"Inside  every small problem is a large problem struggling to get out."

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Respond to the question: conditions for the payoffs in prisoners?

 05/11/2001 03:25 PM by jay surti;
Theres also the recent work of postlewaite's student at upenn (i forget the name...someone called obara I think: theres a link from postlewaites webpage.)

 03/05/2001 12:37 PM by Pedro Dal Bó; prisoner dilemma's payoffs
I don't think you can express the condition for tit-for-tat to be an equilibrium as a condition in a difference of two payoffs only since three payoffs are involved. The temptation payoff T, the reward payoff R and the sucker payoff S. [View full text and thread]

 03/03/2001 09:35 AM by Brandon;
Hi! I understand now but I'm afraid my knowledge's not up to task :)
Keep your question here and I'm sure someone would help you with it as soon as they can. [Manage messages]

 03/03/2001 01:45 AM by Birol Baskan; problem is the following
Thank you Brandon for your eager answer. Let me be more specific about what I am particularly interested. When you repeat the prisoner's dilemma infitinitely many times, there arise many Nash equilibrium strategy. One of them is Tit for [View full text and thread]

 03/02/2001 08:35 PM by Brandon;
I think I should get it right and more specific here.... When both players cooperate they are both rewarded at an equal, intermediate level (reward, R). Now we want to create a chance to "cheat" so, When only one player defects, [View full text and thread]

 03/02/2001 08:21 PM by Brandon;
Hi! I'm not sure a "standard procedure" to go about assigning payoffs but I think one should be able to construct your own simple payoff matrix while keeping the following in mind: No matter what the other player does, you'll be [View full text and thread]

 03/02/2001 08:11 AM by Birol Baskan; conditions for the payoffs in prisoner's dilemma
While assigning payoffs to strategies in prisoner's dilemma, what conditions should we impose on the payoffs? [View full text and thread]