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The Folk Theorem

- individual rationality: each players gets at least what they can get when they know the other players strategy
- social feasibility: there is some combination of strategies that gives players the given average present value of utility

Prisoner's Dilemma

	Player 2	
Player 1	don't confess	confess
don't confess	32,32	28,35
confess	35,28	30,30







The Folk Theorem:

the entire socially feasible individually rational set (except possibly the boundaries) are subgame perfect equilibrium for discount factors close enough to one.

• we know two equilibria - the static Nash equilibrium at (30,30) and the grim strategy equilibrium at (32,32)

Minmax and Maxmin

Minmax:

Player 1 knows player 2's strategy and does the best he can Player 2 hurts player 1 as badly as possible

 $\min_{s_2} \max_{s_1} u_1(s_1, s_2)$

example

	Player 2	
Player 1	L	R
U	2,3	3*,2
D	4*,2	1,1

* marks best for player 1

should 2 play L(4) or R(3)? Choose R(3)

Minmax is player 1's individually rational payoff level

Similar analysis for player 2

Maxmin:

Player 2 knows player 1's strategy and hurts player 1 as badly as possible

Player 1 tries to prevent the loss

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\max_{s_1} \min_{s_2} u_1(s_1, s_2)
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example

	Player 2	
Player 1	L	R
U	2*,3	3,2
D	4,2	1*,1

* marks worst for player 1

should 1 play U(2) or D(1)? Choose U(2)

Similar analysis for player 2

notice always $\max \min \le \min \max$

Minmax (and not the maxmin) is player 1's *individually rational* payoff level