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| 01/28/2000 12:51 PM by pedro; More on the chicken game |
Consider the following chicken game:
C N
C 3 , 3 1, 4
N 4 , 1 0 , 0
If this game is only played once there are two [View full text and thread]
I think that the chicken game is quite different from the prisoner dilemma. In the latter both agents would like to cooperate but the incentives to cheat make both of them deviate and end in an outcome that is not Pareto optimal. But if they are playing that same game again and again to infinity and the discount rate is low enough, the Pareto optimal outcome, that is cooperate-cooperate, can be supported in equilibrium. In the chicken game, when only played once, there are two NE and both of them are Pareto optimal -for this game see the equivalent Hawk-Dove game in Osborne and Rubinstein, pag.17, for example-. In the infinitely repeated game other outcomes can be supported. For example both pulling out of the road, that is also Pareto optimal. Then, while the threat of the future allows the players to achieve the Pareto optimal allocations in the prisoner dilemma, thing that they couldm't support in equilibrium when only playing once, in the chicken game it only adds more Pareto optimal allocations.
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Since there are variations on the one-shot prisoner's dilemma, I am wondering if there are variations on the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Particularly chicken and the assurance game. Has there been any papers written on these [View full text and thread]
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