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## Expected Utility Theory

Let $\Omega$ be a probability space

A gamble is a random variable where the quantity represents "money" or "consumption"

Suppose that $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ are "gambles"
Which gamble is prefered?

## Von Neumann-Morgerstern Preferences

Gambles are compared using a numeric valued utility function $u: \Re_{+} \rightarrow \Re$
$u(x)$ is the utility from consuming $x$
$x_{1}$ is at least as good (strictly better than) as $x_{2}$
$E u\left(x_{1}\right) \geq(>) E u\left(x_{2}\right)$

## Expected Utility Theory

## Example

$$
u(x)=10-10 / x
$$



Money payoffs for player 1

|  | H | T |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $U$ | 5 | 1 |
| $D$ | 4 | 2 |

Utility payoffs for player 1

|  | H | T |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $U$ | 8 | 0 |
| $D$ | 7.5 | 5 |

If H and T have equal probability is it better to choose U or D ?

|  | Expected <br> money | Expected utility |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| U | 3 | 4 |
| D | 3 | 6.25 |

Choose D

## Risk Aversion

Would you rather get a gamble $x$ or get the expected value of the gamble Ex for sure? Suppose that the gamble is $x^{L}$ with probability $p$ and $x^{H}$ with probability $1-p$
utility


What happens as $p$ changes?

## Risk Loving



- Insurance: auto insurance company charges a premium
- Investment: risky portfolio? Stocks or bonds?
- Gambling


## Allais Paradox

Case 1, choose between:

Gamble 1
.33 chance of $\$ 27.5$ billion
.66 chance of $\$ 24.0$ billion
.01 chance of nothing

Gamble 2
$\$ 24.0$ billion for sure

Case 2, choose between:

Gamble 1
.33 chance of $\$ 27.5$ billion
.67 chance of nothing

## Gamble 2

.34 chance of $\$ 24.0$ billion
.66 chance of nothing

## Case 1

$$
\begin{aligned}
& .33 u(27.5 b)+.66 u(24.0 b)+.01 u(0)-u(24.0 b)= \\
& .33 u(27.5 b)-.34 u(24.0 b)+.01 u(0)
\end{aligned}
$$

## Case 1

$.33 u(27.5 b)+.67 u(0)-(.34 u(24 b)+.66 u(0))=$
$.33 u(27.5 b)-.34 u(24 b)+.01 u(0)$

Expected utility predicts the same choice between gambles in the two cases.

