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Experimental Economics
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Prisoners Dilemma
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Ask a question about: Prisoners Dilemma
Respond to the question: conditions for the payoffs in prisoners?

05/11/2001 03:25 PM by jay surti;
Theres also the recent work of postlewaite's student at upenn (i forget the name...someone called obara I think: theres a link from postlewaites webpage.)
[View full text and thread]

03/05/2001 12:37 PM by Pedro Dal Bó; prisoner dilemma's payoffs
I don't think you can express the condition for tit-for-tat to be an equilibrium as a condition in a difference of two payoffs only since three payoffs are involved. The temptation payoff T, the reward payoff R and the sucker payoff S. [View full text and thread]

03/03/2001 09:35 AM by Brandon;
Hi! I understand now but I'm afraid my knowledge's not up to task :) Keep your question here and I'm sure someone would help you with it as soon as they can. [View full text and thread]

03/03/2001 01:45 AM by Birol Baskan; problem is the following
Thank you Brandon for your eager answer. Let me be more specific about what I am particularly interested. When you repeat the prisoner's dilemma infitinitely many times, there arise many Nash equilibrium strategy. One of them is Tit for [View full text and thread]

03/02/2001 08:35 PM by Brandon;
I think I should get it right and more specific here.... When both players cooperate they are both rewarded at an equal, intermediate level (reward, R). Now we want to create a chance to "cheat" so, When only one player defects, [View full text and thread]

03/02/2001 08:21 PM by Brandon;
Hi! I'm not sure a "standard procedure" to go about assigning payoffs but I think one should be able to construct your own simple payoff matrix while keeping the following in mind:

No matter what the other player does, you'll be better off "defecting" (confessing). To see the paradox later, the other player realizes this as well, so you both end up confessing, with identical payoffs which is not pareto efficient. Ironically, if you had both "cooperated" (refused to confess), you would both be much better off.

You might want to take a look at some sample. In any case, though you may find that the payoffs are not always identical, the above rule should still be true. Cheers! [Manage messages]

03/02/2001 08:11 AM by Birol Baskan; conditions for the payoffs in prisoner's dilemma
While assigning payoffs to strategies in prisoner's dilemma, what conditions should we impose on the payoffs? [View full text and thread]