Zero Sum Games
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If each personís private valuation is common knowledge, then in the equilibrium all the persons with valuation greater than v101 will arrive simultaneously at the waiting line at the time that waiting cost is equal to v101. All others [View full text and thread]
Thanks very much for the help with the coordination game. I have another problem that I need help with:
|07/30/2006 03:34 AM by Stella; multiunit auction|
200 people are waiting in line for a movie, only 100 can be admitted. The price of admission is expressed in the amount of time each person waits, ti, person i's valuation is vi, so her payoff is vi-ti. Assume v1>v2>v3... etc and if several people arrive at the same time, the person with the lowest index gets admitted. If a person arrives and finds 100 people or over already there, then she gets a payoff of 0. Model the situation as a discriminatory multiunit auction and find the NE. Bidding ties are broken in favor of the lower-indexed player.
My intuition would be that they would arrive successively, that is v1 arrives first, v2 next, v3 after etc (following from the case when they all arrive simultaneously). For what they bid, I think that they would bid v2, v3, v4, ... v101, v101, ... v200. However, I am not sure if this is correct. Thanks very much in advance for any help!! [Manage messages]