1. Consider the extensive form game given below

a. Find all subgame perfect equilibria.
b. Find the normal form (player 1 picks the matrix, player 2 the row, player 3 the column).
c. Apply iterated strict dominance.
d. Find all Nash equilibria, including mixed equilibria.
e. Find a self-confirming equilibrium with an equilibrium path that cannot be obtained as a public randomization over Nash equilibria.

2. Consider the normal form game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0,0</th>
<th>2,1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Find all Nash equilibria.
b. Which Nash equilibria are trembling hand perfect?
c. Is there a correlated equilibrium that gives strictly less utility than any public randomization over Nash equilibrium?