Zero Sum Games
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if the game is repeated a finite no of times then collusion cannot be rationalised and we can only find one unique equilibrium -- to cheat.
To see this, remember that the only reason to cooperate is to avoid a backlash in the future. [View full text and thread]
why are there only one equilibria in finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma. [Manage messages]
You could start with the book: Fudenberg and Tirole, "Game Theory" (1993), Cambridge: The MIT Press. This book is full of references.
You could also see:
Aumann, R (1987): Game Theory. In J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Nweman [View full text and thread]
|07/12/2000 09:08 AM by Walter;|
I am a student and i have to write a homework about the history and envelopment of the prisoner dilemma and its application to sciences. Could someone give me an advice where to find something about it? (internet pages)
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