Zero Sum Games
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Well, I think Nash bargaining solution is not so restrictive in a sense that we can show that non-cooperative nargaining solution also coincides with Nash bargaining solution. One thin you can do, in my view, is to calculate the bargaining outcome with some bargaining power(a,1-a) and do some comparative statics (and hopefully efficiency consequences).
|03/05/2002 11:44 PM by Sungbin Cho; Re:contract theory as non-cooperative game: thank you and a comment|
I am not quite sure what you mean by other refinemnets. Intuitive criterion? Or something else? [Manage messages]
Sungbin: Thanks for your reply. It is as I had expected. I do have a further comment, however. If, as I find in my model, a continuum of subgame perfect equilibrium contracts exist, is it reasonable to employ the Nash bargaining [View full text and thread]
|02/25/2002 09:21 AM by arabella; contract theory as non-cooperative game: thank you and a comment|
Negotiation/contractual agreement does not necessarily imply the cooperative game. Think about the Rubistein bargaining model. Is it a cooperative bargaining? NO. The Rubinstein model is a "Non-Cooperative" bargaining model.
Moreover, [View full text and thread]
|02/23/2002 03:08 PM by Sungbin Cho; Re:contracting model of regulation and compliance: cooperative or non-cooperative game?|
I am modelling a compliance and enforcement game between a regulator and a representative firm. An exogenous performance standard has been set by the regulator. Given the standard, the firm chooses the level of performance (e.g. [View full text and thread]
|02/23/2002 11:09 AM by arabella; contracting model of regulation and compliance: cooperative or non-cooperative game?|