

Notes for

## Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games

Dilip Abreu (Princeton) and David Pearce (NYU)

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# 1. Introduction

Nash (1953) considers a scenario in which two players may choose their strategies independently, but in which contractual enforcement is available both for strategic agreements the two players may come to, and for threats each player makes about what she will do if agreement is not reached. Nash gives two analyses of this problem, and shows that the two solutions coincide. One builds upon Nash (1950) in giving an axiomatic treatment, while the other devises what is now called a “Nash demand game” whose payoffs are perturbed to yield a unique refined Nash equilibrium payoff pair. Carrying out this dual axiomatic/noncooperative approach to strategic problems with contracts is what has been dubbed “the Nash program”.

This paper attempts to implement the Nash program in a broad class of two-player stochastic games. Leaving behind the static world of Nash (1953), it admits problems in which the state of the world (for example, firms’ marginal costs, capital stocks, inventories and so on) may evolve over time, perhaps influenced by the players’ actions. Like a game without state variables, a stochastic game with contracts is, in essence, a bargaining problem. One wants to know how players are likely to divide the surplus afforded by their stochastic environment.

Since the passage of time is crucial in a stochastic game, whereas it plays no role in Nash (1953), it is not immediately clear how to

do an exercise in the spirit of Nash in these dynamic settings. For this reason, we begin in Section 2 by recasting the atemporal game of Nash as a strictly repeated discounted game. At the beginning of each period, players select actions for that period, and have an opportunity to bargain over how to split the surplus for the rest of the infinite-horizon game. If agreement is not reached in period 1, there is another opportunity to bargain in period 2, and so on. All stationary perfect equilibria of the intertemporal game approach (as slight stochastic perturbations as in Nash (1953) tend to zero) the same division of surplus as the static Nash bargaining with threats (NBWT) solution. The result is independent of the rate of interest.

After the stochastic game model is introduced in Section 3, Section 4 develops the proposed solution for a broad class of these games. At the heart of the analysis is a family of interlocking Nash bargaining problems. With each state  $\omega$  is associated a bargaining set (the convex hull of the set of all pairs of expected present discounted values of strategy profiles for the game starting in  $\omega$ ) and a disagreement point. The disagreement point is determined partly by the “threat” actions played in  $\omega$ , and partly by the solution values of possible successor states of  $\omega$ . The solution value at  $\omega$  is generated by the feasible set and disagreement point at  $\omega$  by the maximization of the “Nash product” just as it is in Nash (1950, 1953). At least one solution (giving action pairs and value pairs in each state)

exists, and we give sufficient conditions for all solutions to have the same value pair starting at state  $\omega$ : call this value pair  $V^*(\omega)$ .

Consider perturbing the game  $G$  so that it is not perfectly predictable whether a given pair of demands is feasible at  $\omega$ . Section 5 establishes that all Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs have the same limit as the perturbation approaches 0; for the game starting at  $\omega$ , this limit equals  $V^*(\omega)$ , the solution value suggested by the family of NBWT problems from the preceding paragraph.

Thus, the solution  $V^*(\omega)$  has been given a noncooperative interpretation. Section 6 demonstrates that, applying the axiomatic approach of Nash (1953) to the family of NBWT problems of Section 3, one gets unique predictions of how surplus will be divided starting in any state  $\omega$ . Showing that this prediction coincides with  $V^*(\omega)$  completes the Nash program for stochastic games.

Given the flexibility of the stochastic game model, applications of the solution are almost limitless. Section 7 sketches one example that illustrates the ability of a relatively weak competitor to extort surplus from a stronger party.

Section 8 concludes, and relates the results to ongoing work on reputationally perturbed stochastic games.

## 2. Strictly Repeated Games

This Section translates the noncooperative treatment Nash (1953) gives his bargaining problem, from his static setting to a stationary, infinite-horizon environment. Making assumptions analogous to those of Nash, we derive identical results regarding the proportions in which surplus is divided, and the actions that should be employed as threats.

Nash takes as exogenous a finite game  $G = (S_1, S_2; U_1, U_2)$  in strategic form (with associated mixed strategy sets  $M_1$  and  $M_2$ ) and a bargaining set  $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$ . The set of feasible payoffs of  $G$ , namely  $\Pi = co\{u(s) : s \in S\}$  (where  $co$  denotes "convex hull of"), represents all the payoffs players can attain without cooperation (ignoring incentives). The set  $B$  includes all payoffs available to players through cooperation, that is, through enforceable contracts. Nash assumes that  $B$  is convex and compact, and that  $\Pi \subseteq B$ . The interpretation is that if players are willing to cooperate, they may be able to attain payoff combinations not possible from playing  $G$ . (For example, if a couple are willing to sign a marriage contract, they gain additional legal rights and perhaps receive a tax break.)

For any arbitrary nonempty, compact, convex bargaining set  $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$  and "threat point" or "disagreement point"  $d \in X$ ,  $N(d)$  denotes the associated Nash bargaining solution. The latter is the unique solution to  $\max_{x \in B} (x_1 - d_1)(x_2 - d_2)$  if there exists  $x \in B$  such that  $x \gg d$  and otherwise uniquely satisfies  $N(d) \in X$  and  $N(d) \geq x$  all

$x \in X$  such that  $x \geq d$ . Let the functions  $V_i : M_1 \times M_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  be defined by  $V_i(m) = N_i(U(m))$ .

In the strategic setting described by  $(G, B)$  as in the preceding paragraph, there is a bargaining set, but no exogenous threat point. In constructing his proposed solution, Nash imagines that players choose respective threats  $m_i \in M_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ , knowing that the Nash bargaining solution will result (relative to the threat point  $(m_1, m_2)$  and  $B$ ). That is, he defines the game  $\widehat{G} = (M_1, M_2; V_1, V_2)$ . Nash shows that this game  $\widehat{G}$  whose pure strategies are the mixed strategies of  $G$ , has equilibria that are interchangeable and equivalent. Their value, denoted  $v^*$ , is the Nash bargaining with threats (NBWT) solution.

Notice that the game  $\widehat{G}$  is just a construction in the formulation of the solution, NOT the noncooperative implementation of that solution. The construction mixes the idea of Nash equilibrium with the Nash product, which was justified axiomatically in Nash (1950).

To obtain an entirely strategic justification for his proposed solution, free of any axiomatic assumptions, Nash devised a two-stage game as follows. In the first stage, each player  $i$  simultaneously chooses  $m_i \in M_i$ . Thus, the pure actions of the first stage game are the mixed strategies of  $G$ . In the second stage, having observed the actions  $(m_1, m_2)$  from the first stage, each player  $i$  makes a utility demand  $u_i$ . If the pair  $(u_1, u_2)$  is feasible in  $B$ , then it is implemented. Otherwise, the utility pair received by the players is  $U(m_1, m_2)$ , the

threat point determined by first period choices. Since the threat pair is typically NOT a Nash equilibrium of  $G$ , the players often have an interest in not carrying it out; external enforcement is needed to ensure that the threats are not abandoned ex post.

There is in general a great multiplicity of (subgame perfect) equilibria of the two-stage game, so Nash introduces random perturbations to the feasible set, making players slightly unsure about whether a given pair of demands would be feasible or not. This allows him (after taking limits of sequences of equilibria, as the perturbations become vanishingly small) to isolate a particular equilibrium, whose value pair coincides with the feasible pair that maximizes the Nash product.

We follow Nash in assuming free disposal: if  $u \in B$  and  $v \leq u$  then  $v$  is feasible. Let  $B^+ = \{v \mid v \leq u \text{ for some } u \in B\}$ . In the unperturbed problem, if players demand  $v = (v_1, v_2)$ , the probability it is feasible is 1 if  $v \in B^+$  and 0 if  $v \notin B^+$ . In a perturbed game, a perturbation function  $h$  specifies the probability that  $v$  will be feasible.

We consider perturbation schemes as defined by probability functions of the following form:

A perturbation is a function  $h: \mathbb{R}^2 \rightarrow [0, 1]$  with

- (i)  $h(v) = 1$  if  $v \in B^+$  and  $h(v) < 1$  if  $v \notin B^+$ .

(ii)  $h$  is continuously differentiable. Furthermore,  $h(v) \in (0, 1) \Rightarrow h_i(v_1, v_2) < 0$ .

We are interested in limits of SPEs of a sequence of perturbed games, where the perturbation functions approach the unperturbed game in a natural way.

Nash shows that there is only one equilibrium that survives all local perturbations. It is unfortunately still possible that for any particular perturbation, there may be many equilibria with dramatically different values. This cannot be the case for any regular perturbation, as defined below.

A sequence of perturbations  $\{h^n\}_{n=1}^\infty$  is regular if:

(i)  $A$  compact and  $A \cap B^+ = \emptyset \Rightarrow \exists$  integer  $\bar{n}$  s.t.  $v \in A \Rightarrow h^n(v) = 0 \forall n \geq \bar{n}$ .

Let  $O^n = \{v \mid h^n(v) \in (0, 1)\}$ . For  $(v_1, v_2) \in O^n$ ,

$$\psi^n(v) \equiv -\frac{h_1^n}{h_2^n}$$

is the slope of the iso-probability line at  $v$ .

Let  $\bar{s}(v)$  and  $\underline{s}(v)$  be the supremum and infimum respectively of slopes of supporting hyperplanes of  $B$  at  $v$ .

Let  $\bar{B}^+$  denote the boundary of  $B^+$ .



(ii)  $\forall v \in \overline{B}^+ \ \& \ \forall \varepsilon > 0, \exists \delta > 0 \ \& \ \bar{n}$  s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} v' \in C^n \ \& \ |v' - v| < \delta \implies \\ \underline{s}(v) - \varepsilon \leq \psi^n(v') \leq \overline{s}(v) + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

The first condition imposes a uniformity on the way in which points outside  $B$  are assigned certain infeasibility as  $n$  grows. The second requirement is that asymptotically, the iso-probability sets must respect (approximately, for points near the frontier of  $B^+$ ) the trade-offs between players' demands that are expressed in the slope of the frontier of  $B^+$ .

Let  $\underline{v}_i$  denote player  $i$ 's minmax payoff in  $G$ .

To avoid some tedious qualifications in the proofs, we assume that  $\underline{v}_i < \bar{b}_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ .

Recall that  $v^*$  denotes the equilibrium payoff profile and let  $m^*$  denote a profile of mixed strategy equilibrium threats of the standard NBWT game associated with  $(G, B)$ .

Let  $\underline{m}_j \in M_j$  denote a strategy of  $j$  which minmaxes  $i \neq j$ .

**Lemma 1** *If  $v_i^* = \bar{b}_i$  then  $\underline{m}_j$  is an optimal strategy for  $j$  in the NBWT game  $\widehat{G}$ .*

Let  $m_j^*$  be an optimal strategy for  $j$  in the NBWT game  $\widehat{G}$  and furthermore equal to  $\underline{m}_j$  if  $v_i^* = \bar{b}_i$ .

Let  $\bar{b}_i$  be player  $i$ 's highest payoff in  $B$  (or equivalently  $B^+$ ). For  $b_1 \leq \bar{b}_1$  let  $f^2(b_1)$  be the maximal corresponding value of  $b_2$  in  $B^+$  :  $(b_1, f^2(b_1)) \in B^+$  and for all  $(b_1, y) \in B^+$ ,  $f^2(b_1) \geq y$ . The function  $f^1$  is defined analogously.

Suppose for the moment that the two players have chosen threats  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ . Denote the resulting subgame, with perturbation function  $h$ , by  $\xi(m, h)$  (suppressing for the moment the game  $G$  and bargaining set  $B$  that are being held fixed), and let  $V(m)$  be the Nash bargaining solution for the problem with bargaining set  $B$  and disagreement point  $U(m)$ .

Even in a perturbed demand game, there may be degenerate equilibria in which each player  $i$  demands so much that if  $j \neq i$  demands at least as much as his value at the threat point, the probability of feasibility is zero. All our results are for equilibria that are nondegenerate in this sense on all subgames.

Lemma 1 says that if Player  $i$  uses her NBWT equilibrium strategy  $m_i^*$  as defined earlier, then all nondegenerate equilibria of only slightly perturbed demand games have values at least (almost) equal

to  $v_i^*$ . Since  $v^*$  is a strictly efficient payoff, Proposition 1 below follows directly.

Lemma: Let  $\{h^n\}$  be a regular sequence of perturbations and consider a threat pair  $m \equiv (m_1, m_2^*)$ . Then for any  $\varepsilon > 0$  there exists  $\bar{n}$  such that for all  $n \geq \bar{n}$  and any non-degenerate NE  $\sigma^n$  of the subgame indexed by  $m$ ,

$$U_2(\sigma^n) \geq V_2(m) - \varepsilon$$

Proof :

Denote by  $v_i^n$  Player  $i$ 's equilibrium demands in the subgame indexed by  $m$ . If the conclusion is false then there must exist a subsequence (for simplicity denote this also by  $n$ ) converging to some  $\hat{v}$  such that  $\hat{v}_2 < V(m)$ . We argue that this yields a contradiction.

In the subgame  $v_1^n$  solves

$$\max_{v_1^n} \{v_1^n h^n(v_1, v_2) + (1 - h^n(v_1, v_2))d_1\} \text{ where } d = U(m).$$

The FONC are:

$$v_1^n h_1^n + h^n - h_1^n d_1 = 0 \text{ or } (v_1^n - d_1)h_1^n = -h^n.$$

By the nondegeneracy assumption  $h^n(v^n) > 0$ . It follows that  $(v_1^n - d_1) > 0$ , and  $h_1^n < 0$ .

Since the corresponding conditions apply to Player 2,

$$\frac{v_2^n - d_2}{v_1^n - d_1} = \frac{h_1^n(v_1^n, v_2^n)}{h_2^n(v_1^n, v_2^n)}.$$

It must be the case that  $\hat{v}$  lies on the upper boundary of  $B$  (denoted  $\bar{B}$ ). If  $\hat{v} \notin B$  then for large  $n$ ,  $h^n(v^n) = 0$ , contradicting the nondegeneracy assumption. If  $\hat{v} \in B$  and  $\hat{v} \notin \bar{B}$  then the optimality of players' choice of demands is contradicted for large  $n$ .

It follows that for all  $\varepsilon > 0$ , there exists  $\bar{n}$  such that for all  $\psi^n(v^n) \equiv -\frac{h_1^n(v_1^n, v_2^n)}{h_2^n(v_1^n, v_2^n)}$ , the slope of the iso-probability line at  $v^n$ , satisfies  $\underline{s}(\hat{v}) - \varepsilon \leq \psi^n(v^n) \leq \bar{s}(\hat{v}) + \varepsilon$ .

It follows that

$\frac{\hat{v}_2 - d_2}{\hat{v}_1 - d_1} = -s$  for some  $s \in [\underline{s}(\hat{v}), \bar{s}(\hat{v})]$ . By Nash (1950, 1953), if  $\hat{v}$  is on the boundary of  $B$  and  $\hat{v} \gg d$  then the preceding condition is satisfied if and only if  $\hat{v} = V(m)$  (and consequently the conclusion follows).

If  $d$  lies on the (strictly) efficient frontier of  $B$  then  $\hat{v} = d$  and  $d = \hat{v} = V(m)$ .

Now suppose that  $d$  is not on the efficient frontier of  $B$  and  $\hat{v}_1 = d_1$  and  $\hat{v}_2 = d_2$ . Since, as argued above,  $\hat{v} \in \bar{B}$ , either  $\hat{v}_2 = d_2 = \bar{b}_2$  or  $\hat{v}_1 = d_1 = \bar{b}_1$ . In the former case we are done. In the latter, it follows that  $v_1^* = \bar{b}_1$ . But in this case we have defined  $m_2^* = \underline{m}_2$  and consequently  $d_1 < \bar{b}_1$  (as per our assumption that  $v_i < \bar{b}_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ ). This yields a contradiction.

In the above scenario if  $\hat{v}_1 > d_1$  and  $\hat{v}_2 = d_2$  then  $\lim \psi^n(v^n) \equiv 0$  (recall that  $\psi^n(v^n) = -\frac{h_1^n(v_1^n, v_2^n)}{h_2^n(v_1^n, v_2^n)} = \frac{v_2^n - d_2}{v_1^n - d_1}$ ). It follows that  $\hat{v}_2 = d_2 =$

$\bar{b}_2$ , and again we are done. Finally suppose that  $\hat{v}_1 = d_1$  and  $\hat{v}_2 > d_2$ . Then  $\lim \psi^n(v^n) \equiv \infty$ . It follows that  $\hat{v}_1 = d_1 = \bar{b}_1$ . But this yields a contradiction as in the preceding paragraph.

Now consider the full two-stage game with perturbation function  $h$  in stage two; call this extensive game  $E(h)$ . A nondegenerate subgame perfect equilibrium of  $E(h)$  is an SPE of  $E(h)$  which induces nondegenerate equilibria in every subgame following a choice of threats. Proposition 1 says that the values of nondegenerate SPE's converge, as you move along a regular sequence of perturbations, to the NBWT value  $v^*$ .

Proposition 1: Let  $\{h^n\}$  be a regular sequence of perturbations and  $\{\sigma^n\}$  any sequence of nondegenerate SPEs of the respective perturbed games. Then

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} U(\sigma^n) = v^* \quad (\text{NBWT solution}).$$

Again Proposition 1 does something slightly different from what Nash (1953) shows, establishing convergence of ALL nondegenerate equilibria (along ANY regular sequence of perturbations). Nash instead argues that only one equilibrium survives ALL nearby perturbations, and he admits a broader class of perturbation functions

than we do. A second distinction is that Nash does the limit analysis only in the second- stage game, using the limiting values to determine first-period behavior.

This completes our analysis of the static world of Nash (1953). We turn now to the description of an infinite horizon model whose Markovian *SPE*'s yield the same (limiting) results. In each period (if agreement has not yet been reached), the two players play the perturbed two-stage game  $E(h)$  described earlier: each player  $i$  chooses a threat  $m_i$  from  $M_i$ , and having observed her opponent's threat, chooses a demand  $v_i \in \mathbb{R}$ . With probability  $h(v)$ , the demands are feasible, and the game is essentially over: each player  $i$  receives  $v_i$  in each subsequent period. With complementary probability, the demands are infeasible, and play proceeds to the next period. In every period before agreement is reached the same perturbation function  $h$  is used, but the draws are independent across time. Payoffs are discounted at the rate of interest  $r > 0$ .

Notice that the utility pair  $U(m_1, m_2)$  serves as a temporary threat point: it will determine the period- $t$  payoffs if the demand pair is infeasible. In contrast to Nash (1953), infeasibility causes a delay to cooperation rather than irreversible breakdown.

We are interested in the Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of the repeated game. An MPE is a stationary subgame perfect equilib-

rium in which neither player's behavior in period  $t$  depends on the history of actions or demands in earlier periods.

The proposition below is the analog of the result Nash (1953) derives for his two-stage noncooperative game (in which a choice of threats is followed by a Nash demand game). It proves that along any sequence of perturbed games (and MPE's thereof) with the perturbations converging to 0, the demands made by the players converge to the NBWT solution (Nash (1953)). Thus, the repeated game is an alternative to Nash's original two-stage game as a setting in which to give noncooperative expression to the NBWT solution.

Proposition 2: Let  $\{h^n\}$  be a regular sequence of perturbations of the "repeated bargaining game" and  $\{\sigma^n\}$  any sequence of corresponding nondegenerate Markov Perfect equilibria of the respective perturbed games. Then

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} U(\sigma^n) = v^*$$

An axiomatic foundation for the NBWT solution is easily given in the repeated game setting of this section, but it is covered in the more general treatment of Section 6.

### 3. The Stochastic Model

In the stationary model of Section 2, the noncooperative game  $G$  summarizes the payoff pairs that are feasible (ignoring incentives), and the bargaining set  $B$  specifies a weakly larger set of payoffs available to players if they sign binding contracts. This section specifies the game and the bargaining sets (one for each state) for the stochastic environment studied in Sections 4, 5 and 6.

The role of  $G$  will be played by  $G = (\Omega, S_i(\omega), u_i(\cdot; \omega), \rho(\cdot; \omega, s(\omega)), s(\omega) \in S(\omega), \omega \in \Omega, i = 1, 2, \omega_0, r)$ , where  $\Omega$  is the finite set of states,  $\omega_0$  is the initial state,  $S_i(\omega)$  is the finite set of pure strategies available to player  $i$  in state  $\omega$ ,  $u_i$  specifies  $i$ 's utility in any period as a function of the state  $\omega$  prevailing in that period and the action pair  $s \in S(\omega)$  played in that period,  $\rho(\omega'; \omega, s)$  is the probability that if state  $\omega$  prevails in any period  $t$ , and  $s$  is the action pair in  $S(\omega)$  played in  $t$ , state  $\omega'$  will prevail in period  $t + 1$ . Let  $M_i(\omega)$  be the mixed strategy set associated with  $S_i(\omega)$ . For any  $m(\omega) \in M(\omega)$ ,  $\rho(\omega'; \omega, m(\omega)) = \sum_{s_1 \in S_1(\omega)} \sum_{s_2 \in S_2(\omega)} \rho(\omega'; \omega, s) m_1(s_1; \omega) m_2(s_2; \omega)$ . Finally  $r$  is the strictly positive rate of interest at which both players discount their infinite stream of payoffs.

The interpretation is that in period 1, each player  $i$  selects a strategy from  $S_i(\omega_0)$  or from its associated mixed strategy set  $M_i(\omega_0)$ , and the strategy pair results in an immediate payoff and a probability of transiting to each respective state in period 2, and so on. Starting in any period  $t$  and state  $\omega$  one can compute the feasible (average)



payoffs from  $t$  onward; let this set be denoted  $\Pi(\omega)$ .

Let  $B(\omega)$  denote the set of discounted average payoffs that the players could attain from period  $t$  onward starting in state  $\omega$ , by signing contracts. Just as Nash assumed  $\Pi \subseteq B$  (see Section 2), we assume for each  $\omega$  that  $\Pi(\omega) \subseteq B(\omega)$  : contractual cooperation can achieve anything that independent action can achieve. Further, anything players can accomplish by acting independently today and then signing contracts tomorrow, they can achieve today by simply signing one contract today. Formally, we assume:

$$\text{co}\{(1-\delta)u(m(\omega); \omega) + \delta \sum_{\omega'} \rho(\omega'|\omega, m(\omega))v(\omega') \text{ s.t. } m(\omega) \in M(\omega), v(\omega') \in B(\omega') \text{ all } \omega'\} \subseteq B(\omega).$$

To establish uniqueness of a fixed point arising in the proposed solution in Section 4, either of the following conditions is sufficient.

**Eventual Absorption(EA):** The set of states can be partitioned into  $K$  classes  $\Omega_k$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K$  such that  $\Omega_K$  is an absorbing set of states and from any states in  $\Omega_k$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K-1$ , play can transit only to states in  $\Omega_{k'}$  for  $k' > k$ .

**Uniformly Transferable Utility(UTU):** The efficiency frontiers of all  $B(\omega)$ ,  $\omega \in \Omega$  are linear and have the same slope.

Because of the availability of long-term contracts, it is not crucial to work with infinite-horizon stochastic games. Note that Eventual Absorption places no restrictions whatever on finite-horizon stochastic games. Transferable utility is most plausible when players are bargaining over something that is "small" relative to their overall wealth.

We will refer to the game  $G$  and the collection of bargaining sets  $B$ , as a stochastic bargaining environment.

## 4. The Proposed Solution

Here we develop a solution for stochastic games with contracts, that will be given noncooperative and axiomatic justifications, respectively, in Sections 5 and 6. The goal is to formulate a theory that explains players' behavior in a state  $\omega$  by analyzing the bargaining situation they find themselves in at  $\omega$ .

What bargaining problem do players face at  $\omega$ , if they have not yet signed a contract? The available strategies for player  $i$  are those in  $M_i(\omega)$ , and the bargaining set is  $B(\omega)$ . We want to follow Nash by maximizing the Nash product in  $B(\omega)$  relative to the disagreement point. But if players choose the threat pair  $(m_1, m_2)$ , the corresponding one-period payoff  $u(m(\omega))$  is just the temporary disagreement

point, familiar from Section 2. Taking a dynamic programming perspective, a player who observes that bargaining has failed today in state  $\omega$  expects that after getting  $u(m(\omega))$  today, she will get the value assigned by the solution to whatever state  $\omega'$  arises tomorrow. Thus, the dynamic threat point  $D(\omega; m)$  associated with threats  $m$  and proposed value function  $v(\cdot; m)$ , is given by the formula:

$$D(\omega; m) = (1 - \delta)u(m(\omega); \omega) + \delta \sum_{\omega'} \rho(\omega' | \omega, m(\omega)) v(\omega'; m)$$

which naturally depends on the rate of interest and on the endogenous transition probabilities.

Notice the simultaneous determination of the values  $D(\omega; m)$  and  $v(\omega'; m)$ : we wish each  $v(\omega; m)$  to maximize the Nash product relative to  $D(\omega; m)$ , but at the same time  $D(\omega; m)$  is partly determined by the  $v(\omega'; m)$ . Thus, even holding fixed the threats  $m(\omega)$ , finding a solution involves a fixed point calculation. The uniqueness of the fixed point is guaranteed by either eventual absorption (*EA*) or by uniformly transferable utility (*UTU*) (see section 3).

Lemma 1 Assume *EA* or *UTU*. Then for any  $(m_1, m_2) \in M_1 \times M_2$ , there exists a unique function  $V(\cdot; m_1, m_2)$  defined on  $\Omega$ , such that for all  $\omega \in \Omega$ ,  $V(\omega; m_1, m_2)$  is the Nash bargaining solution to the

bargaining problem  $(\Pi(\omega), D(\omega))$ , where

$$D(\omega) = (1 - \delta)d(\omega; m) + \delta \sum_{\omega'} \rho(\omega'|\omega, m(\omega)) V(\omega'; m)$$

The above exercise was done for a fixed action pair. Now that value consequences for action pairs are established, we can ask, for each state  $\omega$ , what actions (threats, in Nash's interpretation, 1953) players would choose if they were in  $\omega$ . In other words, we imagine players playing modified versions of  $G$ , where for state  $\omega$ , the payoffs will be given by  $V(\omega, \cdot)$ . This is called the threat game. It is indexed by the "initial" state  $\omega$  and is denoted

$$\hat{\mathcal{G}}(\omega) = (M_i, V_i(\omega, \cdot); i = 1, 2)$$

Again, we mimic Nash in thinking of players in  $\omega$  choosing  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ , to maximize  $V_1(\omega; m)$  and  $V_2(\omega; m)$  respectively. This game's equilibria are interchangeable and equivalent, so it has a value  $v^*(\omega)$ .

We have:

**Lemma 2 (Existence)** *There exists a pair  $(m_1^*, m_2^*)$  such that  $(m_1^*, m_2^*)$  is an equilibrium of  $\hat{\mathcal{G}}(\omega)$  for all  $\omega \in \Omega$ .*

Notice that in addition to existence, the lemma asserts a nice time consistency property. Moreover,

**Lemma 3** *Equilibria of  $\hat{\mathcal{G}}(\omega)$  are equivalent and interchangeable.*

Let the function  $v^*: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^2$  be defined by  $v^*(\omega) = V(\omega; m^*)$ . This is the proposed solution.

In the framework of Nash (1953), the pair  $(m_1^*, m_2^*)$  is the (state-contingent) pair of threats associated with the stochastic game with initial state  $\omega$ , and  $V(\omega; m_1^*, m_2^*)$  is the associated equilibrium value pair. These may be viewed as generalizations of the NBWT solution to stochastic environments.

## 5. Noncooperative Treatment

Section 4 developed a proposed solution for any stochastic game that satisfies "eventual absorption" or that has transferable utility. Here we provide support for the proposed solution by doing a non-cooperative analysis of the stochastic game in the spirit of Nash (1953). As in Section 2, we perturb the demand game (in any state) and study the equilibria as the perturbations become vanishingly small. All Markovian equilibria have values in any state  $\omega$  converging to  $v(\omega)$ , the demand pair recommended by the proposed solution.

Similarly, the limit points of any sequence of Markovian equilibrium action pairs at  $\omega$  (as perturbations vanish) are in the interchangeable and equivalent set of temporary threat pairs at  $\omega$  specified by the proposed solution. In other words, a noncooperative perspective points to the same state-contingent values and threat actions as the proposed solution.

We begin by describing the (unperturbed) noncooperative game to be analyzed. Based on the stochastic bargaining environment of Section 3, it involves the bargainers playing a threat game, followed by a demand game, in any period if no contract has yet been agreed upon. In period 1, the state is  $\omega_0$ , so each player  $i$  chooses a threat  $x \in M_i(\omega_0)$ . Having observed the threats, players make demands  $(v_1, v_2)$ . If  $(v_1, v_2) \in B(\omega_0)$ , the rewards are enforced contractually and the game is essentially over. Otherwise, the threat payoff is realized in period 1, and the state transits to  $\omega'$  with probability  $\rho(\omega'|\omega, x)$ . In period 2, threats are again chosen (from sets that depend on the prevailing state), and so on.

This unperturbed game, denoted  $G$ , naturally has many perfect Bayesian equilibria, so one looks at a sequence of perturbed games approaching  $G$ . The  $n$ th element of the sequence is a stochastic game in which feasibility of a demand pair  $(v_1, v_2) \in B(\omega)$  is given by  $h^{nw}(v_1, v_2)$ , where the outcomes are independent across periods. For

any  $\omega$ , the perturbation function  $h^{nw}$  satisfies the same conditions as in Section 3, and regularity of the sequence (with index  $n$ ) is defined as before.

Before stating the convergence result precisely we provide some rough intuition for the case of "eventual absorption" (with  $K$  classes of states). In any absorbing state  $\omega$ , players are in the situation covered by Section 2, where the "Nash bargaining with threats" convergence results were established. If instead  $\omega$  is in class  $K - 1$ , incentives are different, both because the game in the current period differs from the game to be played from tomorrow onward, and because threats today affect the state transition matrix. But the dynamic threat point defined in the construction of the proposed solution in Section 4 mimics these phenomena exactly, so convergence to the generalized NBWT threats and demands (the proposed solution) also occurs in these states. The same argument applies by induction to all states.

Proposition: let  $\{h^{nw}\}_{\omega,n}$  be a regular sequence of perturbations of the stochastic bargaining game and  $\{\sigma^n\}$  any sequence of corresponding nondegenerate Markov Perfect equilibria of the respective perturbed games. Then

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} U(\sigma^n(\omega)) = v^*(\omega)$$

**Proof.** (Sketch)

For given  $m^n$

$$D^n(\omega) = (1 - \delta)u(m^n(\omega); \omega) + \delta \sum_{\omega'} \rho(\omega' | \omega, m^n(\omega))V^n(\omega)$$

$$v_1^n(\omega)h^{n\omega}(v^n(\omega)) + (1 - h^{n\omega}(v^n))D_1^n(\omega)$$

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$$\frac{v_2^n(\omega) - D_2^n(\omega)}{v_1^n(\omega) - D_1^n(\omega)} = \frac{h_1^{n\omega}(v^n(\omega))}{h_2^{n\omega}(v^n(\omega))}$$

The unique NBWT fixed point is characterized by:

$$D(\omega) = (1 - \delta)v(m(\omega); \omega)$$

$$+ \delta \sum_{\omega'} \rho(\omega' | \omega, m(\omega))v(\omega'; m)$$

$$\frac{v_2(\omega; m) - D_2(\omega; m)}{v_1(\omega; m) - D_1(\omega; m)} = -f'(v_1(\omega; m))$$

To be completed.

## Section 6. Cooperative Treatment

Nash (1953) gives us an axiomatic theory of how a bargaining problem will be resolved. A bargaining problem consists of a nonempty, compact and convex set  $B$  of feasible utility pairs, nonempty finite sets  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  of pure strategies (or “threats”) players can employ (they can mix over those pure strategies), and a utility function



$U$  mapping  $S_1 \times S_2$  into  $\mathbb{R}^2$ . A theory associates with each bargaining problem a unique solution, an element of the feasible set. Nash proposes a set of axioms such a theory should satisfy; he shows there is exactly one theory consistent with this set.

At first glance, it would appear that a much more elaborate set of axioms is required to address the complexities of a stochastic game with contracts. But adopt the perspective of Section 4: the players in the stochastic game beginning in state  $\omega$  implicitly face a bargaining problem. Their feasible set is the set of all present discounted expected payoff pairs they can generate by signing contracts today concerning their actions in all contingencies. Their sets of threats are the sets of actions available at  $\omega$ . How do the players evaluate a pair of threats  $(m_1, m_2)$ ? They get a flow payoff pair  $U(m_1, m_2)$  until the state changes and there is some new opportunity to bargain. At that point, they have encountered a new bargaining problem (the stochastic game beginning in some state  $\omega'$ ), and the theory we are trying to axiomatize says what players should get in that situation. Since the pair  $(m_1, m_2)$  determines the arrival rates of transition to other states, one can compute the expected discounted payoff consequences of  $(m_1, m_2)$  for each player.

To summarize, a theory assigns to each stochastic game with contracts, a solution pair from its feasible set. If the players believe the theory, these values determine a payoff pair that players expect

to result if they adopt a particular threat pair and agreement is not reached. Analogues of Nash's axioms can be applied directly to this family of bargaining problems. The difference between this family and that of Nash (1953) is that for Nash, the threat pair utilities are fully specified by a pair of actions, whereas here they are partially determined by the proposed theory, as explained in the preceding paragraph. This gives rise to a fixed point problem. While we can show existence in great generality, for uniqueness we assume either transferable utility or eventual absorption, as in Sections 4 and 5.

A stochastic bargaining game  $G$  is defined by a stochastic game and a state-dependent bargaining set  $B(\omega)$  where  $\Pi(\omega) \subset B(\omega)$ .

Fix  $\Omega, \rho$ . We may associate a variety of stochastic bargaining environments  $E$  with the above fixed elements [By varying  $B(\cdot)$ 's,  $M$ 's, etc.]

Definition: A value  $v^*$  for a stochastic bargaining environment  $E$  specifies for each  $\omega \in \Omega$  a unique element  $v^*(\omega) \in B(\omega)$ .

Definition: A solution specifies a unique value for each  $E$ .

Axioms on Solution

1. Pareto optimality
2. Independent of Cardinal Representation.

Consider  $E$  and  $E'$  where  $E'$  is identical to  $E$  except that for some  $a_i > 0$  and  $b_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ , utility values  $u_i$  in  $E$  are transformed

to

$$u'_i = a_i u_i + b_i \text{ in } \mathcal{E}'.$$

Then

$$v_i^*(\omega; \mathcal{E}') = a_i v_i^*(\omega; \mathcal{E}) + b_i \quad \forall \omega, i = 1, 2.$$

### 3. "Local" determination / IIA

Suppose  $S$  and  $S'$  are stochastic bargaining environments and are identical except that  $B'(\omega) \subseteq B(\omega) \forall \omega$ . If for all  $\omega$   $v^*(\omega; E) \in B'(\omega)$  then

$$v^*(\omega; \mathcal{E}') = v^*(\omega; \mathcal{E}) \quad \forall \omega$$

For bargaining environments  $E$  with a single threat pair  $(m_1, m_2)$ , the disagreement payoff at state  $\omega$  is denoted  $D(\omega)$  and is defined endogenously in terms of the solution as follows:

$$D(\omega) = (1 - \delta)u(m_1, m_2; \omega) + \delta \sum_{\omega'} \rho(\omega' | \omega, m(\omega)) v^*(\omega')$$

where  $v^*$  is the value specified by the solution for  $E$ .

### 4. SYMMETRY

Suppose a bargaining environment  $E$  has a single threat pair  $(m_1, m_2)$  and at some state  $\omega$ ,  $B(\omega)$  is symmetric and  $D_1(\omega) = D_2(\omega)$ . Then  $v_1^*(\omega) = v_2^*(\omega)$ .

5. Suppose  $M'_1 \subseteq M_1$ . Then  $v_1(\omega; M'_1, M_2) \leq v_1(\omega; M_1, M_2) \quad \forall \omega$ .

6. For all  $m_1 \in M_1$  there exists  $m_2 \in M_2$  s.t.

$$v_1^*(\omega; \{m_1\}, \{m_2\}) \leq v_1^*(\omega; M_1, M_2)$$

The first four axioms are the most familiar, as they appear in Nash (1950) as well as Nash (1953). The final two axioms are analogous to two Nash added in 1953 to handle endogenous threat points. Axiom 5 says that a player is (weakly) strengthened by having access to more threats. Axiom 6 says that if Player 1's set of threats is reduced to a singleton  $\{m_1\}$ , and 2's threat set is reduced to a singleton in the most favorable way for 2, then 2 is not hurt by the changes. This is compelling if, in some sense, threats don't exert influence "as a group" against a singleton threat of an opponent.

## 7. Example

## 8. Conclusion.

When two persons have different preferences about how to cooperate, what should each of them threaten to try to gain advantage, and what will the ultimate outcome be? For static bargaining situations, Nash (1953) proposes a solution, and presents both axiomatic and noncooperative strategic analyses that isolate his solution. We translate his results into a real-time setting, and then allow for dynamic phenomena such as random changes in the environment, learning by doing, investment in physical and human

capital, and so on. Our extensions of Nash’s axiomatic and non-cooperative approaches agree on a unique division of surplus in a wide class of stochastic games with contracts, and on what actions to take to influence the outcome in one’s favor.

As a simple example of the strategic dynamics that can be captured, we show that a weak rival can extort a surprising amount of money from a stronger competitor by threatening to enter the market (even if this would be at great loss to the weaker party). If gaining access to the market is costly to the potential entrant, the theory offers a prediction about the optimal rate of investment in the technology needed for entry.

Our adaptation of Nash’s perturbed demand game to the stochastic game setting is perhaps more convincing than his original story in the static case: when an accidental failure of bargaining occurs (because of random perturbations), we don’t need to insist that the inefficient threat actions will be carried out in perpetuity. Rather, they will be reconsidered when another opportunity to bargain arises. Nonetheless, we think there is a still more plausible noncooperative story that justifies our proposed solution. In ongoing work we show that small behavioral perturbations of the stochastic game lead to “war of attrition” equilibria whose expected payoffs coincide with those proposed here.

## References

- [1] Nash, J. (1950a), “The Bargaining Problem,” *Econometrica*, 18: 155—162.
- [2] Nash, J. (1953), “Two-Person Cooperative Games,” *Econometrica*, 21: 128—140.