Economic and Game Theory
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As i see it, this would occur when players are drawn from a homogenous population that perceives itself as such,
when no knowledge from previous games is assumed, and when the players are assumed to have equal endownment
(i.e., when none can credibly commit to dare by relying in some "outside" resource the otierh player cannot count
Goven the above, mixed strategies could lead to mutual cooperation 1/6 * 1/6 of the time --that is, if players choose
1/3 dare, 1/3 chicken, and 1/3 randomly between chicken and dare, only (1/3)/2 of the time will a player cooperate,
and since their moves are independent (are they?) the probability of actual cooperation will be 1/36. Is that correct?
I could not find Taylor and Ward's 1982 article (i have been off campus for a year now) --Taylor, M. and H. Ward.
"Chickens, Whales and Lumpy Goods: alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision," Political Studies, vol. 30 (1982)--
but acording to Mueller (Social choice II) they apparently argue that a super-chicken game would allow for endogenous
cooperation, much as PD, Mueller implies, does. I cannot see how that could be the case...
I will appretiate your help.
Diego [Manage messages]