types, we use the

462 rank measure, which sterilizes the distribution of raw effort of the influence of 463 circumstances upon it¹⁰.

Because the functions u^t are assumed to be strictly monotone increasing in *e*, it follows that an individual will have the same rank on the distribution of the objective, within his type, as he does within the distribution of effort of his type¹¹. Define:

467 $v^t(\boldsymbol{\pi}, \boldsymbol{\varphi}) = u^t(e^t(\boldsymbol{\pi}), \boldsymbol{\varphi})$

where $e^{t}(\pi)$ is the level of effort at the π^{th} quantile of the distribution G_{ϕ}^{t} , that is, 468 $G_{\phi}^{t}(e^{t}(\pi)) \coloneqq \pi$. Then the functions $v^{t}(\cdot, \phi)$ are the inverse functions of the distribution 469 functions of the objective, by type, under the policy φ . (In this sense, v^t is like Pen's 470 471 parade, which is also the inverse of a distribution function.) Inequality of opportunity 472 holds when these *functions* are not identical. In particular, because we are viewing 473 persons at a given rank π as being equally accountable with respect to the choice of effort, the vertical difference between the functions $\{v^t(\cdot, \phi)\}$ is a measure of the extent 474 475 of inequality of opportunity (or, equivalently, the horizontal distance between the 476 cumulative distribution functions).

What policy is the optimal one, given this conception? We do not simply want to render the functions v^t identical at a low level, so we need to adopt some conception of 'maxi-minning' these functions. We want to choose that policy which pushes up the lowest v^t function as much as possible – and as in Rawlsian maximin, the 'lowest' function may itself be a function of what the policy is. A natural approach is therefore to

¹⁰ Some authors (Ramos and Van de gaer (2012)) have called this move – of identifying the degree of effort with the rank of the individual on the objective distribution of his type – the Roemer Identification Assumption (RIA). While the name is lofty, the idea is simple: persons should not be held responsible for characteristics of the distribution of effort in their type, for that distribution is a circumstance.

¹¹ If actual effort is a vector, then a unidimensional measure e would be constructed, for example, by regressing the objective values against the dimensions, thus computing weights on the dimensions of raw effort.

482 maximize the area below the lowest function v^t , or more precisely, to find that policy 483 which maximizes the area under the *lower envelope* of the functions $\{v^t\}$. The formal 484 statement is to:

485
$$\max_{\varphi \in \Phi} \int_{0}^{1} \min_{t} v^{t}(\pi, \varphi) d\pi . \qquad (3.1)$$


486 We call the solution to this program the opportunity-equalizing policy, ϕ^{EOp} .

487 (Computing (3.1) is equivalent to maximizing the area to the left of the left-hand
488 envelope of the type-distributions of the objective, and bounded above by the horizontal
489 line of height one.)

490 In the case in which the lower envelope of the functions $\{v^t\}$ is the function of a 491 single type (the unambiguously most disadvantaged type), what we have done is simply 492 to maximize the average value of the objective for the most disadvantaged type, since 493 $\int_{0}^{1} v^t(\pi, \varphi) d\pi$ is simply the mean value of the objective for type *t* at policy φ .

Thus, the approach implements the view that differences between individuals caused by their circumstances are ethically unacceptable, but differences due to differential effort are all right. Full equality of opportunity is achieved not when the value of the objective is equal for all, but when members of each type face the *same chances*, as measured by the distribution functions of the objective that they face.

499 One virtue of the approach taken here is that it is easy to illustrate graphically. In 500 Figure 1, we present two graphs, to illustrate inequality of opportunity in Hungary and 501 Denmark. In each graph, there are three cumulative income distributions, corresponding 502 to male workers of three types: those whose more educated parent had no more than 503 lower secondary education, those whose more educated parent just completed secondary 504 education, and those whose more educated parent had at least some tertiary education. (The data are from EU-SILC-2005.) The inverses of these distribution functions are the 505 506 functions $v^t(\cdot, \varphi)$ defined above. The policy is the status-quo policy. It seems clear that, 507 with respect to this one circumstance (parental education), opportunities for income have




515

516

backgrounds)

been more effectively equalized in Denmark than in Hungary¹². The graphs are taken
from Roemer (2013).





517

518 <u>Figure 1b.</u> As in Figure 1a, but for Hungary

519

520 The approach inherent in (3.1) is one which treats all causes of inequality not 521 accounted for by a person's type as being due to effort. For example, with respect figure 522 1, there are many circumstances which influence outcomes not accounted for in the 523 definition of type, and so the inequality of opportunity illustrated in that figure should be 524 considered to be a lower bound on the true inequality of opportunity. Nevertheless, it is 525 often the case that delineating only a few circumstances will suffice to illustrate obvious 526 inequality of opportunity, and one can say that social policy should attempt to mitigate at 527 least that inequality.

528 Let us note that the equal-opportunity approach is *non-welfarist* or more precisely 529 non-consequentialist. A welfarist procedure for ordering social policies uses information 530 only in the objective possibilities sets of the population associated with those procedures. 531 In the income example, it would use only the data of the income distribution of the 532 population, and ignore the data of what individuals were of what types. Circumstances 533 are non-welfare (or non-objective) information. More informally, consequentialism 534 only considers the final results of policies (incomes), and not the causes of those 535 consequences. Here, we say there are two kinds of cause of outcomes with different 536 moral status: circumstances and effort. We must distinguish between these causes, and

social policy should attempt to mitigate the inequality effects of one of them, but notnecessarily of the other.

539 At this point, we return briefly to consider a philosophical critique of this 540 approach – and indeed of the general evolution of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, 541 as it was reviewed in section 1 above - offered by Susan Hurley (2002), who writes that 542 "Roemer's account does not show how the aim to neutralize luck could provide a basis 543 for egalitarianism." Hurley says that, absent luck, many possible distributions of the 544 objective could have occurred, and one cannot claim that 'neutralizing' luck means to 545 render outcomes sensitive only to degrees of effort. Moreover, she writes that it is not 546 an *argument* for EOp that it neutralizes the effects of luck.

547 The moral premise of the EOp view is that rewards should be sensitive only to the 548 autonomous efforts of individuals. This is a special case of rewards according to deserts. 549 People deserve, in the EOp view, to acquire the objective in proportion to how hard they 550 try. Thus, strictly speaking, the EOp view is not one whose fundamental primitive is 551 equality: deservingness is fundamental, together with the normative thesis that justified 552 inequality tracks deservingness. Inequalities that are not due to unequal efforts are 553 defined as being due to luck: that is, luck is so-called because it is a cause of reward that 554 is illegitimate from the EOp view. The statement that 'EOp intends to neutralize the 555 effects of luck on outcomes' is therefore equivalent to the statement 'EOp intends to 556 render outcomes sensitive only to effort.'

557 So, for example, suppose a child, A, does well in life because his parents were 558 rich, not because he exerted great effort, while another child, B, from a poor family, does 559 well by virtue of exerting great effort. Some might argue that it may be no less a matter 560 of luck that B was the kind of person who works hard than that A had rich parents, but 561 that approach, whatever its merits, is not the sense in which responsibility-concerned 562 egalitarians use the word luck. Luck, for us, means the source of non-effort caused 563 advantage. To be sure, it is not an *argument* for EOp that it neutralizes luck, it is rather 564 *definitive* of the EOp view that it does so. The *argument* for EOp must be that is *right* to 565 render outcomes sensitive only to effort¹³.

¹³ This point is due to Cohen (2006).

The next example, which is hypothetical, is given to illustrate the difference between the equal-opportunity approach and the approach that is conventional in many areas of social policy, utilitarianism. A *utilitarian* policy maximizes the average value of the objective in a population. Utilitarianism is a special case of welfarism, although there are many welfarist preference orderings of policies.

571 We consider a population partitioned into T types, where the frequency of type t is 572 f^{t} . The population suffers from I diseases, with the generic disease denoted i. The types might be defined by socio-economic characteristics¹⁴, and the Health Ministry is 573 574 interested in mitigating the affect of socio-economic characteristics on health. There is available in the health sector an amount of resource (money), \overline{R} per capita. We do not 575 576 address how much of a society's product should be dedicated to health, but only how to spend the amount that has been so dedicated. Effort is here conceived of as life-style 577 578 quality (exercise, smoking behavior, etc.). We choose the policy space to be allocations of the resource to treating various diseases: that is vectors $R = (R^1, ..., R^I)$ which will be 579 constrained by a budget condition, where R^{i} is the amount that will be spent to treat 580 581 each case of disease *i*, regardless of the characteristics of the person who has contracted 582 the disease. Thus, by *definition*, we restrict ourselves to policies that are *horizontally* 583 *equitable*: any person suffering from disease *i*, regardless of her type and life-style quality, 584 will receive the same treatment, because treatment expenditure is not a function of these 585 variables. A more highly articulated policy space could allocate medical resources 586 predicated also on the type of patient and the life-style that patient had led. But in the 587 health sector, doing so would set the stage for antagonistic patient-provider relations, and 588 interfere with other values we hold, and so we choose to respect horizontal equity. We 589 will return to this point below.

590

591

For any given vector $R = (x^1, ..., x^I)$ there will ensue a distribution of life-style quality in each type *t*, and a consequent distribution of disease occurrences in each type.

¹⁴ Of course, persons are surely in part responsible for their socio-economic circumstances. But the Health Ministry's mandate might be to eliminate health inequalities due those circumstances, and so formally, it would consider socio-economic aspects of households as circumstances.

592 Life-style quality may not be responsive to the policy, but we allow for the general case 593 in which it is. Let us denote the fraction of individuals in type *t* who contract disease *i* 594 when the policy is *R* by $p^{it}(R)$. Then the policy is *feasible* when:

595
$$\sum_{i,t} f^t p^{it}(R) x^i \le \overline{R}$$

and it exhausts the budget precisely when:

597
$$\sum_{i,j} f^t p^{it}(R) x^i = \overline{R}$$
(3.2)

598 The set of *admissible policies* comprises all those for which (3.2) holds: this is the set Φ .

We next suppose that we know the *health production functions* for each type; these are functions that give the probability that a person of type *t* will contract disease *i* if she lives a life-style of quality *q*. Let i = 0 represent the case of 'no disease' being contracted. We denote these functions $s^{it}(\cdot)$; thus $s^{it}(q)$ is the probability that a *t*- type will contract disease *i* if she lives life-style quality *q*. We presume it is the case that $\{s^{it}\}$ are monotone decreasing functions: that is, raising life-style quality reduces the probability of disease.

606 We also have as data of the problem the mapping from the policy space Φ to the 607 space of cumulative distribution functions on the non-negative real numbers. Denote that 608 class of distribution functions by Γ . The map

610 gives us the distribution of life-style qualities that will occur in type *t*, at any policy *R* in 611 Φ . We write $F_R^t = F^t(R)$. Thus an individual with life-style quality *q* in type *t* lies at 612 rank π of the effort distribution of her type, when the policy is *R*, if $F_R^t(q) = \pi$. We 613 denote this value of *q* by $q_R^t(\pi)$.

Finally, we need to postulate the relationship between treatment of disease and health outcome. Let us take the outcome to be life expectancy. We therefore suppose that we know the life expectancy for those in type *t* who have contracted disease *i* and who are treated with the resource expenditure specified by *R*. Denote this life expectancy by $\lambda^{it}(R)$. (Denote by λ^{0t} the life expectancy of a person of type *t* who contracts no disease.) We could further complexify, here, by assuming that life expectancy is afunction, in addition, of the life style quality of the individual, but choose not to do so.

621 Consider, now, a policy $R = (x^1, ..., x^I)$, which induces a distribution of life-style 622 quality in each type. Consider a type *t* and all those at rank π of *t*'s life-style quality 623 distribution. Assume there is a large number of people in each type, so that the fraction 624 of people in a type who contract a disease is equal to the probability that people in that 625 type will contract the disease. Then¹⁵ the average life expectancy of all such people – the 626 (t,π) cohort—will be

627
$$s^{0t}(q_R^t(\pi))\lambda^{0t} + \sum_{i=1}^{I}\sum_{t}s^{it}(q_R^t(\pi))\lambda^{it}(R) \equiv L^t(\pi,R)$$

628 We can now define the EOp policy, which is:

629
$$R^{EOp} = \arg\max_{R} \int_{0}^{1} \min_{t} L^{t}(\pi, R) d\pi \qquad (3.3)$$

630 Although we need a lot of data to compute the EOp policy, it is only the Ministry 631 of Health who must have these data: once the policy is computed, a hospital need only 632 diagnose a patient to know what treatment is appropriate (i.e., how much to spend on the 633 case). No patient need ever be asked her type or her life-style characteristics. There is, 634 that is to say, no incursion of privacy necessitated by applying the policy—apart from the 635 initial incursion in the research survey on a population sample that assembles the data set to compute the health production functions. The policy is horizontally equitable. This is 636 637 an important point, because some philosophers have falsely concluded that applying the 638 equal-opportunity approach will necessitate incursions into privacy, and making 639 distinctions among individuals in resource-allocation questions that are either difficult or 640 socially objectionable in some way (see Anderson (1999)). But this is incorrect: the 641 planner can choose the policy space in a way that makes such distinctions irrelevant for 642 implementing the policy. In other words, not only is the delineation of circumstances a

¹⁵ In the formula that follows, we have assumed for the sake of simplicity that an individual contracts either no or one disease. Of course, the formula can be generalized to the case where we drop this assumption, as we do in the numerical example that follows.

political/social decision that may vary across societies, but so must the specification ofthe policy space take into consideration social views concerning privacy and fairness.

Let us make this example numerical. We posit a society with two types, the Rich and the Poor. The Poor have life-styles whose qualities q are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], while the Rich have life-style qualities that are uniformly distributed on the interval [0.5, 1.5]. The probability of contracting cancer, as a function of life-style quality (q) is the same for both types, and given by:

650
$$s^{CP}(q) = s^{CR}(q) = 1 - \frac{2q}{3}.$$

Only the poor are at a risk of tuberculosis; their probability of contracting TB is:

652
$$s^{TP}(q) = 1 - \frac{q}{3}$$
.

653 Suppose that life expectancy for a rich individual is given by:

655 $60 + 10 \frac{x_c - 1}{x_c + 1}$, if cancer is contracted, and x_c is spent on its treatment.

Thus, if the disease is contracted, life expectancy will lie between 50 and 70, depending on how much is spent on treatment (from zero to an infinite amount). This is a simple way of modeling the fact that nobody dies of cancer before age 50.

660 70 if neither disease is contracted,

661
$$60 + 10 \frac{x_c - 1}{x_c + 1}$$
 if cancer is contracted and x_c is spent on its treatment, and

662
$$50 + 20 \frac{.1x_{TB} - 1}{.1x_{TB} + 1}$$
 if tuberculosis is contracted and x_{TB} is spent on its treatment.

664 expenditures, a person who contracts TB can live to age 70. Furthermore, it is expensive

- to raise life expectancy above 30 if TB is contracted. We further assume that if a Poor
- person contracts both cancer and TB then her life expectancy will be the minimum of theabove two numbers.

Finally, assume that 25% of the population is poor and 75% is rich, and that the national health budget is $\overline{R} = 3000 per capita.

- With these data, one can compute that 33% of the rich will contract cancer, 9.3% of the poor will contract only cancer, 26% of the poor will contract only TB, and 56% of the poor will contract both TB and cancer. (Here, we do not exclude the possibility that a person could contract both diseases.)
- 674 Our policy is $R = (x_C, x_{TB})$, the schedule of how much will be spent on treating 675 an occurrence of each disease. The objective is to equalize opportunities, for the Rich 676 and the Poor, for life expectancy.
- The life expectancy of a Rich person is given by:

678
$$L^{R}(\pi, x_{C}) = \frac{2}{3}(\pi + .5)70 + (1 - \frac{2}{3}(\pi + .5))(60 + 10\frac{x_{C} - 1}{x_{C} + 1}),$$

and of a Poor person by:

680

$$L^{p}(\pi, x_{C}, x_{T}) = \frac{\pi}{3} \frac{2\pi}{3} 70 + \frac{\pi}{3} (1 - \frac{2\pi}{3})(60 + 10\frac{x_{C} - 1}{x_{C} + 1}) + (1 - \frac{\pi}{3})\frac{2\pi}{3}(50 + 20\frac{.1x_{TB} - 1}{.1x_{TB} + 1}) - (1 - \frac{\pi}{3})(1 - \frac{2\pi}{3})\min[(50 + 20\frac{.1x_{TB} - 1}{.1x_{TB} + 1}), (60 + 10\frac{x_{C} - 1}{x_{C} + 1})].$$

681 The solution of the program that maximizes the minimum life expectancy of the two types, subject to the budget constraint, is $x_c = \$686$, $x_{TB} = \$13,027$. In figure 2, we 682 present the life expectancies of the Rich and the Poor, as a function of the rank at which 683 684 they sit on the effort (life-style) distribution of their type, at this solution. The higher 685 curve is that of the Rich. We see that, at the EOp solution, the Rich still have greater life 686 expectancy than the Poor – despite the large amounts being spent on treating tuberculosis¹⁶. The difference, however, is less one year. Moreover, life expectancy 687 688 increases with life-style quality – this inequality of outcome is an aspect that EOp does 689 *not* attempt to eliminate.

690


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692

¹⁶ We could further reduce the difference in the life expectancies of the two types if we were willing to predicate the expenditure policy on a person's type, as well on her disease. But we have opted for a policy space that respects the social norm of horizontal equity, and does not distinguish between types in the treatment of illness.







700


701 Let us compare this solution to the *utilitarian* solution, the expenditure schedule at which

702 *life expectancy in the population as a whole* is maximized. The solution turns out to be

703 $x_C = \$1915, x_{TB} = \$10,571$. Three times as much is spent on cancer as in the EOp

solution. Figure 3 graphs the life expectancy of the two types in the utilitarian solution

705 (dashed lines) as well as the EOp solution (solid lines):



707

<u>Figure 3</u>: Life expectancies of Rich and Poor, utilitarian (dashed) and EOp (solid)
policies

710

We see that the utilitarian solution narrows the life-expectancy differential between the types less than does the EOp solution (although, in absolute terms, the differences are not great). The EOp solution is more egalitarian, across the types, than the utilitarian solution – the utilitarian cares only about average life expectancy in aggregate, not on the distribution of life expectancy across types.

It is obvious that different objective functions will engender different optimal solutions. The unfortunate habit that is almost ubiquitous in policy circles is to identify the utilitarian solution with the *efficient* solution. Critics of the EOp solution will say that it is *inefficient* because it delivers a lower life expectancy *on average* for the population than the utilitarian solution. But this is a confusion. Both solutions are Pareto efficient, in the sense that it is impossible, for either of them, to find a policy that weakly increases the life expectancies of everyone. Identifying the utilitarian social objective with

29

efficiency is an unfortunate practice, rooted in the deep hold that utilitarianism has in
economics. *Social* efficiency is defined with respect to whatever the social objective is,
and there are many possible choices for that objective besides the social average. We

- discuss this point with respect to measuring economic development below in section 5.
- 727

728 4. <u>A more general approach</u>

729 Formula (3.1) gives an ordering on policies, with regard to the degree to which 730 they equalize opportunities, after the set of circumstances has been delineated. It 731 implements the view that inequalities due to differential circumstances for those who 732 expend the same degree of effort are unacceptable. There is, however, a conceptual 733 asymmetry: while the instruction to eliminate inequalities due to differential 734 circumstances is clear, the permission to allow differential outcomes due to differential 735 effort is imprecise. How much reward does effort merit? There is no obvious answer. 736 To provide a social-welfare function (or a preference order over policies) that question 737 must be answered, at least implicitly. In formula (3.1), the preference order is delineated 738 by stating that, if there is a society with just one type, then policies will be ordered 739 according to how large the average outcome is for that society. Fleurbaey (2008) 740 therefore calls formula (3.1) a 'utilitarian approach' to equality of opportunity.

741 What are the alternatives? At a policy $\varphi \in \Phi$, the *lower envelope* of the 742 objective functions $v^t(\cdot, \varphi)$ is defined as:

743

 $\theta(\pi, \varphi) = \min_{t} v^{t}(\pi, \varphi) . \qquad (4.1)$

We wish to render the function θ as 'large' as possible: formula (4.1) measures the 'size' of θ by taking its integral on [0,1]. More generally, let the set of non-negative, weakly increasing functions on [0,1] be denoted Θ ; we desire an ordering \succeq on Θ which is increasing, in the sense that if $\theta(\cdot) \ge \theta^*(\cdot)$, then $\theta \succeq \theta^*$, with strict preference if $\theta(\cdot) > \theta^*(\cdot)$ on a set of positive measure. The integral of $\theta \, d\pi$, as in (4.1), provides such an ordering. But many other choices are possible. For instance, consider the mapping $\Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ given by

751
$$\Gamma(\theta; \varphi) = \left(\int_{0}^{1} \theta(\pi, \varphi)^{p} d\pi\right)^{1/p} \text{ for } -\infty$$

Each of these provides an increasing order on Θ . As *p* becomes smaller, we implement more aversion to inequalities that are due to effort. As *p* approaches negative infinity, the order becomes the maximin order, where no reward to effort is acceptable.

755 We do not have a clear view about what the proper rewards to effort consist in, 756 and hence remain agnostic on the choice of ways to order the lower envelopes $\theta(\cdot, \phi)$. 757 The problem of rewards-to-effort goes back to Aristotle, who advocated 'proportionality,' 758 a view that is incoherent, as it depends upon the units in which effort and outcomes are 759 measured. Because we possess no theory of the proper rewards to effort, this is an open 760 aspect of the theory. We believe that considerations outside the realm of equality of 761 opportunity must be brought to bear to decide upon how much inequality with respect to 762 differential effort is allowable. For instance, G.A. Cohen (2009) has suggested that the 763 inequalities allowed by an equal-opportunity theory should, if they are large, be reduced 764 by appealing to the value of social unity (what he calls 'community'), which will be 765 strained if outcome inequalities are too large.

Our agnostic view concerning the degree of reward that effort deserves contrasts
with that of Fleurbaey (2008), who advocates an axiom of 'natural reward' to calibrate
the rewards to effort, as will be discussed in section 5.

769 We can provide somewhat stronger foundations for the view that an equal-770 opportunity ordering of policies must maximize some increasing preference order on Θ . 771 The first step is to note the importance of the lower envelope function θ : for the persons 772 who are most unfairly treated at a given policy are those, at each effort level, who 773 experience the lowest outcomes, across types. (Hence, they are the ones represented on 774 the lower envelope.) This is because the EOp view says outcomes with are different, due 775 to circumstances, for those who expend the same effort, are unfair. The second step is to 776 state an axiom which encapsulates a requirement of an EOp ordering \succ of Θ , which is: 777

- 778
- . ,
- 779

780 <u>Axiom DOM.</u>

781 *A*. For any two policies $\varphi, \hat{\varphi} \in \Phi$ such that $\varphi \succ \hat{\varphi}$ there exists a set of positive measure 782 *S* such that $\pi \in S \Rightarrow \theta(\pi, \varphi) > \theta(\pi, \hat{\varphi})$.

783 B. For any $\phi, \hat{\phi} \in \Phi$ such that $\phi \sim \hat{\phi}$, either $\theta(\cdot, \phi) = \theta(\cdot, \hat{\phi})$ or there is a set of

positive measure Y such that $y \in Y \Rightarrow \theta(y, \phi) > \theta(y, \phi)$ and a set of positive Y'

785 measure such that $y \in Y' \Rightarrow \theta(y, \phi) < \theta(y, \hat{\phi})$.

786

Part *A* of Axiom DOM states that if one policy is preferred to another, it must make *some*people who are the among the most unfairly treated better off than the other policy, and
Part *B* has a similar justification. Thus DOM is a special case of what is sometimes
called the *person-respecting principle* (see Temkin [1993]): that one social alternative is

better than another only if some people are better off in the first than in the second.

The result of th

793 <u>Proposition</u> Let \succeq be an order on Θ satisfying DOM. Then \succeq is represented by an

increasing operator Γ on Θ . Furthermore, if \succeq is a continuous order, then Γ can be

chosen to be a continuous increasing operator.

 $\max \Gamma(\theta)$

Thus, with any continuous order on the lower-envelope functions Θ , we may write the associated EOp program as:

798

s.t. $\theta(\pi, \phi) \equiv \min_{t} v^{t}(\pi, \phi)$ (GEOp) $\phi \in \Phi$

for some increasing operator $\Gamma: \Theta \to \mathbb{R}$. The acronym GEOp stands for 'generalized equality of opportunity.'

801 We reiterate the main point of this section. Because we possess no theory of 802 what comprise the just rewards to effort, we should not be dogmatic on the exact way to 803 order policies. We have argued that an ordering of policies must come from an 804 increasing order on the set of lower-envelope functions Θ , where the lower-envelope 805 function induced by a policy φ is given by (4.1). This ambiguity in the theory results in 806 program (GEOp), where the degree of freedom is the choice of the operator Γ . 807 Considerations outside of the theory of equal opportunity might put constraints on the 808 degree of overall inequality that is desirable/admissible in a society, and this can guide 809 the choice of Γ .

810 We have thus argued that the theory of equal opportunity is not intended as a 811 complete theory of distributive justice, for two reasons. First, we have emphasized its 812 pragmatic nature. We do not have a complete theory for what people are, indeed, 813 responsible, and have advocated the present approach as one that should viewed as 814 providing policy recommendations for societies that are consonant with the society's 815 conception of responsibility. Thus, the choice of the set of types, and even of the policy 816 space, will be dictated by social norms (we have illustrated the policy-space point with 817 the health-expenditure example). Secondly, the theory does not include a view on what 818 the proper rewards to effort consist in, and this is reflected in the openness inherent in 819 program (GEOp).

820 Because we view the approach as most useful when the objective in question is 821 something measurable like income, or life expectancy, or wage-earning capacity, we shy 822 away from taking an all-encompassing objective of 'utility.' We view the usefulness of 823 the approach as one for policy makers, in particular ministries, who are concerned with 824 narrower objectives than overall utility: the health ministry has an objective of life 825 expectancy or infant survival, the education ministry has an objective of the secondary-826 school graduation rate, the labor ministry is concerned with opportunities for the 827 formation of wage-earning capacity, or for employment, and so on. All these objectives 828 are cardinally measurable, and it makes sense to use any of the operators defined in (4.2)829 to generate an ordering on policies.

830 Nevertheless, we wish to remark that it is possible to apply the theory where the 831 objective is 'utility,' if utility is cardinally measurable. (Actually, to use the operators in 832 (4.2) we require what is called cardinal measurability and ratio-scale comparability.) 833 Because, when thinking about utility, we often conceive of effort as implying a disutility, 834 we now show why this is not a problem for the application. Suppose utility functions 835 over consumption and labor expended are given by u(x,L;w) where $w \in W$ is the 836 individual's wage rate. The distribution function of w in type t is given by F^{t} . Let us 837 suppose we are considering the space of linear tax policies, where after-tax income is

given by $(1-\varphi)wL+b$, where b is a lump-sum demogrant and $\varphi \in [0,1]$ is the tax rate.

839 (It is implicitly assumed, since wage rates are fixed, that production is constant-returns-

840 to-scale.) Then the utility-maximizing individual chooses his labor supply optimally,

841 denoted by $L(\varphi, w)$, and of course, budget-balance requires $b = \varphi \int w L(\varphi, w) dF(w)$

where *F* is the population distribution of *w*. Define $w^t(\pi)$ by $F^t(w^t(\pi)) = \pi$. Then the outcome functions are just the indirect utility functions:

844
$$v^{t}(\pi, \varphi) = u((1-\varphi)w^{t}(\pi)L(w^{t}(\pi), \varphi) + b, L(w^{t}(\pi), \varphi))$$

and we are ready to calculate the EOp policy. Here, 'effort' is interpreted not as one's
labor supply, but rather as those actions which the person took that gave rise to his wageearning capacity. There are different distributions of wages in different types, reflecting
the differential circumstances that impinge upon wage-formation, but within each type,
there is a variation of the wage due to autonomous factors that we view as effort and
worthy of reward.

851

852 5. The Fleurbaey-Maniquet approach

853 Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet have, in a series of writings, proposed a number of proposals for ordering policies with respect to the degree to which they 854 855 equalize opportunities, which are similar in spirit to those discussed above, but different 856 in detail. Their work is summarized in Fleurbaey (2008); the general inspiration of the 857 theory is the idea of envy-freeness, pioneered in the works of Duncan Foley (1967), 858 Serge-Christophe Kolm (1972), and Hal Varian (1975). Here, we present one of their 859 main proposals, which falls in the family of egalitarian-equivalent proposals, and as such, 860 descends from the work of Elisha Pazner and David Schmeidler (1978). The approach is 861 substantially different from the one outlined in section 3, because it does not take the 862 viewpoint that equalizing opportunities involves maximizing the lower envelope function 863 θ defined in (4.1).

864 Suppose that a population is characterized by an outcome function $u(c,r,\varphi)$ 865 where *c* is a vector of circumstances (characteristics of the individual or his environment 866 for which he is deemed not responsible), *r* is a vector of characteristics for which he is 867 deemed responsible, and φ is a policy. We will specialize to the case where φ is the 868 distribution of some resource to the population: say, an allocation of money. Let us 869 suppose, further, that there is some type (i.e., vector of circumstances c^*) that 870 characterizes the most disadvantaged type. We desire to place an ordering on policies φ 871 that reflects the view that persons should not be held responsible for their circumstances, 872 but should be held responsible for the choice of *r*.

873 Fleurbaey (2008) represents the idea that persons should be held responsible for 874 their circumstances by various 'principles of compensation;' an example would be 875 'equal well-being for equal responsibility,' meaning that if two individuals have the same 876 values of r, their outcomes should be the same (i.e., independent of their circumstances). 877 Thus the ordering of policies should reflect this desideratum. He, Bossert (1995) and 878 Maniquet also advocate various 'principles of reward;' for instance, if all individuals 879 have identical circumstances, then the resource should be divided equally among them, 880 called the 'liberal reward principle'. That is, if everyone is of the same type, there is no 881 justification for any compensatory policy. It is clear from simple examples that it is, in 882 general, impossible to respect the liberal reward principle and the 'equal well-being for 883 equal responsibility' principle simultaneously as long as the environment is sufficiently 884 rich, and so Fleurbaey (2008) is a study of social-policy orderings that satisfy weaker 885 versions of postulates inspired by these principles.

886 We summarize a prominent example of such an ordering. Let φ be given, and 887 construct another allocation of the resource, $\hat{\varphi}$ – which need not be feasible, given the 888 budget – defined by:

889

 $u(c_i,r_i,\phi_i) = u(c^*,r_i,\hat{\phi}_i) ,$

890 where *i* indicates the individual, and c^* is a reference set of circumstances – say, those 891 of the most disadvantaged type. Thus, under $\hat{\varphi}_i$ each individual receives an amount of 892 resource which makes her as well off as she is in the φ -allocation, but assuming, 893 counterfactually, that she had been a member of the reference type, and had maintained 894 the same values of the responsible factors. In the counterfactual world in which $\hat{\varphi}$ lives, 895 everybody is of the same type (c^*) and so, *no special compensation* should be made to 896 individuals from the opportunity-equalizing viewpoint, according to the liberal rewared 897 principle. Hence, the ideal policy φ is one in which the associated $\hat{\varphi}$ is an *equal* 898 *distribution* of the resource. This tells us how to order actual policies φ : we say that

899 $\phi \succ \phi'$ if the counterfactual distribution $\hat{\phi}$ is 'more equal' than $\hat{\phi}'$; to be precise

900 $\varphi \succ \varphi' \Leftrightarrow \hat{\varphi} \succ_{lex} \hat{\varphi}'$

901 where \succ_{lex} is the leximin ordering.

902 This particular version of the egalitarian-equivalent approach to responsibility the 903 authors call zero egalitarian equivalence (ZEE), because the standardization takes place 904 by counterfactually making everyone a member of the worst-off type. Of course, 905 standardizing with some other set of circumstances would do as well, although each 906 choice of how to standardize will (generally) produce a different ordering over policies. 907 One virtue of this approach is that an ordinal outcome function u is all that is required, as 908 we only need to compare the outcome for individuals to variants of themselves (where 909 they have different circumstances), which contrasts with the approaches discussed in 910 section 3, that require cardinality and even ratio-scale comparability.

911 Of course, the ZEE approach will in general give a different ordering of policies
912 than the GEOP approach; Roemer (2012) calculates some examples. Both approaches
913 are incomplete: GEOP, as has been discussed, does not dictate a choice of the operator
914 Γ and ZEE does not dictate a choice of the way to standardize circumstances.

915 An essential feature of the egalitarian-equivalent approach is the liberal reward 916 principle, that if everyone were of the same type, then no redistribution is called for. 917 To be specific, in the EOp approach, Roemer closes the model by saying that if everyone 918 is of the same type, then policies are preferred if they produce higher *average* outcomes, 919 while Fleurbaey and Maniquet say that policies are better in this case the closer they are 920 to *equal-resources*. But, as we have argued in section 4, we remain agnostic on the right 921 way of closing the model, because we do not think the concept of equality of opportunity 922 contains a theory of just rewards to effort. In particular, the liberal reward principle, 923 described above, will sometimes or often use use market institutions to close the model. 924 Consider a problem where all persons have the same circumstances, but preferences differ, due to voluntary choices. The principle of liberal reward might be interpreted as 925 926 saying that the allocation of goods should be that associated with the competitive

927 equilibrium following from an equal division of wealth. But this means that the welfare 928 of individuals is determined by a particular set of institutions (markets with private 929 property). Our objection, then, to the liberal reward principle is that in some cases there 930 is no obvious benchmark that can be considered 'natural' to define distribution in the 931 case where there is a unique set of circumstances. This point harkens back to the legal 932 realists, who argued that there is no conception of laissez-faire that is free of ethical bias 933 (see Fried [1998]) – or, to put it more starkly, the usual conception of laissez-faire is a 934 misnomer, as it presupposes property rights enforced by state power.

935 One disadvantage of the egalitarian-equivalent approach is that the notation does 936 not force the practitioner to come to grips with the fact that choices people make are 937 themselves influenced by circumstances. Recall that in the EOp approach, it was the 938 *degree* of effort rather than the *level* of effort that was taken as reflecting responsibility, 939 and this distinction was made because the *distribution* of levels of effort is infected with 940 circumstances. Now one can model the same idea in the ZEE approach, but the notation 941 does not invite doing so: there may be a tendency of practitioners to take r as observed 942 levels of effort and choices of various kinds, and this would fail to take account of the 943 fact that the distribution of choices r in a type is itself a characteristic of the type, and 944 something that calls for compensation. So a literal application of the ZEE model, which 945 is insensitive to this fact, will ascribe to persons responsibility for choices that are 946 perhaps heavily influence by circumstances, and should therefore call for compensation.

947 One of the innovative applications of the egalitarian-equivalent approach by the 948 authors is to tax policy. From among feasible tax policies, that policy should be chosen 949 which is most preferred according to the ZEE preference order. As noted, this approach 950 provides a theory of optimal taxation that does not rely on any cardinalization of the 951 utility function. Therefore, Fleurbaey and Maniquet have produced a theory of optimal 952 taxation liberated from cardinal measurement of utility (that is, from maximizing the 953 integral of some social welfare function). See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and 954 Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, chapter 11).

Fleurbaey and Maniquet also propose a kind of dual to ZEE: namely, imagine a
counterfactual where all individuals expend the same reference level of effort, but
maintain their actual circumstances. In this case, that allocation is most preferred which

958 most closely equalizes outcomes (that is, each person should be indifferent to how he 959 would feel if he had the circumstances of any other person). The basis of this view is 960 that if persons all expend the same value of the responsible factors r, then there is no 961 ethical basis for their having different outcomes. Again, this gives a preference order on 962 policies that can be defined without using cardinal utility functions, but using egalitarian 963 equivalence. The authors name this approach 'conditional equality.'

964 One way to compare the approaches of Roemer and Fleurbaey-Maniquet is to ask: 965 Can the Fleurbaey-Maniquet preference orders be rationalized as instances of program 966 (GEOP), for some choice of Γ ? It turns out that the ZEE approach can be, but the 967 conditional equality approach cannot be. See Roemer (2012) and Fleurbaey (2012).

968 Fleurbaey and Maniquet, in their work reported in Fleurbaey (2008), take an 969 axiomatic approach, proposing a number of axioms modeling the ideas that persons 970 should be held responsible for their autonomous actions but not for their circumstances. 971 Strong versions of these axioms produce impossibility results, as we noted. (This is immediately clear if one thinks of the EOp model discussed in section 3. There will 972 973 almost never exist a policy that uses all the budget available and equalizes for all π , the 974 outcomes across all types. This would be the summum bonum, from the viewpoint of 975 equality of opportunity, but it cannot be achieved in a problem of any complexity. So 976 some compromise is called for.) Their approach is to sequentially weaken axioms until 977 they find possible preference orders over policies. A significant part of their analysis 978 therefore consists in providing axiomatizations of different preference orders over 979 policies, each of which has some purchase as reflecting the equal-opportunity view. The 980 egalitarian-equivalent and conditional-equality families turn out to be the important ones.

Before concluding this section, we mention another preference ordering of
policies similar in spirit to the EOp ordering, first proposed by Van de gaer (1993): order
policies according to the value of

984
$$\min_{t} \int_{0}^{1} v^{t}(\pi, \varphi) d\pi.$$
 (5.1)

In other words, maximize the average outcome value of the most disadvantaged type.
Formally, this proposal simply commutes the integral and 'min' operators compared to
Roemer's approach in (3.1). Its virtue is that it is sometimes easier to compute than

988 (3.1). If there is an unambiguously worst off type (that is a type t such that for all policies φ and for all types t', and all $\pi \in [0,1]$ we have $v^t(\pi, \varphi) \le v^{t'}(\pi, \varphi)$, then (3.1) 989 990 and (5.1) are equivalent. Unfortunately, (5.1) is not a special case of (GEOP); it does not 991 necessarily maximize the size of the lower-envelope function θ , for any conception of 992 how to measure size (i.e., Γ). See Roemer (2012). Ooghe, Schokkaert and Van de 993 gaer (2007) compare the orderings over social policies induced by (5.1) and (3.1) by 994 introducing a number of axioms that distinguish between the two. They argue that 995 Roemer's approach (3.1) is a 'compensating outcomes' approach, while Van de gaer's 996 (4.3) is an 'equalizing opportunity sets' approach, in the sense that the integral

997 $\int_{0} v^{t}(\pi, \varphi) d\pi$ can be viewed as a measure of the degree of opportunity available to type *t*.

998 Therefore, these authors link their approach to the large literature on equalizing
999 opportunity sets (e.g., Bossert (1997), Foster (2011)) which derived its inspiration from
1000 Sen's capability approach.

1001 Our final topic of this section is the attempt to incorporate luck into the theory of 1002 equal opportunity. Of course, luck has already to some extent been incorporated, as 1003 circumstances are viewed as aspects of luck -- for example, the luck of birth lottery 1004 assigns genes, families, and social environments. Besides the luck inherent in 1005 circumstances, however, there are two other kinds of luck that are important: first, what 1006 might be called episodic luck, which is randomly distributed across individuals, and is 1007 often unobservable to third parties (being in the right place at the right time), and the 1008 luck due to the outcome of gambles. Dworkin's view was that no compensation is due to 1009 anyone who suffers a bad outcome due to a voluntarily taken gamble – such 'option luck' 1010 is due to an exercise of preferences for which the person is held responsible. Fleurbaey 1011 (2008), however, contests this view. He splits gambles into two parts: the decision to 1012 take the gamble, which is the person's responsibility, and the outcome of the gamble, 1013 which is an aspect of luck. Let us view the risk-taking preference of the individual as a 1014 responsibility characteristic, and the outcome of the gamble as a circumstance – 1015 something over which the individual has no control. Fleurbaey proposes giving all 1016 persons with a given risk-taking propensity (i.e., responsibility characteristic) the average 1017 value of all gambles that such persons take. Thus, everyone with the same

1018 responsibility characteristic receives the same outcome. Of course, the informational 1019 requirements for implementing such a plan are severe. As well, it seems to countervene 1020 the purpose of gambling. If gamblers wanted to protect themselves from bad outcomes, 1021 they would insure to receive the expected value of the gamble. If, however, gamblers 1022 are risk-loving, then they would only insure to receive something more than the gamble's 1023 expected value, and such insurance is not fiscally feasible. So in offering gamblers the 1024 expected value of all gambles taken by their risk-type, their welfare is being reduced 1025 from actual gambling, assuming that they are risk lovers. This solution, first advocated by 1026 Le Grand (1991), has other weaknesses. The different lotteries offered to the individual 1027 decision makers can be ranked unambiguously from the most profitable to the least one if 1028 Fleurbaey's solution is implemented. Indeed, the lotteries would only differ in terms of 1029 the average outcome since all risk is eliminated. All rational decision makers (who prefer 1030 more than less) will choose the same lottery. Full equality will be then observed ex post. 1031 Fleurbaey's solution then leads fully to eliminate the impact of option luck.

1032 Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2009) believe that the project of separating 1033 influences into circumstances and effort is too binary. They call 'residual luck' a third 1034 influence, and recommend something weaker than compensation for residual luck, 1035 namely, that the correlation between such luck and circumstances be eliminated. 1036 Consider the following examples: some people gain by the chance meeting of another 1037 person; popular views do maintain that persons with rare productive talent be specially 1038 compensated; the winnings of national lotteries (Belgium, France, UK) are often not 1039 taxed. The luck inherent in these examples (especially the first two) is often considered 1040 to be part of life, something that policy should not eliminate. The first example could be 1041 brute luck or due to special effort; the second example is brute luck; the third is option 1042 luck. These authors maintain that these kinds of luck should be equally distributed 1043 across types, at any given level of effort.

- 1044
- Suppose the income-generating process is given by:
- 1045

1046 where c, e, and l are circumstances, effort, and residual luck, respectively. The 1047 distribution of income, conditional upon c and e is defined as:

y = g(c, e, l)

1048 $H(y|c,e) = F_{c,e}(g^{-1}(y,c,e))$

1049 where $F_{c,e}$ is the distribution of luck in the element of the population characterized by 1050 (c,e). The above-described principle says that

1051

for any (c,c') $H(\cdot | c, e) = H(\cdot | c', e) = K(\cdot | e)$.

1052 This allows the distribution of virtual luck to depend on effort but not on circumstances. 1053 If all luck factors are named as circumstances, then the distribution K is simply a point 1054 mass. The authors propose further refinements using stochastic-dominance arguments.

1055

1056 6. Economic development

1057 The standard measure of economic development, GDP per capita, is inspired by 1058 the utilitarian ethic. If we identify utility with income, then average utilitarianism calls 1059 for maximizing average income. Hence this conception of economic development is a 1060 corollary to an ethical view. As utilitarianism was ubiquitous in economic thinking until 1061 Rawls (1971), and continues to be extremely influential in economics after Rawls, 1062 especially in growth theory and policy analysis, it is unsurprising that our central measure 1063 of economic development has a basis in utilitarian thought.

1064 There are various ways we might alter our measurement of economic 1065 development, based on other ethical views. Indeed, some alterations can be made within 1066 utilitarianism. By recognizing that some needs are more urgent than others, we could 1067 apply a concave transformation to income, say the logarithm, and measure economic development by $\sum \log x_i$, where x_i is income, which is ordinally equivalent to 1068 maximizing $\prod x_i$. Of course, this would place much more policy focus upon avoiding 1069 1070 poverty, as a single income of zero is socially catastrophic. Another approach, still 1071 within utilitarianism, is to include other arguments besides income in the utility function 1072 - education, health, etc. - but to take the average of an index of these goods over the 1073 nation. This is the approach of the UNDP's human development index. But if 1074 equalizing opportunities is an attractive ethic, then we should construct measures of 1075 economic development that are consonant with it. This section begins that discussion. 1076 As a preliminary consideration, we must clear the deck of an opposing position 1077 which argues that economic development is a technical concept, not one related to social

1078 welfare. This cannot be correct. Economics is not engineering: its goal is to maximize 1079 social welfare, however that be conceived. Even for those who abjure the possibility of 1080 interpersonal comparisons, Pareto efficiency is a conception of social welfare. An 1081 economy consisting of slaves who produce, for a very small elite, huge wealth, should 1082 not be considered highly developed, no matter how refined the technology. Economic 1083 development must mean the development of human beings (some would include other 1084 sentient beings), and how to conceive of it must be corollary to a theory of the good life 1085 and good society.

1086 If equality of opportunity is to replace utilitarianism as the ethical view of choice, 1087 then we must replace GDP per capita with some measure of opportunity equality as a 1088 measure of economic development. We will propose, here, a two-dimensional index of 1089 economic development, based upon the EOp approach. The first component of the index 1090 is the value of (3.1), and the second is a measure of the extent to which inequality in the 1091 society is due to inequality of *opportunity* (as opposed to differential effort)¹⁷.

1092 There are various methods for defining the second component; here is one. 1093 Suppose *H* is the distribution of income in the society, let H^t be the income distribution 1094 in type *t*, and let f^t be the frequency of type *t*. Then $H = \sum f^t H^t$. Let $\mu(\text{resp.}, \mu_t)$ 1095 be the mean of $H(\text{resp.}, H^t)$. Define the square of the coefficient of variation of *H* by:

1096
$$C(H) = \frac{\operatorname{var} H}{\mu^2}$$

1097 Define the distribution:

1098
$$\Phi^{T}(x) = \sum_{t=0}^{k} f^{t} \text{ on the interval } \mu_{k} \le x \le \mu_{k+1}, \qquad (6.1)$$

1099 where k = 0,...,n and $\mu_0 = 0$ and $\mu_k = \infty$. Clearly the mean of Φ^T is μ . If Φ^T were the 1100 actual distribution of the objective in society, then everybody in a given type would have 1101 exactly the same value of income, equal to the mean income of that type. (The 1102 distribution function Φ^T is a step function with the same mean as *H*.) Were this the case, 1103 then the contribution of effort to inequality would be nil, as no variation of the objective

¹⁷ For instance, take income as the objective, and define a typology by parental education levels.

1104 would exist within any type. Now it is well-known that we can decompose C(H) as 1105 follows:

1106
$$C(H) = C(\Phi^{T}) + \sum f'(\rho')^{2} C(H'), \qquad (6.2)$$

1107 where $\rho^t = \frac{\mu_t}{\mu}$. Since both addends in this decomposition are positive, it is natural to 1108 interpret $C(\Phi^T)$ as a lower bound of the amount of inequality due to circumstances, and 1109 $\sum f^t (\rho^t)^2 C(H^t)$ as an upper bound on the amount of inequality due to effort. We 1110 therefore propose, as a measure of an upper bound on the *degree* inequality due to effort 1111 the index:

1112
$$\eta = 1 - \frac{C(\Phi^T)}{C(H)}$$
. (6.3)


1113 The reason that the measure η is only an upper bound on the fraction of inequality due 1114 to effort is that circumstances continue to influence the second term in the decomposition 1115 (6.2). See Shorrocks (1980) for a characterization of all inequality indices that can be 1116 decomposed in the sense of (6.2).

1117 Our proposal is to measure economic development by the ordered pair 1118 $d = (W^{EO}, \eta)$. W^{EO} replaces GDP per capita: it is the average income of those who 1119 belong to the most disadvantaged type¹⁸. Thus, *d* presents both a level of welfare and a 1120 degree of inequality.

1121 The proposal to measure the degree of equality of opportunity using the 1122 decomposition (6.2) is not original with us. It is a special case of the 'inequality of 1123 opportunity ratio (IOR)' defined in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). Ferreira and Gignoux's 1124 preferred measure of inequality is not the square of the coefficient of variation but the 1125 'mean logarithmic deviation.' The same idea for measuring the degree of inequality due 1126 to circumstances is proposed in Checchi and Peragine (2010) as well.

¹⁸ Or, more generally, as we explained above, it is the average value of the objective of those in the population who comprise the left-hand envelope of the type distributions of the objective. Frequently, the left-hand envelope of the type-income-cdfs is the cdf of a single type.

In figure 4, we present a graph plotting the points *d* for a set of European countries, where the are taken from EU-SILC (2005) and the population of male workers is partitioned into three types, depending on the level of education of the more educated parent. (Type 1: Parent completed only lower secondary; type 2: parent completed upper secondary; type 3: parent had some tertiary education.)



1134

1135 Figure 4. The points $d = (W^{EO}, \eta)$ for a set of European countries

1136

1137 Several remarks are in order. (1) Generally, over 80% of the inequality in income is due 1138 to 'effort,' but recall our typology is very coarse: there is only one circumstance, parental education, partitioned into three levels. A finer decomposition of the population into 1139 1140 more types would lower the degree of inequality due to effort. (2) Iceland's (IS) strong 1141 position on the first component, it must be remembered, is from data before the bank 1142 crisis. (3) No country dominates all others on both components of *d*. But Denmark 1143 (DK) dominates all other countries except Luxemburg (LU) and Iceland. (4) Greece's 1144 component η is not credible, and may be due to poor data. (5) The Eastern European

countries (Lithuania, Lativa, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary) perform
relatively poorly. Finally, recall that we are looking at highly developed countries; were
we to calculate the point *d* for developing countries, there would be a much larger spread.
(For further details on this calculation, see Roemer [2013].)

1149 Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) calculate their version of the measure η for six

Latin American countries as well. Their calculation differs from the one presented here
using the SILC data in two ways: they have a different set of circumstances, and they use
a different measure of inequality. There is, as one might expect, a lower degree of
opportunity equalization in the Latin American countries than in the European ones.

1154 There is one study, of Sweden, in which the population of male workers was 1155 decomposed into 1152 types, based upon the observation of seven circumstances 1156 (Björklund, Jäntti, and Roemer [2012]). These authors use a Shapley-value method to 1157 assign the degree of income inequality due to the various circumstances and to effort. For 1158 the coefficient-of-variation-squared measure, the fraction of long-run income inequality 1159 due to effort is calculated to be between 59 and 80 percent, considerably lower than the 1160 96% shown in figure 4. It is a testament to the degree of equality of opportunity in 1161 Sweden that, with such a fine decomposition of the working population into types, (only) between 20 and 40 percent of income inequality is due to circumstances. 1162

One disadvantage of reporting the level of economic development as a twodimensional statistic is complexity; in particular, this generates only a partial ordering of countries with respect to the degree of development. One could create a single index by aggregating as follows:

1167

 $\hat{d}_{\alpha} = (W^{EO})^{\alpha} \eta^{1-\alpha} \quad (6.4)$

for some $\alpha \in (0,1)$. The advantage of the Cobb-Douglas aggregation is that the ordering it imposes on countries is independent of the units in which *W* and η are measured, so it does not matter that *W* is a large number and η is a small one. For the European countries in figure 4, most values of α in (0,1) render a country-ordering which is very highly correlated with the ordering of the first component. We conjecture that this would not occur with a larger set of countries, in which the variation of η would be more substantial. 1175 The World Bank has been an important innovator in bringing considerations of 1176 equal opportunity into economic development. Its two important publications, to date, 1177 have been the 2006 World Development Report, *Equity and Development*, and a 1178 monograph, *Measuring inequality of opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean* 1179 (Paes de Barros et al., 2009). The more recent publication contains a wealth of 1180 information on the effects of social circumstances on various measures of achievement 1181 and output.

1182 Paes de Barros et al. (2009) propose a measure of equality of opportunity. 1183 Consider a particular kind of opportunity, such as 'attaining the sixth grade in elementary 1184 school.' Let the total sixth-grade attendance in a country be *H*, and the total number of children of sixth-grade age be N, and define $\overline{p} = \frac{H}{N}$ to be the *access* on average of 1185 children to the opportunity of a sixth-grade education. \overline{p} measures the level of this 1186 1187 opportunity in the country, but not the extent to which access is unequal to different 1188 children, based upon their social circumstances. Now using a logit model, they estimate 1189 the probability that each child, *j*, in the country has of attending the sixth grade, where that probability is a function of a vector of circumstances; denote this estimated 1190 probability by \hat{p}_j . Define $D = \frac{1}{2 \overline{p} N} \sum |\hat{p}_j - \overline{p}|$. D measures the variation in access to 1191

1192 the opportunity in question across children in the country. The normalization guarantees 1193 that $0 \le D \le 1$. Now define the *human opportunity index* as

- 1194 $O = \overline{p}(1-D);$
- 1195 note that $0 \le O \le \overline{p}$.

The human opportunity index is a non-consequentialist measure of development, because the probabilities \hat{p}_j can only be computed knowing the circumstances of the children. The measure combines a concern with the level of provision of opportunities and the inequality of the distribution of them. This is to be contrasted with the ordered pair (\hat{W}^{EO}, η), which separates these two concerns into two measures. Obviously, some information is lost in using a single measure rather than two measures. 1202 The concern of the 2009 report is in large part with children. In our view, where 1203 children are concerned, all inequality should be counted as due to circumstances, and 1204 none to effort, and so the fact that the human opportunity index does not explicitly make 1205 the distinction between effort and circumstances is unobjectionable¹⁹. However, if the 1206 measure is used for addressing inequality of opportunity for adults, this may be a defect.

1207 To study this, let us take an opportunity for adults - earning an income above M. 1208 Suppose there are three types of worker, according to the level of education of their more educated parent. Denote the distribution of income in type t as F^{t} ; let the fraction of 1209 type t be f^{t} and let F be the distribution of income in the society as a whole. Then 1210 $\overline{p} = 1 - F(M)$ is the average access to the opportunity in question in the country. Now 1211 for all members j of a given type, t, compute that $\hat{p}_i = 1 - F'(M)$: this is because the 1212 probabilities \hat{p}_j are computed by taking the independent variables in the logit regression 1213 1214 as the circumstances. Hence, the human opportunity measure is:

1215
$$O = \overline{p} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2\overline{p}} \sum f^{t} \left| 1 - F^{t}(M) - (1 - F(M)) \right| \right) = (1 - F(M)) - \frac{1}{2} \sum f^{t} \left| F(M) - F^{t}(M) \right|$$
(6.5)

1216 Despite the fact that effort is not explicitly mentioned in defining the index, effort is 1217 reflected in measure, because the distributions F^t appear in the calculation. Indeed, the 1218 first term 1 - F(M) measures the level of opportunity in the country, while the second 1219 term is a penalty for the degree to which this opportunity is mal-distributed with respect 1220 to circumstances (e.g., if there were no inequality of opportunity, then $F^t(M) = F(M)$ 1221 for all *t*, and the penalty is zero).

1222 In expression (6.5), the first term on the right-hand side, 1 - F(M), plays the role 1223 that \hat{W}^{EO} plays in the ordered-pair measure we introduced above: it measures the level of 1224 development. But while \hat{W}^{EO} focuses upon how well off the most disadvantaged type is 1225 doing, 1 - F(M) is a level for the society at large. The second component of our

¹⁹ Children should only become responsible for their actions after an 'age of consent' is reached, which may vary across societies. Both nature and nurture fall within the ambit of circumstances for the child.

measure, η , is explicitly derived to show the degree to which inequality is due to circumstances, while the second term on the right-hand side of (6.5) is a form of a variance. Certainly these two measures are getting at the same phenomenon. We have a slight preference for our proposal, as it is more carefully justified as measuring what we are concerned with. But these are minor differences; certainly, the measure *O* is in the spirit of thinking of economic development as opportunity equalization.

1232 We finally consider a confusion (from our viewpoint) that infects discussions of 1233 'equity versus development,' similar to the one we mentioned at when we presented the 1234 health-expenditure example. It is often said that equity and efficiency are competing 1235 goals, that equity is purchased at the expense of efficiency. There are two senses in 1236 which this phrase is uttered. The first is that redistributive taxation may be purchased 1237 only at the cost of *Pareto* inefficiency, due to workers' and firms' facing different 1238 effective wages. This is true. The second sense is that redistribution may lower total 1239 These two claims are in principle independent. There may be policies which output. 1240 re-allocate income in a more equitable manner, lower total output, but are not Pareto 1241 inefficient. (Think, for example, of re-allocating educational funds from tertiary 1242 education to secondary education in a poor country. This might have a purely 1243 redistributive effect, without significant consequences for Pareto efficiency.)

We wish to criticize the second usage of the phrase. Saying that there may be a trade-off between equity and efficiency *where efficiency is measured as total output* is equivalent to saying there is a trade-off between equity and the *utilitarian* measure of development, which (in its simplest form) is given by output per person. Consider the following quotations from the otherwise fine report of the World Development Report 2006, issued by the World Bank, entitled *Equity and Development*. In these quotations, equity and development are counter-posed:

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1253

1254

Greater equity is thus doubly good for poverty reduction: through potential beneficial effects on aggregate long-run development and through greater opportunities for poorer groups within any society (p.2)

If the opportunities faced by children like N. are so much more limited than those
faced by children like P. or S., and if this hurts development progress in the
aggregate, then public action has a legitimate role in seeking to broaden
opportunities....(p.3)

1259

1260 1261

1262

Third, the dichotomy between policies for growth and policies specifically aimed at equity is false (p.10)

1263 In the first quotation, saying that equity is 'doubly good,' in that it is good for the poor 1264 and also good for long-run development, only makes sense if one assumes that equity and 1265 long-run development are *different goals*. In our view, long-run development *means* 1266 approaching equity – that is, equality of opportunity. We believe that the authors of this 1267 sentence had in mind GDP per capita as the measure of long-run development, and so 1268 what is being said is that equalizing opportunities will increase GDP per capita. This is 1269 peculiar in a report that is devoted to advocating the view that economic development requires the achievement of equal opportunity 20 . In the second quotation, the 1270 1271 assumption is that redressing the inequality of opportunity among the children is 1272 justifiable because that inequality *hurts development*: but in our view, it is that inequality 1273 which *comprises* underdevelopment, and so the sentence is tautological. Here, the 1274 authors have in mind a utilitarian concept as the measure of economic development. 1275 Finally, the third quotation would likewise be a tautology for us: but in the context, the 1276 authors are saying that policies which increase equality of opportunity also lead to an 1277 *increase in total income.* (That is, the third quotation is offered as an empirical claim, 1278 while for us, it is a tautology.) Again, there is an ambivalence in the conceptualization 1279 of economic development: does it mean equalizing opportunities, or increasing per capita 1280 output?

1281 It will often be the case that policies that redress inequality of opportunity will 1282 also increase total output, because improving opportunities for the disadvantaged 1283 releases talents that were, before, unused. But this need not be the case, and we maintain 1284 that our justification for redressing inequality of opportunity should not depend on its 1285 being the case. There may be groups in society that are so disadvantaged that it is very 1286 costly to compensate them: the return in output per funds invested may be small. Equity

²⁰ To say that development 'requires' equalizing opportunities is weaker than saying that it is synonymous with equalizing opportunities: we have been advocating the latter position in this section.

may be advanced only by shifting investment from uses where it generates high output to
ones where it generates lower output. (This may be so, particularly in the short-run.) But
if this is the case, it does not mean that the policy in question should not be undertaken,
nor does it mean that development is thereby reduced if it is.

1291 The ambivalence in *Equity and Development* is a reflection of the competing 1292 conceptions of justice represented by utilitarianism and opportunity-equalization. 1293 Utilitarianism, as we said, has a strong hold on economists. This is a hold-over from an 1294 earlier period when utilitarianism was the only game in town – let us say, until John 1295 Rawls's work (1958, 1971). Economists and mathematicians developed optimization 1296 techniques (e.g., the Bellman equation) which are suited to solving problems where 1297 utilities are added up across persons, but not to solving problems where the minimum is 1298 maximized. And so it is often comfortable to work with utilitarian formulations. We 1299 submit, however, that this is a bad habit that we should not continue to practice.

1300 If our view of economic development is adopted, there may be a significant 1301 change in policy evaluation. One would not have to justify investment in very 1302 disadvantaged social groups by showing that such investment increases total output. As 1303 we indicated, in the long run, such a conflict might not exist: but often, policy makers are 1304 under political pressure to evaluate the consequences of their policy choices in the short 1305 run. If a country is evaluated on the basis of its ordered-pair statistic $d = (W^{EO}, \eta)$ rather 1306 than on GDP per capita, policies could be quite different.

1307

1308 7. Dynamics

Equality of opportunity invites a dynamic approach. If we apply an EOp policy today, what effect will it have on the distribution of types in the next generation? One hopes that sequential application of EOp policies would create a society where most of the effect on inequality from circumstances has been eliminated. A natural way to study this question is to analyze stationary states: that is policies which have the property that the society they produce at date $\tau + 1$ is a replica of the society that existed at date τ .

1315 We know of only paper on this topic, by Roemer and Ünveren (2012), which 1316 presents an extended example. In the society postulated, there are two economic classes, 1317 rich (*R*) and poor (*P*), whose pre-tax (inelastically produced) incomes are w_R and w_P , 1318 $w_R > w_P$. Both the family and state invest in children. Let private investment in its child 1319 by a type *J* family be i_J and state investment in a *J* child be s_J , for $J \in \{P, R\}$. At a 1320 point in time, the fraction of R(P) households is $f_R(f_P = 1 - f_R)$. Mean income at this 1321 time is $\mu = f_R w_R + f_P w_P$. The state investments are funded by a linear income tax at 1322 some rate *t*; thus

1323
$$t\mu = f_R s_R + (1 - f_R) s_P.$$
(7.1)

1324 Let $z_J = i_J + s_J$ be the total monetary investment in a *J* child, $J \in \{P, R\}$. The 1325 probability of the child's being successful, in the sense of becoming an *R* adult, is a 1326 function of his background. For a child growing up in an *R* household, it is

1327
$$\pi_{R}(z_{R}, z_{P}) = \frac{e^{z_{R}}}{e^{z_{R}} + e^{z_{P}}}, \qquad (7.2a)$$

1328 while the probability of transition to the *R* class for a child from a *P* background is:

1329
$$\pi_{P}(z_{R}, z_{P}) = \frac{ae^{z_{P}}}{e^{z_{R}} + e^{z_{P}}}, 0 < a < 1.$$
(7.2b)

1330 The fact that a < 1 models the idea that the cultural effects of growing up in a P

1331 household (and neighborhood) reduce the chances of becoming an *R* adult. The

formulation of the transition probabilities is a reduced-form representation of a process ofcompetition for the 'good' jobs among young workers.

1334 The *standard of living* of a *J* adult is his after-tax income, which is 1335 $y_J = (1-t)w_J - i_J$. The *utility* of an adult is a function of his income and the expected 1336 income of his child when she becomes an adult; we may write the utility of a *J* adult at 1337 date τ as

1338
$$U_J^{\tau} = y_J + \varphi(\pi_J^{\tau} y_R^{\tau+1} + (1 - \pi_J^{\tau}) y_P^{\tau+1}) \quad . \tag{7.3}$$

1339 A *stationary state* is a stable set of policies and decisions. It comprises a policy 1340 (t^*, s_p^*, s_R^*) , optimal private-investment choices by households, (i_R^*, i_p^*) , and a stable 1341 fraction of rich households f_R^* , such that the following hold:

1342 (1)
$$t^* \mu^* = t^* (f_R^* w_R + (1 - f_R^*) w_P) = f_R^* s_R^* + (1 - f_R^*) s_P^*$$
,

1343 (2) i_R^* maximizes (over *i*)

1344
$$\left. \begin{array}{c} (1-t^{*})w_{R}-i+\\ \phi(\pi_{R}(s_{R}^{*}+i,z_{P}^{*})((1-t^{*})w_{R}-i_{R}^{*})+(1-\pi_{R}(s_{R}^{*}+i,z_{P}^{*}))((1-t^{*})w_{P}-i_{P}^{*}))) \end{array} \right\} \operatorname{Program} P_{R}$$

1345 (3) i_p^* maximizes (over *i*)

$$\left. \begin{array}{c} (1-t) w_{P} - i + \\ \phi(\pi_{P}(z_{R}^{*}, s_{P}^{*} + i)((1-t^{*})w_{R} - i_{R}^{*}) + (1-\pi_{P}(z_{R}^{*}, s_{P}^{*} + i))((1-t^{*})w_{P} - i))) \end{array} \right\} \text{Program } P_{P}$$

1347 (4)
$$f_R^* \pi_R (z_R^*, z_P^*) + (1 - f_R^*) \pi_P (z_R^*, z_P^*) = f_R^*$$

Condition (1) is the budget constraint, and condition (4) says that the fraction of *R* households is stable; condition (2) defines the optimal investment choice of an *R* parent, knowing that the next period will look exactly like the present period from the viewpoint of his child. Condition (3) defines the optimal investment choice of a *P* parent in the stationary state.

1353 Write

1354
$$I_J = \left\{ i_J \ge 0 : i_J \text{ solves Program } P_J \right\}, J = R, P$$

1355 An *environment* is summarized by the data (w_R, w_P, a, u, ϕ) with the intergenerational 1356 transmission functions (π_R, π_P) . For this environment, there will exist a set of stationary 1357 states. We are interested in the stationary state that is best from the equal-opportunity 1358 viewpoint. We define this as follows. In a stationary state, the expected standard of 1359 living of a *J* child is:

1360

$$E_J = \pi_J ((1-t)w_R - i_R) + (1-\pi_J)((1-t)w_P - i_P).$$

1361 The equality-of-opportunity ethic maintains we should maximize the expected standard 1362 of living of the worse-off type of type of child. Thus, if ξ and ξ^* denote two stationary 1363 states, then EOp weakly prefers ξ to ξ^* if:

1364 $\min_{J=P,R} E_J(\xi) \ge \min_{J=P,R} E_J(\xi^*).$ (7.4)

Obviously, the ordering on stationary states defined by (7.4) induces an ordering
on policies. We wish to compute the most desirable state policy according to the
preference order (7.4).

1368Solving for the optimal stationary state is complicated, because the optimization1369program is non-convex due to the incentive-compatibility constraints. The authors

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compute optimal policies for a randomly generated set of economies by analysis and
simulation. The striking result is that, in 76% of the economies randomly generated, the
optimal stationary state from the EOp viewpoint is *laissez-faire*: that is, the state should
neither tax nor invest in children. The reason is that if the state invests in Poor children,
Rich families compensate by investing more in their children.

Admittedly, this is just an example. The authors then consider a second type of policy: investment in parents. Formally, this is modeled by devoting state investment to raise the coefficient a (see eqn. (7.2b)), which reduces the handicap that Poor children face due to their background. Now, in the simulations, in 80% of the cases, the state invests in parents (that is, in increasing a), but not in children.

These results are mindful of the work of James Heckman (2011), who has been championing the importance of early childhood education. It appears that much of the disadvantage of being poor has already occurred by the age of three or four. We suggest, based on these results, that investment in Poor families may be more productive, in the long run, than investing directly in children.

A second approach to incentive issues in equality of opportunity is the work of Calsamiglia (2009), who points out that if there are several ministries attempting to equalize opportunities for different objectives, each taking a 'local' approach, the consequence may be to not equalize opportunities globally. Her paper characterizes the types of local EOp policies that will induce global equality of opportunity.

1390 Suppose that Paul and Richard have identical preferences and skills; both want to 1391 play professional basketball, and to attend college. They face the same basketball 1392 resources in their two neighborhoods, but Richard's (rich) neighborhood has better 1393 schools. So Richard is advantaged with respect to the probability of college admission 1394 due to a fortunate circumstance. Their probabilities of being admitted to college and a 1395 professional basketball team will depend upon their efforts in school and in basketball respectively, and on the resources in their neighborhoods²¹. Suppose initially that both 1396 1397 pro-basketball and college recruiters adopt a 'market' policy : they admit candidates

²¹ We ignore American colleges' propensity to admit star basketball players, regardless of their academic accomplishment.

based only on their scores on relevant tests, which are functions of effort and circumstances in the relevant arena. Facing these policies, Paul and Richard choose basketball and school effort (e_B, e_S) to maximize the total probability of admission to the basketball league and college, minus some convex cost in total effort. Since school effort is relatively less effective for Paul, he devotes less effort to school than Richard and more effort to basketball. It turns out that Richard has a higher utility, although the two boys have identical preferences and skills.

1405 Now the basketball league and college alter their policies, in an attempt to 1406 equalize opportunities. Suppose that the league's policy is to admit players based only 1407 on their efforts pertaining to basketball: then if Paul and Richard expend the same 1408 basketball effort, $e_{\scriptscriptstyle B}$, they will enjoy the same probability of recruitment by the league, 1409 which is locally fair, because they have the same basketball circumstances. Suppose that 1410 the college admissions officer decides to give extra points on his college-admission score 1411 to Paul as compensation for Richard's advantaged circumstances: he simply adds a 1412 lumpsum to Paul's SAT score. This is also a local EOp policy. Given these two 1413 policies, Paul and Richard will not alter their efforts, because of the lump-sum nature of 1414 the compensation to Paul, and hence Paul and Richard will have the same probability of 1415 college admission (locally EOp), but Paul has a higher probability of getting into the 1416 basketball league, as he expended more basketball effort. Although the policies are each 1417 *locally* EOp, the global result is not opportunity equalizing.

1418 The problem lies with the lump-sum nature of the EOp policy in the college sector. 1419 Calsamiglia proves that, under assumptions that the environment is sufficiently rich, the 1420 necessary and sufficient condition for local EOp policies to aggregate to a global policy 1421 that is opportunity-equalizing is that the *marginal* returns to effort must be identical for 1422 all candidates in each sector. Because Paul's effort in school is less remunerative than 1423 Richard's, due to his inferior school, the proper policy is to augment the returns per unit 1424 of school effort for Paul in terms of the desired outcome (probability of college 1425 admission).

1426 Certainly, many affirmative action policies are of the wrong, lump-sum type. For 1427 example, universities often given extra points to students from disadvantaged

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backgrounds, in considering admissions. The empirical implications of Calsamiglia'sresult have yet to be examined.

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1431 8. <u>Preparing the ground for empirical analysis</u>

1432 The literature on distributive justice is divided into two strands, a large normative 1433 one and a small descriptive one. The previous sections have considered the normative 1434 foundations of equality of opportunity. This section and the next review the empirical 1435 evidence showing that in many societies, ordinary people distinguish between two causes 1436 of inequality: those for which individuals should not held responsible, and those for which they should be. If people do make this distinction when discussing inequality, then 1437 1438 implementing opportunity-equalizing policies may be politically more feasible than 1439 otherwise. The issue of social acceptance of the principle is even more important if one 1440 follows Roemer's (1993) view according to which the cut between circumstances and 1441 effort should be a social and cultural decision, rather than a metaphysical one. Each 1442 society should determine the precise set of variables that describe the circumstances and 1443 the effort variables according to the views of its population. Intercultural differences in 1444 social preferences will obtain in this pragmatic view of equality of opportunity. Empirical 1445 work on intercultural differences in the attribution of the responsibility is then relevant. 1446 The state of our knowledge on these matters is still weak. Below, we list the most 1447 obvious candidates for an empirical assessment.

1448The first issue concerns the so-called 'responsibility cut.' In the philosophical1449literature, there is a debate between those who advocate that people should be responsible1450for their preferences (for example, Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) and Fleurbaey (2008)) and1451those who argue that the responsibility variables should be those under the control of the1452individual (prominently, Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989)).

The second issue concerns the correlation between effort and circumstances. Lifestyle choices (patterns of alcohol use, exercise, smoking, diet and so on) are examples of variables under proximate personal control. These choices are, however, influenced by family and social background. As we have said, for the measure of effort to be appropriate for the theory, it must be sterilized of the impact of circumstances upon it. "If we could somehow disembody individuals from their circumstances, then the 1459 distribution of the propensity to exert effort would be the same in every type" wrote 1460 Roemer (1998). As we wrote earlier, Roemer's technique for sterilizing effort of the 1461 effect of circumstances upon it is to measure the degree of a person's effort by her rank 1462 on the distribution of effort of those in her type. The same issue arises with preferences: 1463 if a large number of persons in a given type have preferences which, let us say, degrade 1464 the value of education, one must recognize that educational choices of such persons are 1465 influenced by their circumstances, and are not autonomous in the appropriate sense. 1466 Dworkin's (1981b) opposition to this move is to claim that *not* holding persons 1467 responsible for their preferences is to disrespect them. Another philosopher who opposes 1468 sterilizing the effort distribution of its circumstantial causes was Brian Barry, who 1469 believed that persons should be rewarded for hard work, even if that was induced by 1470 familial culture and pressure.

1471 The responsibility cut must also to be drawn among the different kinds of luck. As 1472 we wrote, Dworkin (1981b) distinguished between brute and option luck. A typical 1473 example of option luck is the outcome of a deliberate gamble. As we wrote, Fleurbaey 1474 (2008) does not advocate holding individuals responsible for the entire consequences of 1475 option luck. He attempts to disentangle the risk-taking aspect from the purely random 1476 aspect of a gamble, considering the latter to be a circumstance. Various compensation 1477 schemes respecting this distinction are proposed.

1478 Implementing equality of opportunity may be viewed as weakening the traditional 1479 role of the family. Roemer (2004) has proposed that parents affect the opportunities of 1480 their children through four channels: (C1) the provision of social connections, (C2) the 1481 formation of beliefs and skills in children through family culture and investment, (C3) 1482 genetic transmission of ability, and (C4) the formation of preferences and aspirations in 1483 children. He views the first three as circumstances, deficits in which should be 1484 compensated by an equal-opportunity policy. Preferences and aspirations are more 1485 complicated. If a coal miner loves coal-mining culture and instills in his child the desire 1486 to become a miner, this is a legitimate influence that does not call for compensation. 1487 What better conception of immortality is there than transferring one's values to one's 1488 children? If, however, the parent instills that desire because he views no other career as 1489 being available to the child, that transfer of preference is not legitimate – that is to say,

1490 preferences which are themselves induced by resource deficits comprise grounds for 1491 compensation. We know of no study that attempts to disentangle the kinds of 1492 preferences parents pass on to their children in this way.

1493 One consequence of viewing (at least some) preference transmission to children 1494 from parents as morally legitimate is to recognize that even a perfect regime of equal 1495 opportunity should not aim at equalizing the rows of the intergenerational mobility matrix. 1496 Parents may legitimately induce differential preferences in their children, *leading to* 1497 *differential incomes*, even if the effects of all other circumstances were miraculously 1498 compensated for. If one does not admit this, then it is difficult to justify why we do not 1499 advocate raising children collectively. At some point, when the unacceptable differential 1500 effects of socio-economic circumstances have been largely eliminated it will become 1501 important to address the distinction discussed with respect to channel (C4).

1502 Finally, the importance of the *nature of the objective* must be taken into account. 1503 Three important objectives appear frequently in the empirical discussion. First, education, 1504 which takes place mainly during childhood and adolescence; second, income, which is 1505 closely related to conditions in the labor market; and third, health, which matters for a 1506 lifetime. Education is peculiar because a good part of it occurs before the 'age of consent,' 1507 that is, the age at which people should be held at least partially responsible for the various choices they make. Health, by many, is viewed as a right, in which matters of choice 1508 1509 should not count. Thus, the *scope* of equal-opportunity policy may differ substantially depending upon the nature of the objective 22 . 1510

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1512 9. Do people advocate equality of opportunity? Lessons from questionnaires and

- 1513 experiments
- 1514
- 1515

The information reviewed here is derived both from the answers of respondents 1516 on questionnaires and from the actions chosen by players in laboratory or field

²² For an early survey experiment, which shows that norms of justice differ quite radically depending upon what the *distribuendum* is, see the seminal paper of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984).

1518 whereas they are used extensively by psychologists and political scientists (see chapter 14 1519 for more methodological issues). Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) made a plea for the use 1520 of questionnaires in the field of social choice and justice and here we build upon their 1521 reasoning. What we desire is a procedure or protocol that helps subjects to reveal their 1522 norms of distributive justice. We recognize that respondents can lie; Gaertner and 1523 Schokkaert (2012) ask why respondents would do so. In the absence of self-interest, they 1524 assert, respondents will choose to reveal their true norms. (We often assume that when an 1525 agent is indifferent between cheating and telling the truth, he will tell the truth.) The main 1526 risk with questionnaires is that respondents answer at random when the question is too 1527 complex, a difficulty of which social psychologists are well aware.

experiments. Questionnaires are sometimes regarded with skepticism by economists,

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1529 A. Questionnaire on the empirical validity of equality of opportunity

A first source of information is provided by value surveys conducted by polling companies or scientific associations like the World Values Survey. In our opinion, these are not fully satisfactory, because the questions remain quite vague and are not related to specific normative theories. Rather, they address the beliefs of respondents concerning the determinants of success in a given country.

1535 Since Schokkaert and Lagrou's (1983) early work, many surveys have been 1536 conducted, most of which propose vignettes about different aspects of life in order to 1537 inquire whether individuals' opinions about justice coincide with the theoretical 1538 propositions put forward by social scientists (for references and overviews see 1539 Schokkaert (1999), Konow (2003), and Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012)). The literature 1540 related to our topic can be divided in two subsets. The first tests the raw idea of 1541 responsibility. The second is rooted in the theories of equality of opportunity proposed 1542 by Roemer and Fleurbaey. Konow (1996, 2001)'s studies, although not anchored in a 1543 theory, introduced the distinction between discretionary and exogenous variables which 1544 is very close to the responsibility cut as viewed by Cohen (1989), although Konow was 1545 apparently unaware of Cohen's work. A discretionary variable affects output and can be 1546 controlled or influenced by the person, while an exogenous variable can have an 1547 influence on the amount or quality of output but cannot, under normal circumstances, be

influenced by personal choice. His findings (telephone interviews with a general adult
population of Los Angeles and written questionnaires completed by college students)
support the view that for income acquisition, variables that are deemed to be controlled
by the individual are viewed as legitimate influences upon income, whereas exogenous
variables are not.

1553 Perhaps the most thorough empirical study related to the philosophical project of 1554 equality of opportunity is that of Schokkaert and Kurt Devoogth (2003) (see also, 1555 Schokkaert and Overlaet, (1989) and Schokkaert and Capeau (1991)). First, the authors 1556 test the two principles of "full compensation" and "natural reward" which are at the heart 1557 of Fleurbaey's approach. (Fleurbaey (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). The 1558 principle of full compensation states that two individuals who exert the same effort 1559 should enjoy the same outcome; thus, the effect of differential circumstances is fully 1560 compensated. The principle of natural reward states that, if individuals have the same 1561 circumstances, there is no reason to transfer income between them (thus, full 1562 responsibility for effort). Second, there is an intercultural dimension in their study, as 1563 they distributed the questionnaire to first-year university students in three very different 1564 countries: Belgium (April 1996), Burkina Faso (May 1996) and Indonesia (August 1997). 1565 (See also Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007)). Finally, this study highlights whether 1566 views of responsibility are sensitive to what we have defined as the objective (or the 1567 opportunity equalidandum), as the questionnaire addresses views of responsibility with 1568 respect to income acquisition and health.

Four situations are contrasted in a two-person society. The two persons differ in only one characteristic. Possibilities of redistribution between the persons are then offered, and students are asked to choose what they think is the fair ex-post tax income distribution.

1573 The first vignette describes a difference in preferences in income-leisure space. 1574 No explanation is offered to explain this difference in tastes, whereas the second vignette 1575 stipulates that this difference comes from different backgrounds. That vignette tests the 1576 disagreement between Roemer and Barry about sterilizing the distribution of effort of the 1577 influence of circumstances. It is important here to notice that the issue raised is not the 1578 transmission of wealth, or social networks, but the transmission of values and preferences across different generations. People convinced by Roemer's reasoning should be more
inclined to redistribute from hard-working Elizabeth to easy-going Catherine in the
second situation than in the first. The third and fourth vignettes concern differences in
productivity. In the third vignette, the difference originates in a difference of effort in the
past. The fourth vignette describes a difference in innate talent.

1584 The results are instructive and we will present them in terms of how the majority 1585 voted. The Belgian sample made the most clear-cut choice: A majority vote for no 1586 compensation at all (no redistribution) in case of Vignettes 1, 2 and 3, and for full 1587 compensation for the situation described in Vignette 4. Thus, the Belgians endorse the view that preference for leisure is a responsibility variable -- they agree with Brian 1588 1589 Barry not to take the causal relationship with parents' preferences into account. Innate 1590 talent, however, is considered as a circumstance. Were that vote representative of Belgian choices as a citizenry, this society would possess the basic ingredients to implement an 1591 1592 equal-opportunity policy.

The authors find that the intercultural differences are much less pronounced than one might have thought. Still, they cannot be completely ignored entirely, since, according to the majority vote criterion, the Burkina- Faso sample is indecisive for all four vignettes. The Indonesian vote is closer to the Belgian one. Indonesians share the same views on the three first vignettes but no majority is found on the last issue, even if the full compensation for talent has a plurality of votes.

1599 At this stage, it is useful to ask whether the objective matters. Schokkaert and 1600 Devooght (2003) attempted to adapt their questionnaire to health-care situations. From 1601 the start, two differences with income scenarios must be noticed that render the 1602 comparison less than clear-cut. In the income case, the stakes belong to the domain of 1603 gains, whereas they belong to the domain of losses in the health-care case: the health 1604 vignettes describe illness and how to cope with health-care expenditures. Since the work 1605 of Tversky and Kahneman (1991), we know a peron's tendency strongly to prefer 1606 avoiding losses to acquiring gains. This may explain a stronger inequality aversion in the 1607 health vignettes. In addition, if questions are asked about how to allocate a budget 1608 between two sick persons, an efficiency issue is raised, which makes it difficult to deduce 1609 views about fairness. All studies about fairness in health care (Dolan and Tsuchiya (2009), 1610 Ubel et al. (1999) and the above cited paper) have chosen to formulate the vignettes in a 1611 scarcity context. Of course scarcity of resources is an important issue in the health 1612 domain (as in others) but a sequential approach with two steps might better elicit 1613 preferences about the responsibility cut.

1614 As an example consider two of the four vignettes proposed by Schokkaert and 1615 Devooght (2003), concerning Luke and Mark who are both suffering from lung cancer. 1616 They have the same wealth at their disposal and earn the same income. Luke and Mark 1617 have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. It is supposed that all treatments are 1618 effective. The two vignettes raise the relevance of factors that are under the control 1619 (smoking) or beyond the control (genetic) of the individual for covering lung-cancer 1620 expenditure. The respondents have the choice between different divisions of the amount 1621 of public resources: equal split between the two patients, all resources for the extra cost 1622 of treating Mark, and intermediate solutions between these two.


1623 It is noteworthy that in all three societies, equal-split garners a majority of votes 1624 in vignette 1. A majority favor an intermediate solution when genetics calls for extra cost. 1625 The social policy that this study suggests is clear-cut: smokers should purchase private 1626 insurance for coverage of smoking-related illness. This conclusion holds as long as the 1627 society is able to attribute the cause of the extra cost to life-style. These results suggest 1628 that the reason that the welfare state in many countries does not appear to be inspired by 1629 responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is not due to popular ethics, but to the difficulty of 1630 identifying an indisputable causal link in health matters. Off-piste skiing is 'the exception 1631 which proves the rule,' where the cost of an accident is generally borne by the individual. 1632 One salient issue remains unsettled: we know of no questionnaire focusing on the link 1633 between life-style and family background. The difference of opinion between Roemer 1634 and Barry has not been reflected in the empirical literature on fairness in health.

Education is another domain where we can conjecture a different attitude with respect to responsibility. Primary and secondary education take place when the person is still, arguably, below the age of consent. Richard Arneson (1990 p.179) has appealed to this fact in egalitarian debates. Lu and Trannoy (2013) have investigated whether primary education elicits different responses from income acquisition in the degree to which persons are held responsible for outcomes. They contrast the results obtained with twovignettes.

1642 In the sales vignette, there are salesmen whose sales compensation is composed of 1643 two parts: a salary and a bonus. The issue concerns the fairness of the bonus. Sales 1644 depend on characteristics which are described as follows. The salesman's circumstances 1645 are identified with his parents' network of acquaintances. Effort is described as the 1646 salesman's hard work, and talent is described as the salesman's skill. A salesman's brute 1647 luck is defined by the territory to which he is randomly assigned. Finally, option luck is 1648 described as the risks the salesman takes: he has to choose between selling an old product 1649 that has been on the market for a long time and is familiar to customers, or a more recent product with unknown customer reaction. If a bonus is to be paid to the successful 1650 1651 salesman, respondents are asked how fair it is to judge the salesman by his 1652 circumstances, effort, talent, brute luck, or option luck. The respondent has to choose 1653 exactly one answer among very unfair, rather unfair, quite fair, or absolutely fair for each 1654 of these choices.

In the school vignette, pupils face difficulties at school. Remedial tuition is 1655 1656 supposed to help schoolwork. Five factors are related to school difficulties. 1657 Circumstances are determined by parents' ability to help children with their homework. 1658 Effort is identified as the zeal with which the child does his homework. Talent is defined 1659 as cognitive ability, which is precisely described as an ability to concentrate. Brute luck 1660 occurs when the child missed part of the previous school year because of illness. Finally, 1661 option luck is risk-taking. The child wants to be in the advanced class, with his friends, 1662 but he cannot keep up with the class. Respondents were asked to judge the fairness of 1663 remedial tuition, if were necessary because of circumstances, effort, talent, brute luck, or 1664 option luck.

1665



1666

1667 Figure 5. The fraction of subjects holding the agent responsible for each factor (Source
1668 Lu and Trannoy (2013)).

1669

1670 Figure 5 presents the differences in the answers to both vignettes (432 1671 respondents in Marseilles). In the sales vignette, we interpret the answers 'quite fair' or 1672 'absolutely fair' as indicating that the respondent holds the salesman responsible for the 1673 factor. In the school vignette, we interpret the answers 'very unfair' or 'rather unfair' as 1674 revealing that the pupil was deemed responsible for the factor by the respondent. A chi-1675 square test for goodness of fit is used to test whether, subjects treated each factor 1676 similarly in the two vignettes. Respondents evaluated moral responsibility with respect 1677 to all causal factors except circumstances differently in the two vignettes. More 1678 specifically, salesmen were held responsible for talent, while almost no subjects held 1679 pupils responsible for talent. Only a small minority deem students responsible for risk-1680 taking while almost everyone deem the opposite for salesmen. The difference for effort is 1681 less impressive, since a small majority of respondents still agree to hold schoolboys 1682 responsible for their effort in doing homework. Our results are preliminary as they are 1683 perhaps influenced by framing. Nevertheless, they cast doubt on holding children 1684 responsible for educational outcomes, at least at the primary level. If that decision is 1685 implemented, then primary-school achievements should be treated as a circumstance in 1686 studying opportunity-equalization of outcomes in later life.

1687 B. Experiments

1688 Fairness attitudes in sharing a cake have been studied in laboratory experiments 1689 with the ultimatum game and the dictator game (Camerer 2003), which provide a neat 1690 elicitation of preferences. These experiments reproduce exchange or distribution 1691 economies where resources are manna from heaven. Various authors (Frohlich et al; 1692 (1987, 2004), Rutström and Williams(2000), Konow (2000), Cappelen et al. (2007, 2010, 1693 2013), and Almas et al. (2010) have conducted experiments to study explicitly what 1694 happens to people's distributive preferences by introducing an earned-money or 1695 production stage prior to a distribution phase consisting of a dictator game. The most 1696 recent articles test the prevalence of responsibility egalitarianism among distributive 1697 justice theories. More explicitly, they investigate the control view of responsibility 1698 advocated by G.A. Cohen, summarized by the principle that "only inequalities that arise from factors under individual control should be accepted"²³. 1699

1700 Cappelen et al. (2007) study a situation in which individuals differ with respect 1701 both to their investments and to the rates of return that they enjoy. The agent chooses the 1702 amount to be invested while the rate of return is assigned randomly. The former factor is 1703 clearly an effort variable, while the rate of return is brute luck, like talent. They assume 1704 that an individual endorses either strict equality of earnings, laissez-faire, libertarianism 1705 (each keeps his income), or responsibility egalitarianism, in which case total income is 1706 shared in proportion to investments. The distribution phase is a two-person setting in a 1707 one-shot dictator game. A parametric utility function is a weighted sum of a purely 1708 selfish element, and an altruistic quadratic loss term, which is larger, the more the 1709 distribution differs from the ideal distribution according to the individual's ethical view. 1710 The econometric analysis attempts to retrieve the parameters of the utility function, the 1711 marginal utility of money, and the preferred distributive ethic view of the subject. The 1712 authors deduce that 43.5 percent of subjects are strict egalitarians, 38.1 percent are 1713 responsibility egalitarians, and 18.4 percent are libertarians. The subject pool consisted of 1714 approximately one hundred students at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 1715 Administration (NHH), a sample that cannot be viewed as representative of the

²³ Cappelen et al. (2007), p.818.

Norwegian society. In addition, the results may depend on the specific form of the utility
function, which balances self-interest and fairness. Nevertheless, their results confirm
that responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is endorsed by a fraction of the population and
competes with libertarianism and outcome egalitarianism. But we do not learn much
about the responsibility cut.

1721 In a companion paper, Cappelen et al. (2010) use the same methodology and pool 1722 of students to enlarge the set of proposed fairness views. Individuals now differ with 1723 respect to three characteristics: working time, productivity, and the market price of their 1724 product. Subjects choose their working time (effort), market price is set randomly (brute 1725 luck), and productivity (talent) is determined through a test in the experiment (the number 1726 of correctly typed words in a short period). The authors consider four competing 1727 distributional views expressed by the list of responsibility factors. An empty list 1728 corresponds to outcome egalitarianism. If effort is the only factor belonging to this list, 1729 the view is control-responsibility egalitarianism. When this list comprises effort and talent, the view is named meritocratic 24 by the authors. (In other words, people may 1730 1731 rightfully benefit from their inborn talent.) Finally when this list comprises effort, talent, and brute luck, it is said that the participant endorses the libertarian view. The subject 1732 1733 pool includes students from all undergraduate years and some alumni. The differences 1734 in preferred distributive views, as estimated by the econometric model, are not 1735 pronounced among students, but alumni have quite different ethical preferences. 1736 Whatever the age group, the meritocratic view is the most popular view among students 1737 whereas the libertarian view is slightly more popular among alumni. The striking fact is 1738 that the control view of equality of opportunity is only supported by a tiny fraction of the 1739 pool: 6% among students and 2% among alumni. At this stage, it is premature to declare 1740 that these results are biased by a selection effect: however, let us remark that business-1741 school students and alumni are very likely among the least egalitarian people in society. 1742 In a less sophisticated way but using the same framework, Almas et al. (2010)

investigate how the views about distributive justice evolve as pupils mature between the
5th and 13th grades. At the beginning of this span, schoolboys favor outcome

²⁴ See Arrow, Bowles and Durlauf (2000) for a discussion of meritocratic ideas.

egalitarianism (2/3) and libertarianism (1/3). As the children get older, they become
increasingly sensitive to equality-of-opportunity arguments and by the end of the grade
span, meritocracy²⁵ becomes the plurality view, even if it does not garner a majority of
votes. Indeed it is striking that the distribution of views in this study for the 13th grade is
almost the same as that obtained for the first year of college obtained by Cappelen et al
(2010).

1751 If we assemble the lessons of these two instructive studies, they lead to the 1752 following conjecture for the development of distributive ideals over the life cycle. 1753 Starting with the stark and simple views of outcome egalitarianism and libertarianism in 1754 childhood, the development of cognitive skills induces understanding of more complex 1755 and less clear-cut views, like equality of opportunity. Views appear not to change 1756 significantly between the end of the high school and the end of the university.

1757 Those successful in the labor market tend more towards laissez-faire opinions. 1758 Were that true in the real world, we should observe a self-serving bias (Messick and 1759 Sentis (1983)) on a large scale, in the sense that individuals, given their degree of success, 1760 would (tend to) endorse the fairness ideal that most benefits themselves. In that sense, 1761 experiments are superior to surveys and vignettes in that they enable one to measure the 1762 extent of this self-serving bias. This phenomenon should be at its minimum when 1763 subjects are students. At this stage of development, subjects are able to understand all 1764 theories of justice but they are still shielded by a veil of ignorance regarding their degree 1765 of success (in the US, where 50% of a generation enrolls in tertiary education). The 1766 prediction would be that the difference between surveys and experiments would be 1767 minimal for this adult group.

We turn now to testing popular views about option luck. Buchanan (1986)
identifies four factors that determine the distribution of income and wealth: luck, choice,
effort, and birth. He considers the acceptability of rewarding effort the least controversial,
and believes that the only inequalities that conflict with common views of justice are ones
caused by birth (pp. 129-30). The difficulty with option luck comes from the fact that it is

²⁵ This study does not make the distinction between control-responsibility egalitarianism and meritocracy.


a mix of two more fundamental factors, one for which we want to hold people
responsible, choice, and the other that is exogenous, luck. A similar difficulty prevails for
talent which is a mix of birth, an exogenous factor, and past effort, which is a
responsibility variable. (Buchanan does not observe the semantic convention that talent
is an inborn factor, and skill results from the application of effort to talent.)

1778 Two papers, Cappelen et al. (2013) and Chanel et al. (2013), investigate the views 1779 of people about option luck and risk taking vis-à-vis the responsibility cut. The first 1780 article endeavors to shed light on the relative popularity of three views about option luck. 1781 The first view is Dworkin's, according to which no redistribution of gains or losses from 1782 risk-taking is ethically required. Dworkin argues in favor of a laissez-faire stance, 1783 because risky lifestyles or risk-taking are expressions of preferences. The second view 1784 considers it fair to eliminate all inequalities resulting from risk-taking. The third view is intermediate between the first two: it would approve ex post redistribution between lucky 1785 1786 and unlucky gamblers but not between gamblers and non-gamblers. This view is 1787 reminiscent of a position first defended by Le Grand (1991) and refined by Fleurbaey 1788 (2008), who considers that people should be fully insured and only bear the consequences 1789 of their decisions over the expected value of the lottery. Gamblers will then receive the 1790 expected gain corresponding to their class of risk. The experiment consists of a risk-1791 taking phase followed by a distribution phase. In the risk-taking phase, subjects face a 1792 sequence of choices between a risky and a safe alternative, where the value of the safe 1793 alternative varies. Estimates of the choice model reveal that subjects (students at the 1794 Norwegian School of Business in Bergen) have diverse opinions and split quite evenly 1795 into three groups. Roughly speaking, two thirds of the subject pool think that people 1796 should be deemed responsible for their choice of risk-taking. The same proportion but not 1797 the same individuals think that people should not bear the consequences of luck. If we 1798 interpret the econometric results as a vote, Le Grand-Fleurbaey's view is the Condorcet 1799 winner among the three alternatives offered to participants. This interesting result needs 1800 to be confirmed by other studies.

1801 Chanel et al (2013) are less precise in studying option luck but their aim is to
1802 deduce the relative importance of option luck in the set of factors for which individuals
1803 should be held responsible. They conduct an experiment on a large scale whose purpose

1804 is to reveal the preferences of agents when four factors matter for earnings: circumstances, 1805 effort, brute luck, and option luck. Three experimental sessions were organized involving 1806 a treatment of about 100 subjects each, who are told that they form a small society. Each 1807 treatment involves an earned-money phase followed up by a redistribution phase, where 1808 the allocation rule is determined by majority vote. In the first phase, participants can earn 1809 money through four different channels, each of which reflects a specific factor: the place 1810 of one's birth represents a circumstance and success at a visual-spatial attention task requires effort. Brute luck and option luck are easily contrasted by a random draw and 1811 1812 taking a bet, respectively. Votes are then organized on whether or not to redistribute the 1813 gains from each step, which corresponds to a given factor. A self-serving vote is found to 1814 be prevalent (about 1/3 of the sample who succeeded in earning money vote not to 1815 redistribute) and non-parametric econometrics are mobilized to retrieve the true ethical 1816 preferences beneath the votes. The distribution of ethical preferences among the subject 1817 pool is described in Figure 6.

1818



- 1819
- 1820

1821 <u>Figure 6</u>. Distribution of ethical preferences about the responsibility cut (source: Chanel

- 1822 et al 2013). On the left vertical axis, the figures are proportions. On the right vertical axis,
- 1823 E stands for effort, O for option luck, B for Brute luck, C for circumstances. In each

1824 square, 0 (respectively 1) means no compensation (resp. compensation). For example,1825 egalitarians think redistribution is mandated regardless of the cause of earnings.

Five ethical positions are represented here 26 . At the two extremes, we find the 1826 libertarian and outcome-egalitarian stances. Three intermediate positions are allowed: in 1827 1828 EOP1, only differential circumstances merit compensation; in EOP2 brute luck in 1829 addition merits compensation. Option luck joins the compensation set with EOP3. The 1830 two extreme positions attract almost a quarter of the views. This means that 60% of the 1831 sample endorse some version of equality of opportunity. There remains a large diversity 1832 of opinion regarding the locus of the responsibility cut. In the aggregate, the result of this 1833 experiment supports Dworkin's view according to which we should draw a distinction 1834 between option luck and brute luck, option luck being on the responsibility side along 1835 with effort, and brute luck being on the compensation side with circumstances. 1836 Nevertheless, we need to be more careful before a more definitive conclusion is reached, 1837 for many areas of uncertainty must addressed. More specifically, the design of the 1838 experiment tests Le Grand-Fleurbay's position against that of Dworkin. Redistributing 1839 gains from bettors to non-bettors has not been proposed to voters.

1840 C. A progress report

In agreement with Roemer's suggestion (1993), we have developed the view that theory and empirical work are more complements than substitutes. As stated by Schokkaert and Gaertner (2012) "The theory of equality of opportunity offers a general and consistent framework which can be applied for any cut between effort and circumstances, while empirical work supplies the necessary information about where the boundary is drawn in different societies."

1847 If we take again the four "primary factors" identified by Buchanan, -- birth, luck,
1848 choice and effort²⁷ -- it seems indisputable that subjects make a clear distinction between

²⁶ Fewer than 10% of the subjects convey an ethical preference that is not captured by one of these.

²⁷ One wonders why it is important to distinguish between effort and choice. An answer is suggested by


G.A. Cohen who distinguishes difficulty from costliness. It is difficult to lift a weight, but not costly; it is costly to sign a large check, but not difficult. Effort is difficult. Choice is often costly (as in taking a bet) but not difficult in the natural sense of the word. Barry's view that effort deserves remuneration even if not

1849 the first two and the last two. In questionnaire-experiments, the assumption that choice 1850 and effort are under the control of the individuals and that participants are well-informed 1851 about the consequences of the acts cannot be disputed, since the protocols of the 1852 experiments are clear. Even if more research is welcome, the conclusion reached by 1853 Konow (2001) ten years ago appears to stand: "To summarize, the evidence from 1854 experiments and surveys generally indicates that someone whose contribution is more 1855 highly valued is more deserving if that person bears responsibility for the contribution but 1856 not if it is due to factors outside his or her control." Does this mean that from an 1857 empirical perspective, the control view of Arneson and Cohen prevails over the 1858 preference view of Dworkin and Fleurbaey-Maniquet ? Not exactly, for the proper test 1859 has not been conducted. Except for Schokkaert and Devooght (1983), we know of no 1860 study testing both theories in a competitive way through questionnaire-experiments. The 1861 control theory has been repeatedly tested by psychologists and economists but not against 1862 the preference theory. We observe choices, not preferences. Economists are keen on 1863 promoting the concept of preference among social scientists; the main weakness of the 1864 concept is that preferences are not easily revealed to experts, let alone laymen. It is 1865 asking a lot to make preferences pivotal in a theory of distributive justice that will garner 1866 mass agreement, when, at best, only some experts can argue that they have been able to 1867 deduce what preferences people hold.

Equality of opportunity involves an *equalizing* aspect and a *disequalizing* one.²⁸ Equalization, or compensation, takes place with respect to those factors deemed circumstances; inequality is non-compensable, however, if it is due, tautologically, to factors for which individuals are held responsible. The difficulties arise when some causes of success or failure, with respect to a desirable objective, involve mixtures of these two kinds of element. Skill is a mixture of talent, due to birth, and past effort; option luck is a mixture of choice and luck. Self-protection as defined by Ehrlich and

due to the person's choice can be explained if one believes that difficult actions deserve reward, regardless of the intent of the actor.

²⁸ No empirical study has tested whether people support the liberal or the utilitarian approach to reward (as far as we know).



1908 encapsulate the inequality of opportunity with an index, as has been done for inequality 1909 of outcomes with the Gini, Atkinson, Theil and others indices. We may be more modest 1910 in just wanting to rank distributions, and be content with incomplete but robust rankings 1911 provided by instruments of a dominance analysis, such as the Lorenz curve. 1912 Circumstances, effort, and luck are just sources of outcome inequality, and we may wish 1913 to trace their contribution to overall inequality. Decomposition exercises among sources 1914 are just as appropriate in EOp empirics as in inequality-of-outcome analysis. Quantifying, 1915 ranking, and decomposing are three familiar operations which we may apply to equal-1916 opportunity analysis, and the tools are mainly borrowed from the measurement of 1917 inequality literature.

opportunity may mean different things. At the most basic level, we may want to

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1919 A1. EOp measurement as a multi-dimensional problem

1920 Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the level of complexity of the analysis is 1921 greater because EOp is multi-dimensional. Equality-of-opportunity analysis may use the 1922 conceptual framework developed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) in the field of 1923 multi-dimensional inequality. These authors focus on how to measure income inequality 1924 when each income unit belongs to a specific needs group. The information is two-1925 dimensional -- income and needs for each household -- and the aim of the analysis is to 1926 rank income distributions taking into account the information provided by the vector of 1927 needs. In EOp analysis, we would rank outcome distributions (income, health, education) 1928 which are unidimensional, taking into account the information provided by the vector of 1929 circumstances, the vector of efforts and perhaps the vector of residuals. EOp 1930 measurement then belongs to the family of problems of multi-dimensional inequality 1931 when *margins* are fixed, where margins comprise the non-outcome information that 1932 matters in EOp assessment (circumstances, effort and perhaps the residual). The 1933 inequality in the objective must be assessed conditional on the types and efforts of the 1934 population.

1935A direct application of the sequential Lorenz quasi-ordering to this setting is not1936appropriate and it is interesting to see why. Of course, effort can be seen as analytically1937similar to needs: that is, at the margin, the more effort one makes, the more one deserves.

1938 Reciprocally, circumstances can be seen as negative needs: the better one's circumstances 1939 are, the less one deserves. But these two statements have limitations. We may wish not to 1940 reward effort excessively, for reasons discussed in section 4. And regarding 1941 circumstances, there is an asymmetry: we desire to compensate for disadvantageous 1942 circumstances, but do not regard advantaged circumstances as an evil. Furthermore it is 1943 the interplay between circumstances and effort that makes the evaluation of the ensuing 1944 inequality problematic. We need to know how additional effort should be rewarded 1945 across the circumstance dimension; as we discussed, there is no clear answer to this 1946 question within the theory. For further discussion, see Bossert (1995), Fleurbaey (1995), 1947 Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013).

1948

1949 A2. EOp as a process

1950 What also distinguishes EOp empirical analysis from inequality-of-outcome 1951 analysis is its two-stage nature: one generally requires an econometric-estimation stage, 1952 preceding the inequality-measurement stage. It is not so much the difference in 1953 circumstances per se that matters, but the difference in the impact of circumstances. 1954 Socio-economic advantage has to be estimated through parametric and non-parametric 1955 estimation techniques, captured by the coefficient of the circumstance variable in a linear 1956 model regressing the outcome on a set of circumstances and effort variables. An 1957 evaluation of inequality must be concerned with the process that generates it. This leads 1958 Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) to state, provocatively, that any EOp empirical analysis 1959 must be preceded by an estimation phase to discover the best structural model leading to 1960 the results. Only in the second step should we be interested in measuring inequality of 1961 opportunity as such.

In principle, we agree. This is, however, more easily said than done. Two observations are in order. The two main obstacles to any causal inquiry are reverse causality and endogeneity due to omitted variables. The good news is that, regarding circumstances, reverse causality can often be dismissed since circumstances are frequently characteristics of states that existed in the past (e.g., one's parents' education). However, endogeneity cannot be discarded in that way since EOp measurement is plagued with informational problems. Omitted variables are widespread; a good example 1969 is provided by genetic variables which have been found paramount in income attainment 1970 by Börklund et alii (2012). Omitted variables in empirical EOp analysis cause 1971 skepticism in claims of causality we may wish to assert. The situation is even worse 1972 when the objective is earnings, since according to Bourguignon et al. (2007), ".... an 1973 instrumental variable strategy is unlikely to succeed, since it is difficult to conceive of 1974 correlates of the circumstance variables that would not themselves have any direct 1975 influence on earnings." Experiments and quasi-experiments enable one to make causal 1976 statements, but experiments can usually only study problems which are much more 1977 circumscribed than those which interest researchers in this field. We are trying to 1978 understand the whole process by which someone reaches an income level, a health status, 1979 or an educational attainment. The processes are dynamic and cover part of the lifespan of 1980 an individual and, and understanding them fully in a causal way seems out of reach at 1981 present.

1982 Should we worry about this lack of causal interpretation? Of course, if we want to 1983 give advice to policy makers about the true effect of leveling-the playing-field policies, 1984 impact evaluation needs to be causal. However, if one merely wants to measure the 1985 degree of inequality of opportunity -- that is inequality due to circumstances -- a 1986 correlation (with variables which occurred in the past) is already something that is 1987 relevant.

The challenge is even greater if we use the preference view for responsibility variables advocated by Dworkin and Fleurbaey. Retrieving the true parameter of the preferences is perhaps the most difficult issue in econometrics in terms of identification conditions (See, however, Fleurbaey et al (2013) for an attempt to estimate the individual's trade-off between health and income and Bargain et al (2013) for the estimation of cross-country preference heterogeneity in the consumption-leisure tradeoff.)

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1996 A3. Lack of relevant information

1997 It should be clear from this discussion that we need a much richer database to 1998 perform EOp empirical analysis than a pure inequality-of-outcome analysis. We should 1999 have variables describing the situation of the family and social background and variables pertaining to effort. It is quite common that some important background variables are
missing and then we have an incomplete description of the circumstances. More
importantly, effort variables are generally missing for the very reason that effort is private
information, as is emphasized in economic theory. We must use proxies, which are
problematical.

2005 The measurement of effort depends upon our view of responsibility. On the one 2006 hand, there is the view that effort takes into account what set of actions a person can 2007 access, where access is a question not simply of physical constraints, but of 2008 psychological ones, which may be determined by one's circumstances. On the other hand, there is the view that a person should be held responsible for his preferences, and 2009 2010 hence a person is responsible for taking those actions that flow from his preferences. 2011 Roemer's measurement of effort as the rank of a person's effort in the distribution of 2012 effort of his type represents the access (or control) view: one judges the accessibility of 2013 actions to members of a type by what people in that type actually do. (This view is also 2014 reflected in G.A. Cohen's (1989) phrase 'access to advantage', which he desires to 2015 equalize.) Dworkin and Fleurbaey represent the preference view, in which a person is 2016 held responsible for his choices, if they flow from preferences with which he identifies. 2017 Because almost all empirical studies (except Fleurbaey et al (2013) and Garcia-Gomez et 2018 al. (2012)) seem implicitly guided by the control view, the authors should explain in what 2019 sense the chosen variables are under the control of the individual. Jusot et al (2013) have 2020 argued that lifestyles in health (diet, exercise) are examples of variables under the control 2021 of the individual, and inequality of opportunity for achieving health status should be 2022 measured with this in mind.

2023 Several points that should be made about two variables that appear repeatedly in 2024 empirical analysis when trying to measure EOp in income attainment: the number of 2025 hours of work and years of education. The number of hours of work is a good effort 2026 variable, under the control view, for self-employed occupations, but is clearly less 2027 satisfactory for wage-earners. It is true that hours of work correspond to a quantum of 2028 effort: the issue is whether they correspond to the *desired* amount of hours. Part-time jobs 2029 may be involuntary; overtime work may depend on the orders of the firm, and obviously 2030 unemployment may be just bad luck. To a large extent, using hours of work in a given

2031 period as an effort variable is therefore problematical for wage-earners. We can be more 2032 confident that the number of hours of work over the life span is under the control of the 2033 individual because one can compensate for the impact of bad luck and low hours of work 2034 during a given period by working more in luckier periods. Using the full data for the 2035 lifespan is, however, quite rare (See Aaberge and al. (2011) or Björklund and al. (2012) 2036 for examples.) For snapshot distributions, the question arises of how to purge hours of 2037 work of bad luck, which, by assumption is not under control of the individual. Detecting 2038 chosen part-time from involuntary part-time is a difficult econometric issue. At best, we 2039 would estimate a probability that the person works voluntarily part-time, which makes 2040 the effort variable a number in the interval [0, 1]. Any empirical study that fails to do so 2041 will not respect Fleurbaey and Schokkaert's methodological dictum to do the best to 2042 estimate the most thorough structural model before any attempt is made to measure 2043 inequality of opportunity,.

2044 Years of education is also a popular effort variable in empirical studies. It is 2045 controversial to consider it as a variable under individual control, because primary and 2046 secondary education take place when the person is a child and adolescent, largely prior to 2047 the relevant age of consent. If a child is lazy in school, there might be factors not under 2048 his control that explain his laziness. Only tertiary education and lifelong learning are 2049 immune from this criticism. The problem with tertiary education comes from its path-2050 dependency: one's probability of being accepted to university depends on one's grades in 2051 secondary education, which in turn depend upon achievements in primary school. The 2052 above-mentioned problem for the two early stages of education then contaminates higher 2053 education attainment.

2054 A good starting point is to attempt to account for achievements in early education 2055 by circumstances of the family. Socio-economic circumstances may be available in data 2056 sets, but parental pressure to achieve is also an important determinant of educational 2057 outcomes, and is usually not measured. We cannot, therefore, usually give a complete 2058 account of educational achievement. However, if one views all actions of the child as 2059 due to either nature or nurture, both of which are beyond his or her control, by hypothesis, 2060 before the age of consent, then one should simply take the child's educational 2061 accomplishments at the age of consent as a circumstance with respect to determining

outcomes in later life. Family circumstances may still be important in explaining choices
after the age of consent: for example, a young adult might not attend college both because
his achievements in secondary school were mediocre (which, according to the view just
expressed would be a circumstance) and also because his parents put little value on
tertiary education (also a circumstance). Facing these two circumstances, if a lowachieving eighteen-year-old nevertheless succeeds in going to college, through taking
compensatory courses, that would be ascribed to exceptional effort, ceteris paribus.

2069 In both the hours-of-work and education examples, then, we will often not have 2070 an accurate measure of effort. It will be measured with error and bias. Broadly speaking, 2071 the authors do not pay sufficient attention to these problems and overlook their practical 2072 implications. Since effort measurement does not have the same robustness as 2073 circumstance measurement, choosing effort as the conditioning variable as in the tranche 2074 approach (see for instance Peragine (2004 and 2008)) seems risky. True, circumstances 2075 may be only partially described, but generally they are not noisy. Since tranche and type 2076 approaches seem incompatible (see below), conditioning on type seems a better choice 2077 than conditioning on tranches.

2078

A4. Age and sex

2080 The issue of availability of information cannot be raised about age and sex. The 2081 problem is how to treat these variables. Under the control view, age and sex are 2082 circumstances. Under the preference view, because age and sex are important 2083 determinants of preference, they will implicitly enter as factors of effort! Because, under 2084 this view, preferences should be respected whatever they are unless they are not well-2085 informed, they are put on the responsibility side of the cut. Of course, as Fleurbaey and 2086 Schokkaert (2009) pointed out, we are free, once the true impact of age and sex has been 2087 identified econometrically, to test whether it matters to put age and sex on one side or on 2088 the other (see Garcia-Gomez et al. (2012) for an application). When we are explaining 2089 health, it does not come as a surprise to learn that 45% of the explained variance in health 2090 comes from these two demographic variables (see Jusot et al. (2013)). This is not the 2091 thorniest issue in EOp measurement, but the reader should be aware that the extent of 2092 inequality of opportunity may depend on whether or not one includes these variables in

2093 the responsibility set. For instance, Almas et al. (2011) put age among the responsibility 2094 variables, on the ground that our concern should be with inequality of lifetime earnings. 2095 Another solution would be to exit the dual world of the model and to admit that there are 2096 variables that are neither under the control of the individual nor for which compensation 2097 is due. An example is provided in the health sphere where it is admitted, by most, that 2098 health policies cannot erase the impact of demographics. (We should not consider males 2099 disadvantaged with respect to females if, due to innate biological factors, their life 2100 expectancy is shorter.) For earnings achievement, this stance cannot be easily argued, 2101 because differences in returns, linked to gender and perhaps age, may be related to 2102 discrimination, which would obviously be a violation of EOp.

2103 As in other domains of econometrics, there is a large issue of what to do with 2104 poor data. The mistake to avoid is pretending that a poor data set is rich. Innovative methods exist to deal with missing variables. An important methodological issue that has 2105 2106 been raised and partially solved is to deduce what can be said about inequality of 2107 opportunity when we know that the observables are far from recovering the process 2108 through which the objective has been attained. We should adapt our empirical strategy to 2109 the richness of the informational structure of the database. Basically, we can contrast 2110 situations from the richest informational setting to the poorest one. In the first situation, 2111 we have a good description of the world, that is, a quite comprehensive set of 2112 circumstances and some candidates for effort variables. In the second situation, no effort 2113 variables are available and individuals can be ranked in broad type categories. We will 2114 contrast the methods accordingly.

2115

B. The estimation phase

2117 B1. The case of rich data set

The first choice is to decide between parametric and non-parametric estimation. Because, by assumption, there are many observable variables, a parametric estimation will fit the data better (see, Pistolesi (2009) for a semi-parametric estimation). Bourguignon et al. (2007) took the lead regarding the econometric strategy in this case.

2122 We should estimate a system of simultaneous equations. The first equation will describe

the process of attainment of the outcome. In the income context, it can be called a return

2124 equation, the coefficient of each determinant giving the marginal return (in a linear 2125 model) of each determinant whether it is a circumstance, effort, or demographic variable. 2126 The other equations (one for every effort variable) will relate the effort variable to 2127 circumstances and other control variables. In the control view of responsibility variables, 2128 we should understand how variables that are outside the control of the individual 2129 influence her effort variables. In these 'reaction equations' circumstances must be 2130 introduced, including market conditions (prices, any market disequilibrium such as the 2131 local rate of unemployment for job decisions) and demographics. One supposes that the 2132 reaction of individuals to their environments (market and background conditions) may 2133 vary across individuals. We should let the coefficients vary according to demographics. 2134 The difference in the value of these coefficients, if any, would be interpreted in a 2135 different way according to the control versus the preference view. According to the latter, 2136 they are preference shifters, whereas according to the former they are driven by 2137 circumstances, and belong to the non-responsibility side of the cut.

We introduce some notation. Let y_i be the outcome of individual *i* (the original outcome variable or some function of it), C_i the vector of circumstances, $E_i = (e_{i1}, ..., e_{ij}, ..., e_{ik})$ the vector of effort of dimension *k*, D_i the vector of demographics, M_i the market conditions prevailing for *i*, ε_i , the mean-zero residual of the return equation and o_{ij} the mean-zero residual of the reaction equation of effort *j*. The other letters employed are for coefficients of both regressions. In the simplest linear model the following equations have to be estimated:

2145

$$y_i = \mu_{y_1} + \alpha_c C_i + \alpha_d D_i + \alpha_e E_{i,} + \varepsilon_{i,}, \qquad (10.1)$$

 $e_{ij} = \mu_{e_i} + \beta_c C_i + \beta_d D_i + \beta_m M_{i_i} + \gamma_{cd} C_i D_i + \gamma_{cm} M_i D_i + o_{ij_i}$, for each effort variable

2147

- $j = 1, \dots, k$
- 2150

Equation (10.2) is written in a compact way: coefficients β describe the average reaction of adjusting effort to external conditions while coefficients γ are the 'preference shifters' which allow individuals to adjust in a different way according to their age and sex group.

(10.2)

It is plausible that market conditions do not always explain the outcome (for instance the price of fruit and vegetables may impact the diet, while having no impact on mortality rate). If this is the case, we may have exclusion restrictions that will be helpful to identify the system.

The omitted variables (perhaps IQ or any measure of innate talent) may impact the residuals of all equations. The structure of residuals may follow some common pattern that can be captured by a correlation between disturbance terms. (See table 1 in Garcia-Gomez et al. (2012) for an implementation for mortality outcome.) If the correlation is significant, it may reveal an omitted covariate that matters for the estimation of the full system. However, we cannot tell if the revealed omitted variables are on the circumstances or effort side.

Many authors (Bourguignon et al. (2007), Trannoy et al.(2010) for example) have argued that the estimation of the full system is not necessary if we are only interested in determining the full impact of circumstances. Estimating the reduced form (10.3) suffices if we want to measure the impact of observable circumstances:

2169 2170 $y_i = \mu_{\rm v3} + \delta_{\rm c} C_i + \delta_{\rm d} D_i + v_{\rm i.}, \qquad (10.3)$

2171 This statement, however, requires some qualification. Neglecting the shift parameter, it is 2172 true that in a linear model $\delta_c = \alpha_c + \alpha_e \beta_c$, due to the Frisch-Waugh theorem, α_c captures 2173 the direct effect of circumstances and $\alpha_e \beta_c$ captures the indirect effect of circumstances 2174 through effort. (The same goes for demographics.) However, the relation is lost for a 2175 non-linear model, such as a logit or probit specification, even if Jusot et al. (2013) found that the difference between δ_c and $\alpha_c + \alpha_e \beta_c$ is quite small. More importantly, the reduced 2176 2177 form (10.3), which has been repeatedly estimated in empirical studies, does not allow the 2178 effect of circumstances on outcomes to be mediated by demographics. The information 2179 provided by the preference shifters γ introduced in the reaction equations (10.2) is lost. It 2180 will be split into the reduced coefficient of circumstances, the reduced coefficient of 2181 demographics and perhaps the residual. A solution would be to introduce a cross effect of 2182 circumstances and demographics in the reduced equation but, to some extent, the effect 2183 of demographics as shifters of preferences will go beyond the cross effect in the structural 2184 model. The basic message here is that, with a reduced form, we cannot isolate the effect

of demographics as circumstances from the effect of demographics as shifters of preferences, and therefore responsibility variables: to do so, we would need to estimate the full structural model. We recall the claim of Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) that failing to estimate a structural model is costly in terms of the limitations that are thereby imposed in the measurement phase.

2190 We now comment on the impact of omitted variables on the estimation. The 2191 coefficients will be biased and cannot be interpreted as causal. An example from health is 2192 the presence of lead in a child's home, which could entail health problems for both 2193 children and parents. If this variable is missing in the dataset, a correlation between the 2194 health status of children and parents will be observed, whereas there is no causal link. It 2195 would then be unwise to base policy recommendations on the estimates of the structural 2196 model (10.1) and (10.2) or the reduced model (10.3). Other empirical strategies have to 2197 be implemented if we want to use the estimates in this way. Regarding the reduced form, it must be clear that the estimate $\hat{\delta}_{a}^{29}$ conveys the impact of any unobserved variable 2198 correlated with observable circumstances. If these variables are circumstances, this is fine 2199 from a correlation viewpoint. We can claim that $\hat{\delta}_c C_i$ gives a fair account of the 2200 contribution of all factors linked to observable circumstances to the income of individual 2201 2202 i.

2203 The interpretation becomes trickier if all the unobservables correlated with 2204 circumstances are not interpreted as circumstances. Let us take the example of innate 2205 talent and suppose that an accurate measure is IQ. We have advocated treating IQ, 2206 measured before the age of consent, as a circumstance. However, as is clear from 2207 surveys and questionnaires (see section 8), opinions are quite diverse on this question. If 2208 we follow the self-ownership view, it should be a responsibility variable (i.e., persons 2209 would deserve to benefit from their high IQs). Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) have argued that the reduced form will lead (through the computation of $\hat{\delta}_c C_i$) to a lower bound 2210 estimate of circumstances. If the missing variables in the reduced form are classified as 2211 2212 efforts and are positively correlated to observable circumstances such as IQ, it is the other way round. Instead of having a downward bias, the impact of circumstances would be 2213

²⁹ A circumflexed variable denotes an estimate.

2214 biased upward. The remedy is not trivial because any other simple solution fails to solve 2215 the problem. Estimating a reduced form with only observable effort would convey the 2216 impact of circumstances correlated with effort, which conflicts with the message of EOp. 2217 Now the estimates given by the structural model will be even more at odds with the ethics 2218 of EOp. The impact of unobservable IQ will be split into the various coefficients 2219 estimated in the return equation (10.1) plus the residual, meaning that some part of innate 2220 talent would be assimilated with responsibility characteristics and some part would be 2221 non-responsibility characteristics. At this stage, we should recognize that since innate 2222 talent is a form of luck, the parametric estimation is too restricted to cope with luck (see 2223 below).

2224 One of the virtues of the structural model is that it enables one to decompose the 2225 impact of the circumstances into a direct and an indirect term (through effort). Bourguignon et al (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) acknowledge that sub-2226 2227 decompositions into direct or indirect effects, or into the effects of individual 2228 circumstances, would be strongly affected by the presence of omitted variables. 2229 Bourguignon et al. (2013) show that it is no so much the magnitude of inequality of 2230 opportunity, but rather its decomposition between direct and indirect effects, that will be 2231 affected by biased estimates of coefficients of circumstances in both the return and the 2232 reaction equations.

We conclude with the interpretation of the residuals of the various equations. We first emphasize that they are not orthogonal to the regressors with omitted variables, which is worrying. That said, the residuals of the reaction equation are close in spirit to the Roemerian effort. They are effort sterilized of the impact of circumstances and external conditions. This leads Jusot et al. (2013) to estimate an equation where we substitute Roemerian effort for effort in equation (10.1), namely:

- 2239
- 2240
- $y_i = \mu_{v4} + \delta_c C_i + \delta_d D_i + \alpha_e O_i + \tau_i, \qquad (10.4)$
- 2241

where O denotes the vector of residuals of equations (10.2). Due to the Frisch-Waugh
theorem, the coefficient of Roemerian effort will be the same as the coefficient of true
effort, whereas the coefficients of circumstances and demographics will be augmented by

their indirect influence through effort and then equal to the coefficients estimated in the reduced equation $(10.3)^{30}$. This enables these authors to offer a decomposition of the inequality into responsibility, non-responsibility, and demographic parts, in the spirit of Roemer. They contrast the results with the estimates obtained with equation (10.1) where the impact of circumstances is only direct and thus follows Brian Barry's recommendation (individuals should be rewarded for their absolute, not relative, effort).

2251 It should be clear from the previous discussion that the residual of the return 2252 equation (10.1) is a mixed bag of error terms and omitted variables, which may be 2253 circumstances, effort, or luck variables. Generally the error term represents a large part of 2254 the variance, more than 70% in Björklund et al. (2012) for the residual of the reduced 2255 form (10.3). It is quite normal that the explained part remains small on cross-sectional 2256 estimation: 30% is already an achievement. Should we assign the residual to the effort or 2257 circumstance side? Several views clash here. Roemer and his co-authors over the years 2258 put the residual of the reduced equation on the effort side while Devooght (2008) and 2259 Almas et al. (2010) put the residual of the structural return equation on the circumstance side³¹. Lefranc et al. (2009) and Jusot et al. (2013) argue that these solutions are ad hoc. 2260 2261 They prefer to maintain the position that we cannot tell what the residual represents. 2262 Furthermore, when it represents 50% of the variance or more, putting it on one side or the other will determine the relative magnitude of inequality of opportunity. Consequently, 2263 2264 they prefer to discard it in any decomposition analysis and move on with the explained 2265 part of the outcome, from (10.1):

2266

$$\hat{y}_i = \hat{\mu}_{y1} + \hat{\alpha}_c C_i + \hat{\alpha}_d D_i + \hat{\alpha}_e E_{i,} \quad . \tag{10.5}$$

2268

 $^{^{30}}$ In fact, it is not quite correct if market conditions and shift parameters are introduced as in (10.2). The statement is valid for a simple form of (10.2).

³¹ They also present robustness results where the residual belongs to the responsibility set. Almas (2008) considers both alternatives.

2269 Parametric methods try to estimate the conditional expectation E(y/C, E).³² Non-

- 2270 parametric methods are more ambitious because they try to estimate the conditional
- 2271 distribution F(y/C,E). O'Neill et al (2000) were the first to use a kernel density estimator

to estimate the distribution of income conditional on parental income. It is not by
accident that the authors chose a continuous variable (parental income) to perform a nonparametric analysis. The parametric estimation already offers some flexibility for discrete
variables. Pistolesi (2009) borrows a semi-parametric estimation technique from Donald
et al.(2000). In a nutshell, since the hazard rate is defined as,

2277 $H(y) = \frac{f(y)}{1 - F(y)} = \frac{f(y)}{S(y|C,E)} ,$

2278 with S (.|.) the conditional survivor function, one can write :

2279
$$f(y|C, E) = H(y|C, E)(S(y|C, E)).$$

The trick is then to estimate a hazard-function-based estimator and introduce covariates using a proportional-hazards model. In a second step, the necessary transformations using the above equation are made to obtain an estimate of the associated conditional density function. It is known that the estimation of duration models is more flexible than of linear models. In substance, Pistolesi estimates the conditional distributions corresponding to equations (10.1) and (10.2) with this estimation technique.

2286

2287 B2. The case of a poor dataset

2288 The distinctive feature of a poor data set is that no effort variable is available, but we may still have a rich set of circumstances and a large sample. We can construct types 2289 2290 but we cannot a priori build tranches. The approach here comes from Roemer (1993, 2291 1996, 1998) with his identification axiom. It is the only assumption that enables us to say 2292 something about inequality of opportunity in the poor-information case. It is non-2293 parametric in essence, since effort is deduced from the distribution of outcome for a type, F(y/C). Two individuals located at the same quantile of their type-conditional distribution 2294 are defined as having exerted the same effort, which will be denoted e_{RO} . Formally, 2295 2296 starting from the income generating process given by

 $^{^{32}}$ E denotes the expectation operator.

2297

2299

$$y = g(C, E),$$

2298 the Roemer identification axiom (RIA) reads:

$$F_{y}(g(\mathcal{C}, E) | \mathcal{C}) = F_{y}(g(\mathcal{C}', E') | \mathcal{C}') \Rightarrow e_{RO} = e'_{RO}$$

By construction, this effort is distributed uniformly over [0, 1] for all types. This way of identifying effort has been used by O'Neill et al (2000) in a non-parametric setting to depict the opportunity set of an heir defined as the income range that she can reach for all levels of Roemerian efforts belonging to [0, 1]. The opportunity sets are contrasted according to the level of advantage given by the decile of parental income.

2305 This way of identifying effort has also been used by Peragine (2004, 2008) to 2306 build a tranche approach to EOp where the multivariate distribution is described by a 2307 matrix whose typical element is the income for a given type and percentile of the type-2308 conditional income distribution. However, this approach is not immune to the omitted 2309 variable problem that was discussed above. As was rightly pointed out by Ramos and 2310 Van de gaer (2012), omitted circumstances induce wrong identification of the Roemerian 2311 effort unless the unobserved circumstances, after conditioning on observed 2312 circumstances, no longer affect income (see their Proposition 6). This is a strong 2313 condition that will be rarely be satisfied in empirical work.

2314 The identification axiom may be questionable from an analytical point of view 2315 (see Fleurbaey (1998)), because it is not clear how multi-dimensional effort can be 2316 aggregated into one indicator, and luck factors can interact with effort in a complex way. 2317 The view that the *distribution* of effort specific to a type is a circumstance makes sense 2318 in the control view but not in the preference view. Let us coin this axiom as the *type*-2319 independent effort distribution: the relevant normative effort distribution should be 2320 independent of type. This axiom is clearly weaker than Roemer's identification axiom. It 2321 has inspired fruitful empirical strategies, both in a parametric and non-parametric setting. 2322 In the former case, Björklund et al. (2012) estimated a reduced form as in (10.3) with v_i a 2323 Gaussian white noise. They assimilate the distribution of the residual to the distribution 2324 of effort. However, the distribution of the residual can vary across types and this variation 2325 is a non-responsibility characteristic. They have corrected for variation in the second 2326 moment by adding and subtracting to the regression equation a residual term that has the

overall variance. Hence the relevant effort in each type is renormalized to have the samevariance.

In a non-parametric setting, Lefranc et al. (2009) retain this independence view of effort, which is postulated in the Roemer identification axiom, without assuming that we can identify effort with the quantile of the type-conditional income distribution. Let the distribution of effort conditional on type (supposed to be unidimensional) be given by G(e|C). They assume that the relevant effort is the relative effort denoted e_r given by the quantile within the effort distribution of an individual's type:

(10.6)

Equipped with this conception of effort, they are able to link what we can check (in a poor setting) with what we would want to check if we had all the information about effort. What we can check is obviously the equality of the distribution of income conditional on the observables, here, only the vector of circumstances:

 $e_r = G(e|C).$

2340

2341 For any (C,C'), $F(\cdot|C) = F(\cdot|C')$. (conditional-distribution equality) (10.7) 2342

We have already stated (see Section 5) that we would like luck to be even-handed in aworld where all circumstances and effort are observed.

2345

2346 For any (C, C', e) $F(\cdot | C, e) = F(\cdot | C', e) = K(\cdot | e)$ (equal-luck opportunity) (10.8)

2347

This allows the distribution of episodic luck to depend on effort but not on circumstances.

2349 Their main result, mathematically obvious but of practical importance, is that a necessary

2350 condition for equal-luck opportunity to be satisfied is conditional-distribution equality, if

2351 we use relative effort. Mathematically, if we replace e by e_r , in (10.8), then (10.8)

- 2352 implies (10.7). Is this result false if some circumstances are non-observed? Proposition 5
- in Lefranc et al (2009) proves that this is not the case. Checking the conditional-
- 2354 distribution equality on the set of observed circumstances is still necessary for the global
- equality of opportunity condition to be satisfied. These results pave the way for using

stochastic-dominance tools³³ to measure the unfairness of the distribution, which we
discuss below.

2358

2359 C. The measurement phase

Once a model has been estimated, the question of how to proceed to use the estimations obtained in the econometric phase remains open. Various choices have been proposed concerning three issues: the types versus tranches approach, the direct unfairness versus the fairness gap, and the inequality index. We will deal with these three approaches in turn.

2365

2366 C1. Types versus Tranches

2367 A way to organize the information in a discrete setting is to construct a matrix in which rows are types and columns effort. An element m_{ij} of the matrix is the outcome for 2368 2369 type *i* and effort level *j*. It is important to emphasize that this way of proceeding is correct 2370 if and only if the knowledge of circumstances and effort is sufficient to determine the 2371 outcome level. It means that, with respect to the decomposition of the process allowed by 2372 the regression, the residual is assigned to either effort or circumstances, unless the 2373 outcome is replaced by the predicted outcome. In this setting, two principles of 2374 compensation can be stated. First, we define a *tranche* as the set of individuals who 2375 expend the same degree of effort.

The *tranche-compensation principle* states that the closer each column is to a constant vector, the better. If for some effort (column), the inequality of outcome across types is reduced, and everything else remains unchanged, equality of opportunity has been improved.

The *type-compensation principle* states that it is good to transfer from an advantaged type to a disadvantaged type, provided that the ranking of types is respected. Suppose that between two types, one is unambiguously better off than the other, that is, the outcomes can be ranked unambiguously according to first-order stochastic dominance.

³³ It is possible to go beyond stochastic dominance to define the relative advantage of a type (see Herrero et al. (2012) for a proposal involving an eigenvalue of a matrix).

2384 Then a transfer from the dominant type to the dominated type for some effort level, 2385 ceteris paribus, is EOp enhancing. This principle can be extended further to a second-2386 order stochastic dominance test (Lefranc et al. (2009)). Indeed if two types have the same 2387 average outcome but the first one has a larger variance, any risk-averse decision maker 2388 would prefer to belong to the second type and consequently one cannot declare that the 2389 two types have the same opportunities in terms of risk prospects. The need to take into 2390 account the risk dimension echoes the treatment of heteroscedasticity of the residuals in 2391 the parametric case by Björklund et al. (2012). This extension leads to a weak criterion of 2392 equality of opportunity, which corresponds to a situation of absence of second-order stochastic dominance across types³⁴. 2393

2394 Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) show by the means of an example that the two 2395 principles clash. There is no complete ordering of the full domain of (positive) matrices, which respects both principles. If we connect this to the results obtained by Lefranc et al. 2396 2397 (2009), it is as if we said that equal-luck opportunity conflicts with conditional*distribution equality.*³⁵ They claim that a choice should be made between the two 2398 principles. Logically this is correct. Empirically, it seems to us, that the conflict is not 2399 2400 that deep because the principles are useful in different informational contexts. Either, 2401 one trusts the information about effort and the tranche-compensation principle is 2402 appropriate, or one lacks the information about effort, or believes it is insufficiently 2403 reliable because of the omitted variable problem, and then the type-compensation 2404 principle remains available.

Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) also point out that the tranche-compensation principle clashes with two principles of reward, the principle of natural reward and the principle of utilitarian reward. Ramos and Van de Gaer (2012) showed that this incompatibility extends to another principle of reward inspired by a criticism of Roemer

³⁴ These two principles have been dubbed ex ante (type) and ex post (tranche) approaches by Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013). The terms are misleading because ex post and ex ante usually refer to a situation with uncertainty which is not explici here.

 $^{^{35}}$ The comparison is not artificial because to some extent, both principles can be viewed as a ranking adaptation of (10.7) and (10.8).

2409 against the principle of natural reward. It seems to us that this kind of conflict should not 2410 be overemphasized if we agree to prioritize the principles. If we annihilate the inequality 2411 due to circumstances according to the tranche-compensation principle, then in each 2412 column, each element is equal to its tranche average before the redistribution took place. 2413 Hence this redistribution according to the tranche compensation principle respects a 2414 simple *natural arithmetic average reward* principle: the arithmetic average income 2415 difference due to differences in effort should remain invariant to redistribution. At this 2416 stage, this principle of reward reduces to the principle of natural reward and no more 2417 redistribution is required to comply with the requirements of EOp.

We conclude with an insight borrowed from Ramos and Van de gaer (2013), who remark that if we retain the Roemerian effort, annihilating inequality within the columns of the matrix implies equalizing the prospects for each type, since by construction the distribution of Roemerian effort is the same for every type.

2422

2423 C2. Direct Unfairness versus Fairness Gap

Almost the same idea appears in the papers of Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) and Pistolesi (2009) concerning how to measure inequality due to circumstances. We will here retain the nomenclature of the former authors, while we are closer to the latter in terms of the definitions. These authors propose two approaches.

2428 *Direct unfairness* (DU) is computed as the inequality of the counterfactual 2429 distribution when one has removed the effect of effort variables, either by suppressing 2430 them, or by imputing to each individual a reference value of effort such as the average 2431 value. Following are some examples of possible computations of direct unfairness, 2432 where *I* denotes some inequality index.

For the reduced form (10.3), a natural choice for direct unfairness is to compute the inequality of the conditional expectation of outcomes across types (a solution first proposed by Van de gaer (1993)). Since the regression decomposes the conditional expectation, we get

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2438

$$I(\mathsf{E}(y/C_{i}, D_{i})) = I(\hat{\mu}_{y3} + \hat{\delta}_{c} C_{i} + \hat{\delta}_{d} D_{i})$$
(10.9)

which is a neat solution chosen by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). The residual is set to 0,its mean value.

For the more structural model (10.1) or (10.4), where an estimation of the impact of the effort variable has been obtained, it is possible to set the effort variable to 0 or to consider some reference value such as the average effort. The inequality of the conditional expectation of outcome for an average effort level is given by³⁶

2445

$$I\left(\mathsf{E}(y/C_i, D_i, E)\right) = I\left(\hat{\mu}_{y1} + \hat{\alpha}_c C_i + \hat{\alpha}_d D_i + \hat{\alpha}_e \overline{E}_i\right)$$
(10.10)

A potential problem for both the above calculations is that the distribution of estimated residuals across types may be type-dependent. If so, then the difference in the mean of estimated residuals across types should be taken into account.

2449 The *fairness gap* (FG) measures the gap between the inequality of the actual 2450 distribution and the inequality of a counterfactual distribution in which all the effects of 2451 circumstantial variables have been removed, either by suppressing them, or by imputing 2452 to each individual a reference value of circumstances such as the average one. We give 2453 some examples below. If we had estimated a reduced form with only effort variables 2454 (something that has not been done in the literature so far), we could have the analog of 2455 formula (10.9) with an estimation of the inequality of the expected outcomes across 2456 tranches when circumstances are in the residual and have been removed. Computing 2457 directly from the data the average outcome of those sharing the same effort, as done by 2458 Checchi and Peragine (2010), is a non-parametric way of doing this. The fairness gap is then given by³⁷ 2459

2460

$$I(y) - I(E(y/E_i))$$
 . (10.11)

For the more structural model (10.1) or (10.4), where both effort and circumstances variables are introduced as regressors, we can do better and estimate the fairness gap for a counterfactual distribution where the set of circumstances has been set to a reference value, for example, the average one. Then one obtains for the fairness gap

³⁶ An overbar on a variable denotes a mean.

³⁷ Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) are the only who propose to apply the inequality index to the gap. The other authors compute the gap between total inequality and the inequality of the counterfactual distribution.

$$I(y) - I(\mathsf{E}(y/\overline{C}_i, \overline{D}_i, E_i)) = I(y) - I(\hat{\mu}_{y1} + \hat{\alpha}_c \, \overline{C}_i + \hat{\alpha}_d \, \overline{D}_i + \hat{\alpha}_e \, E_i).$$
(10.12)

2467

Bourguignon et al. (2007) propose a similar measure. The problem is, again, how to assign the residual. According to (10.12), the residual has been removed and is considered as measuring a circumstance. The above authors implicitly consider the residual as measuring effort. Another solution is to replace the overall inequality by the explained inequality, that is, remembering that \hat{y}_i is the explained outcome (see equation (10.5)), to compute :

- 2474 $I(\hat{y}_i) I(\hat{\mu}_{y1} + \hat{\alpha}_c \, \overline{C}_i + \hat{\alpha}_d \, \overline{D}_i + \hat{\alpha}_e \, E_i), \qquad (10.13)$
- a solution chosen by Jusot et al (2013).

The reference values in (10.10) and (10.12) are somewhat arbitrary and we can compute the formula for different values and then take the arithmetic mean. DU and FG as defined above are defined in absolute value. They can of course be defined in relative terms and be divided by the overall inequality. Several recent empirical studies (e.g. Aaberge et al (2011), Checchi and Peragine (2010)) perform both estimations of the inequality of opportunity as robustness checks.

2482 The measurement of unjust inequality using direct unfairness is linked to the 2483 tranche-compensation principle as follows: if direct unfairness computed according to formula $(10.10)^{38}$ for some matrix *m* is lower than for some other matrix *m'* for all 2484 2485 inequality indices, then m is preferred to m' according to the tranche-compensation 2486 principle where the considered transfers are of the Pigou-Dalton sort. Similarly, there is a 2487 link between the *type-compensation principle* and the fairness gap. Indeed, if *m* is 2488 preferred to m' according to the type-compensation principle, then the FG is lower for m2489 than for m', computed according to (10.12), for all inequality indices when the reference 2490 type is different from the two types involved in the Pigou-Dalton transfer. The statement 2491 is not as general for FG as for DU since we cannot extend the above statement whatever 2492 the reference type, the choice of which is ad hoc. This leads some authors to consider 2493 instead a weighted average of the FG. In that case it can be proved that, if m is preferred

³⁸ In a parametric or non-parametric way.

to m' according to the type-compensation principle, then the weighted³⁹ sum of the FGs is lower for m than for m', computed according to (10.12), for all inequality indices belonging to the entropy class.

2497 We conclude the discussion of direct unfairness and the fairness gap by observing 2498 that the concepts in substance are not new as methods of decomposing inequality among 2499 its sources. When Shorrocks (1980) advocated the use of the variance, he observed in his 2500 conclusion that when one thinks about the contribution of one source to inequality, one 2501 can wonder either about how much inequality is left when the impact of this inequality 2502 factor is neutralized, or about how much inequality remains when the other sources are 2503 equalized. This is exactly the choice available in the literature on EOp measurement. 2504 Shorrocks also observed that when there are two sources (here, the set of circumstances 2505 and the set of effort variables) the natural decomposition of the variance given by the 2506 covariance of the source with outcome has a nice interpretation: the covariance of a 2507 source is just equal to the arithmetic mean of the above two computations. In the context 2508 of EOp, this means that the covariance of circumstances with outcome is the arithmetic 2509 mean of the direct unfairness and fairness gap when the other source is removed in the 2510 computations (not put at a reference level). This point was made by Jusot and al. (2013) 2511 and and by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) (see their appendix).

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2513 C3. The choice of an index

The entire spectrum of inequality indices has been used by researchers in EOp, perhaps with the exception of Atkinson's indices. One can speculate that the absence of the Atkinson indices is due to EOp's not being a welfarist theory. Lefranc et al. (2009b) and Almas et al (2011) have used the Gini index, and Aaberge et al.(2011) have used the rank-independent measures. Elements of the entropy family have been used by Bourguignon et al.(2007) who picked the Theil index, and Checchi and Peragine (2010),

³⁹ For the statement to be true, the weights cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The weight of a type is given by the weight of this type in the between-type term.

2520 Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), Lefranc et al. (2012) use the mean logarithmic deviation 2521 (MLD). Pistolesi (2009) and Björklund et al. (2012) are eclectic and use a range of 2522 measures. These examples are when the objective is income attainment, and they are 2523 relative measures. When the objective is health status (self-assessed health or mortality), 2524 it makes sense to use an absolute measure such as the variance, a choice made by Jusot 2525 and al (2013) and Bricard et al (2013), which possesses the decomposition property 2526 mentioned above. However, the variance is not such a good choice for income 2527 attainment since it is not relative. Returning to the income case, there is no first-best 2528 choice. The connection with stochastic dominance, which is the advantage of rank-2529 dependent measures, among them the Gini index, is counterbalanced by the 2530 decomposability properties of the entropy family. The relevant decomposition is among 2531 sources of inequality, and not so much among subpopulations, and the Shapley 2532 decomposition (Chantreuil and Trannoy (2013) and Shorrocks (2013)) can be applied to 2533 any inequality index.

2534 The property of path independence of the MLD pointed out by Foster and 2535 Shneyerov (2000) has recently been emphasized by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) to 2536 single out this index. Indeed, path independence is interesting in the context of EOp 2537 because it can be interpreted as saying that the inequality measured by the direct 2538 unfairness criterion be equal to the inequality measured by the fairness gap. This 2539 proposition has to be qualified. Direct unfairness is computed as the inequality of the 2540 average outcome across types. The fairness gap is obtained by rescaling the distribution 2541 of the outcome due to effort by the ratio of average income to average income in a type. 2542 This is one among many possibilities for nullifying the impact of circumstantial factors. 2543 Thus, if we find this way of neutralizing the impact of circumstantial inequalities 2544 appealing for the fairness gap, then we do not have to worry about computing two 2545 measures of EOp because they are equivalent (under path independence). We conclude 2546 by saying that in the health realm, variance may be a better choice, while MLD is 2547 prominent for income achievement.

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D. Results

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2551 It is beyond our scope to present a unified treatment of all empirical results. As 2552 argued earlier, the estimates of inequality of opportunity are likely a lower bound of the 2553 true figure in all cases and the magnitude of the underestimation is inversely related to 2554 the richness of the dataset. Consequently, the importance of the empirical results has to 2555 be gauged by considering the number of types that can be defined with the dataset. 2556 Intriguing issues that may arouse the curiosity of the readers can be easily identified. 2557 First, what is the extent of equality of opportunity with respect to overall inequality? 2558 What is the contribution of effort to inequality, is it larger than that of circumstances? Is 2559 the indirect contribution of circumstances through its impact on effort sizeable? Does it 2560 make much difference to follow Roemer's viewpoint in measuring effort, or will using 2561 absolute measures of effort give similar results? Among circumstances, what are the most 2562 significant? Is there a common pattern among inequalities of opportunity with respect to 2563 the objectives of health, education and income? Is there a difference of magnitude in 2564 inequality of opportunity between the developed countries and the developing countries? 2565 Does the ranking of countries differ when we look at inequality of opportunities versus 2566 inequality of outcomes? Do taxes and benefits or other instruments make a large 2567 difference when measuring EOp? (I.e., inequality of opportunity for pre-fisc versus 2568 post-fisc income.)

Starting from a very coarse definition of types, (three levels for father's education, five levels for income), Lefranc et al. (2009b) found that Sweden and Norway almost achieve equality of opportunity for income, while at the other extreme in the range of western countries lie Italy and the US, with other European countries in the middle. The qualitative results are similar to those of Roemer et al (2003). We will take a closer look at the Nordic countries before reporting the results obtained for Italy and the US. We will then contrast these results with those obtained for Latin America, Africa and Turkey.

Three thorough empirical studies have studied EOp for income in Scandinavia: Aaberge et al. (2011) and Almas et al. (2011) for Norway, and Björklund et al. (2012) for Sweden. Starting with the latter, the authors claim that they have a fine-grained typology (1152 types), which partitions the sample into types based upon parental income quartile group (four groups), parental education group (three groups), family structure/type (two groups), number of siblings (three groups), IQ quartile groups (four groups), and body

mass index (BMI) quartile group at age 18 (four groups).⁴⁰ The random sample is 2582 2583 consists of 35% of Swedish men born between 1955 and 1967 and the outcome is an 2584 average of pre-fisc income over 7 years (age group: 32-38). Looking at the graphs of 2585 stochastic dominance reveals something that was already present in Lefranc et al. 2586 (2009b). The income CDFs of the different educational or parental-income types are 2587 quite close. The differences are more pronounced for IQ-types. Parametric results reveal 2588 that the three most important contributors to inequality of opportunity are parental 2589 income, IQ, and the type heterogeneity of the disturbance (which may be due to effort, 2590 luck or unobserved type heterogeneity, because the parental-income and education group 2591 are still large). Looking at the Gini coefficient (the results are a bit sensitive to the 2592 measure, as usual), putting IQ aside, the other 'social' circumstances account for between 2593 15.3% and 18.7% of the overall Gini. That means that in the counterfactual situation 2594 where the only factors of inequality would be these social circumstances, the Gini 2595 coefficient would attain a modest value of 0.043 for the oldest cohort! The contribution 2596 of IQ represents about 12% of the overall Gini. So far, these results are very impressive 2597 and confirm that Sweden is close to reaching a situation of equal opportunity. Still, it will 2598 remain to see if introducing parental income in a continuous way and perhaps education 2599 of both mother and father, thus refining the typology, would alter the results significantly.

2600 The results for Norway obtained by Aaberge and al. (2011) are built upon a 2601 coarser typology (three educational parental levels, to grow up in a large family or not, to 2602 be born in a main city or not, and birth cohort). Tranches are defined by relying upon the 2603 Roemer identification axiom. The data come from a rich longitudinal set containing 2604 records for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2006, enabling one to build up a permanent 2605 income measure. The Gini coefficient in permanent income is as low as 0.17, and the 2606 authors graph Pen's parade (the inverses of the permanent income CDFs) for the three 2607 educational groups. These inverse CDF's are quite close. The Gini coefficient 2608 corresponding to inequality of opportunity is about 0.05 suggesting that opportunity 2609 inequality accounts for about 28 percent of income inequality when the analysis is based on permanent income. Since the typology is coarser than in Björklund et al. (2012) for 2610

⁴⁰ BMI is measured at a young age. It would be far more controversial to put BMI on the circumstance side for older people. Of course, there are genetic roots of obesity among some subjects, but the main determinant is lifestyle (see the discussion in Bricard et al. (2013)).

2611 Sweden, the results so far are compatible with a higher inequality of opportunity and 2612 likely a higher contribution of inequality of opportunity to overall inequality. Almas et al. 2613 (2010) use a different methodology and the results cannot be easily compared. 2614 Nevertheless, we can observe an upper bound for the impact of effort. If we consider the 2615 usual candidates for effort variables such as years of education, hours of work (for those 2616 who work), working in the public sector, county of residence, choice of university major, 2617 then effort's raw contribution to the Gini in Norway in 1986 is about 25.5% in the pre-tax 2618 income when we do not sterilize effort variables of the impact of circumstances. 2619 However, the impact of parental background on effort variables is quite small. It 2620 represents one Gini point over a Gini of 0.26.

2621 Next, we will review results on the 'poor achievers' of the EOp class among 2622 developed countries, the US and Italy. Pistolesi (2009) uses panel data, the PSID from 1968 to 2001, and he considers age, race, education of both parents, the region of birth 2623 2624 and the occupation of the father as circumstances. The two responsibility variables are the 2625 years of education and the hours of work. Their conditional distributions are estimated 2626 non-parametrically against the vector of circumstances. Pistolesi then predicts two 2627 counterfactual distributions for both educational and working-duration distributions. In 2628 the first, the effect of unequal circumstances is removed, whereas each individual is 2629 assumed to have exerted the same effort in the second. The circumstances have a weaker 2630 impact on hours of work than on education, a finding quite common across empirical 2631 studies, and which makes sense. A presentation of the results with the Gini to allow 2632 comparisons with previous studies shows that the share of inequality due to 2633 circumstances in the direct unfairness sense is about 35% for a five-year average earnings 2634 at the mean point of the distribution. It is indisputably higher than in Sweden but it 2635 follows a quite remarkable decreasing trend over the period. If the results were confirmed, 2636 it would mean that the increase in inequality that has occurred in the US is not due to an 2637 increase in inequality of opportunity. Checchi and Peragine (2010) study the inequality of 2638 opportunity in Italy. There are three circumstances: parents' education (five types), sex, 2639 and regions (North, South). What is striking is that with such a coarse typology, they 2640 find that inequality of opportunity accounts for about 20% of overall income inequality in 2641 Italy -- that is, higher than the 16% in Sweden with a much finer typology.

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2642 Next we will turn to less developed countries. The Latin-American study by 2643 Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) provides results that can be compared with previous studies. 2644 Circumstances are defined as ethnicity, father's and mother's occupation, and birth 2645 region, for Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Colombia and Peru. The number of 2646 types is more than one hundred for the first four countries and about fifty for the last two 2647 countries. The contribution of circumstances to inequality is quite high and it varies quite 2648 a lot across the six countries. If we look at income, Guatemala and Brazil have in 2649 common a high value of the share explained by observed circumstances, about one-third, 2650 followed by Panama (30%) and Ecuador (26%). The contribution of inequality of 2651 opportunity to total inequality is about 28% in Peru and only 23% in Colombia. However, 2652 these two countries have fewer types, which biases the estimates downward with respect 2653 to the other countries. The authors also provide estimates of the contribution of non-2654 responsibility characteristics to consumption inequality per capita, which may be more 2655 similar to permanent income. The degree to which inequality of opportunity explains 2656 inequality is even higher for some countries, over 50% for Guatemala. Ferreira et al 2657 (2011) study the case of Turkey, which has roughly the same level of development as 2658 Brazil, and find that on a sample of ever-married women aged 30–49, inequality of 2659 opportunity accounts for at least 26% of overall inequality in imputed consumption, 2660 which is by and large a lower value that those found for Latin American countries, except 2661 for Colombia. For African countries we will refer to the study of Cogneau and Mesple-2662 Soms (2008). The surveys that are selected are the only large-sample nationally 2663 representative surveys in Africa that provide information on parental background for 2664 adult respondents. They cover two countries under Britain's former colonial rule, Ghana 2665 and Uganda, and three countries under France's former colonial rule, Ivory Coast, Guinea, 2666 and Madagascar. The types are defined by a small number of occupational, educational 2667 and geographical circumstances. For the two most developed countries, Ivory Coast and 2668 Ghana, the Gini inequality of opportunity index is about 0.15 (the triple of what is found 2669 in Sweden) and it represents about one-third of overall inequality (0.45). The information 2670 is poorer for other countries but, given the results one has on a comparative basis, one can 2671 guess that the share of inequality of opportunity is even higher there.

2672 All in all, it seems that the inequality of opportunity for income is highly 2673 correlated with inequality of income. This observation is confirmed by the high 2674 correlation (0.67) between these two kinds of inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient 2675 for western countries (Lefranc et al. (2009)). Moreover, this strong correlation seems a 2676 general pattern that does not depend on the outcome chosen. Indeed, working on the 2677 Retrospective Survey of SHARELIFE, which focuses on life histories of Europeans aged 2678 50 and over, Bricard et al. (2013) observe a positive correlation of about 0.39 between 2679 inequality of opportunity in health and health inequality. Furthermore, since lifestyles are 2680 documented in this dataset, the authors are able to show that inequalities of opportunity 2681 for health status in Europe represent on average half of the health inequalities due to both 2682 circumstances and effort (lifestyles). There are, however, large variations across 2683 countries. The health indicator in this study is SAH (self-assessed health) but using 2684 mortality indicators as in Garcia-Gomez et al. (2012), the importance of lifestyles also 2685 comes out as a distinctive feature. These authors use a rich dataset for the Netherlands 2686 (1998-2007), linking information about mortality, health events and lifestyles. They 2687 estimate a full structural model that reveals strong educational gradients in healthy 2688 lifestyles which in turn have the expected effect on mortality.

We are at the very beginning of solid empirical analyses of inequality of opportunity. Analysis has been hampered so far by limitation of data sets and the intricacy of the issue. For each recent paper beginning with Bourguignon et al. (2007), the same ritual sentence appears in the introduction, to the effect that 'this set of circumstance and effort variables is richer than those used so far in the existing empirical literature on inequality of opportunity.' If this trend continues, we can be optimistic that, in the coming years, data sets will improve, as the stakes become clearer.

2696

2697 11. <u>Conclusion</u>

The main contribution of the equality-of-opportunity literature to the vast literature on inequality is to point out that the *source* of inequality matters from an ethical viewpoint. Most would agree that effects of circumstances on persons' well-being that are beyond the control of individuals should be rectified, while at least some differential outcomes due to choice are not compensable at the bar of justice. Thus, measures of inequality *as such* are not terribly useful – unless one is a simple outcome-egalitarian,
who views all inequality as unjust. To the extent that economists ignore this ethical
principle – and popular view – their measurements of inequality will not persuade people
to rectify it.

2707 As we said, the theory of equal opportunity involves both an equalizing aspect 2708 and a disequalizing one. Some philosophers focus – we believe excessively – on the 2709 disequalizing aspect, which induces criticisms of the approach from the left. We 2710 mention the work of Scheffler (2003) and Anderson (1999), both of whom criticize what 2711 they call 'luck egalitarianism' as too focused upon individual choice: to this they oppose 2712 a view of 'democratic equality' which involves treating all persons with equal dignity and 2713 respect. Indeed, one would surely be sympathetic to their complaint, if the entirety of 2714 the equal-opportunity approach were limited to cases of expensive tastes, whether or not society should pay for the hospitalization of the motor cyclist who crashes having chosen 2715 2716 not to wear a helmet, or even with the more socially important issue of the responsibility 2717 for smoking-related disease. These examples focus upon the disequalizing aspect of the 2718 equal-opportunity view – that the effects of poor choices are not compensable in the strict 2719 interpretation of the view. However, we believe that the main focus of the EOp view is 2720 upon its mandate for *equalization* of outcomes that are due to differential circumstances: 2721 most urgently, at this juncture in history, for eliminating differences in income, health, 2722 and educational achievement which are due to the vastly different socio-economic 2723 backgrounds in which children are raised, due in large part to the institutions of our 2724 capitalist societies. The bourgeois revolutions, which eliminated feudalism and 2725 inequality of opportunity due to arbitrary social status, although not complete (think of 2726 caste in India), marked a huge advance in the equalization of opportunities: but they 2727 replaced feudal inequality of opportunity with inequality of opportunity due to 2728 differential wealth. (Of course, ancient forms of inequality of opportunity, due to gender, 2729 ethnicity, and race still remain as well.) The Nordic social democracies have done most 2730 at eliminating inequality of opportunity due to income and wealth⁴¹.

⁴¹ One should also query, of those who advocate 'democratic equality' over the kind of equality of opportunity discussed here, whether democratic equality of the kind they

2731 We have characterized economic development earlier as an elimination of 2732 inequality of opportunity due to parental socio-economic status. Assuming development 2733 continues globally, according to this measure, we will eventually replace the most 2734 important circumstance with – we conjecture—inequality due to natural talent. Many 2735 people in the experiments we reported support the meritocratic view, that returns to 2736 natural talent are just. Perhaps, as we succeed gradually in eliminating inequalities of 2737 important objectives that are due to differential wealth, the focus will then turn to 2738 inequalities due to differential natural talent. This would not necessarily require that 2739 untalented people be compensated for not having access to the pleasure which talented 2740 people enjoy from exercising their talents, but it may well require that no income 2741 advantage accrue to the talented. (The taxman will not bill you because you get great 2742 pleasure from singing in the shower.) Think of the communist slogan, "From each 2743 according to his ability, to each according to his need." That slogan does not begrudge 2744 the psychological pleasure and social respect that talent garners, but advocates a complete 2745 separation of *income* from talent.

2746 Skeptics will say that markets will always be necessary in large and complex 2747 societies, and markets cannot operate efficiently if earnings are too sharply divorced from 2748 productive contribution. But this view accepts without question the assumption that 2749 individuals always maximize selfishly against the tax regime, or other redistributive 2750 policy, which they face. In other words, the incentive problem, so central to economic 2751 theory today, takes that problem as a fact of nature, like Newton's laws of gravitation. It 2752 is, however, not a fact of that kind, but rather a corollary to a particular human 2753 psychology, that has developed in a particular historical epoch, when material scarcity is still prevalent globally, and capitalist economic relations are virtually ubiquitous⁴². It is 2754

envisage can possibly exist before the invidious inequalities due to circumstances are eliminated. How can people treat each other as equals when massive material inequalities among them, due to luck, continue to exist?

⁴² We do not claim that humans have no propensity to be self-interested, but rather that that propensity may be vastly overblown. It is difficult to know how human psychology will change as material scarcity fades into the past.

2755	quite possible (and we believe it to be so) that human material needs are limited, and an
2756	historical period will arrive, perhaps relatively soon, when they are more or less
2757	universally satisfied. Keynes (1930) in fact argued that such an epoch was virtually upon
2758	us, at least in what he called the progressive countries, and that attitudes towards material
2759	acquisition would change radically over the next century. If and when this occurs, it
2760	seems to us quite reasonable to conjecture that societies will attempt to eliminate
2761	differential rewards to talent, having by then done away with inequalities due to feudal
2762	status, and capitalist wealth. The question of how an economic mechanism can
2763	accomplish this efficiently may well be the central problem for economists of that era.
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