Basic Concepts of Game Theory and Equilibrium

Course Slides

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A Finite Game

an $N$ player game $i = 1 \ldots N$

$P(S)$ are probability measure on $S$

finite strategy spaces

$\sigma_i \in \Sigma_i \equiv P(S_i)$ are mixed strategies

$s \in S \equiv \times_{i=1}^{N} S_i$ are the strategy profiles

$\sigma \in \Sigma \equiv \times_{i=1}^{N} \Sigma_i$

other useful notation $s_{-i} \in S_{-i} \equiv \times_{j \neq i} S_j$

$\sigma_{-i} \in \Sigma_{-i} \equiv \times_{j \neq i} \Sigma_j$

$u_i(s)$ payoff or utility

$u_i(\sigma) \equiv \sum_{s \in S} u_i(s) \prod_{j=1}^{N} \sigma_j(s_j)$ is expected utility
**Dominant Strategies**

σₖ weakly (strongly) dominates σ’ₖ if
\[ u_i(σ_i, s_{-i}) ≥ (> )u_i(σ’_i, s_{-i}) \]
with at least one strict

**Nash Equilibrium**

players can anticipate on another’s strategies

σ is a *Nash equilibrium* profile if for each
\[ i ∈ 1, \ldots, N \quad u_i(σ) = \max_{σ’_i} u_i(σ’_i, σ_{-i}) \]

*Theorem:* a Nash equilibrium exists in a finite game

this is more or less why Kakutani’s fixed point theorem was invented

\[ B_i(σ) \]
is the set of best responses of i to σ_{-i},
and is UHC convex valued

This theorem fails in pure strategies: consider matching pennies
Some Classic Simultaneous Move Games

Coordination Game

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<tr>
<td>U</td>
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<td>D</td>
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three equilibria (U,R) (D,L) (.5U,.5L)  
**too many equilibria??**

Coordination Game

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risk dominance:
indifference between U,D

\[2p_2 - 10(1 - p_2) = (1 - p_2)\]

\[13p_2 = 11, p_2 = 11/13\]

if U,R opponent must play equilibrium w/ 11/13
if D,L opponent must play equilibrium w/ 2/13

\(\frac{1}{2}\) dominance: if each player puts weight of at least \(\frac{1}{2}\) on equilibrium strategy, then it is optimal for everyone to keep playing equilibrium (same as risk dominance in 2x2 games)
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

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a unique dominant strategy equilibrium (D,L)  
this is Pareto dominated by (U,R) does it really occur??

discuss repeated version  
time average with grim strategies  
this leads to a coordination problem  
Next: dynamic (extensive form) games
Extensive Form Games

a finite game tree $X$ with nodes $x \in X$

nodes are partially ordered and have a single root (minimal element)

terminal nodes are $z \in Z$ (maximal elements)

player 0 is nature

information sets $h \in H$ are a partition of $X \setminus Z$

each node in an information set must have exactly the same number of immediate followers

each information set is associated with a unique player who “has the move” at that information set

$H_i \subset H$ information sets where $i$ has the move
**More Extensive Form Notation**

information sets belonging to nature $h \in H_0$ are singletons

$A(h)$ feasible actions at $h \in H$

each action and node $a \in A(h), x \in h$ is associated with a unique node that immediately follows $x$ on the tree

each terminal node has a payoff $r_i(z)$ for each player

by convention we designate terminal nodes in the diagram by their payoffs

Example: a simple simultaneous move game
**Behavior Strategies**

A pure strategy is a map from information sets to feasible actions $s_i(h_i) \in A(h_i)$

A behavior strategy is a map from information sets to probability distributions over feasible actions $\pi_i(h_i) \in P(A(h_i))$

Nature’s move is a behavior strategy for Nature and is a fixed part of the description of the game

We may now define $u_i(\pi)$

Normal form are the payoffs $u_i(s)$ derived from the game tree

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<td>4,4</td>
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**Kuhn's Theorem:**

every mixed strategy gives rise to a unique behavior strategy

The converse is NOT true

1 plays .5 U
behavior: 2 plays .5L at U; .5L at R
mixed: 2 plays .5(LL), .5(RR)

however: if two mixed strategies give rise to the same behavior strategy, they are equivalent, that is they yield the same payoff vector for each opponents profile $u(\sigma_i, s_{-i}) = u(\sigma'_i, s_{-i})$
Refinements of Nash Equilibrium

some games seem to have too many Nash equilibria

Ultimatum Bargaining
player 1 proposes how to divide $10 in pennies
player 2 may accept or reject

Nash: any proposal by player 1 with all poorer proposals rejected and equal or better proposals accepted

Chain Store
Subgame Perfection

Selten Game

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{U} & \text{D} \\
\text{L} & (-1,-1) & (2,0) \\
\text{R} & (1,1) \\
\end{array}
\]

Define subgame perfection equilibria:
UR is subgame perfect
D and .5 or more L is Nash but not subgame perfect

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Application to Bargaining

the pie division game: there is one unit of pie; player 1 demands $p_1$
player 2 accepts or rejects
if player 2 rejects one period elapses, then the roles are reversed, with player 2 demanding $p_2$
common discount factor $0 < \delta < 1$

Nash equilibrium: player 1 gets all pie, rejects all positive demands by player 2; player 2 indifferent and demands nothing

conversely: player 2 gets all the pie

wait 13 periods then split the pie 50-50; if anyone makes a positive offer during this waiting period, reject then revert to the equilibrium where the waiting player gets all the pie

subgame perfection: one player getting all pie is not an equilibrium: if your opponent must wait a period to collect all pie, he will necessarily accept demand of $1 - \delta - \varepsilon$ today, since this give him $\delta + \varepsilon$ in present value, rather than $\delta$ the present value of waiting a period
Rubinstein’s Theorem:

there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium

players always make the same demands, and if
they demand no more than the equilibrium level
their demands are accepted

to compute the unique equilibrium observe that
a player may reject an offer, wait a period, make
the equilibrium demand of \( p \) and have it
accepted, thus getting \( \delta p \) today; this means the
opposing player may demand up to \( 1 - \delta p \) and
have the demand accepted; the equilibrium
condition is

\[
p = 1 - \delta p \quad \text{or} \quad p = \frac{1}{1 + \delta}
\]

notice that the player moving second gets

\[
\frac{\delta}{1 + \delta}
\]

and that as \( \delta \to 1 \) the equilibrium
converges to a 50-50 split
a problem: if offers are in pennies, subgame perfect equilibrium is not unique
More on Refinements

Selten Game

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subgame perfect equilibria:
UR is subgame perfect
D and .5 or more L is Nash but not subgame perfect

can also solve by weak dominance or by trembling hand perfection
Summary of Refinements

- subgame perfection (backwards induction)
- iterated dominance (forwards induction)
- trembling hand perfection
- extensive form trembling hand perfection
- sequentiality

Definition of trembling hand perfection

\( \sigma \) is trembling hand perfect if there is a sequence \( \sigma^n \gg 0, \sigma^n \rightarrow \sigma \) such that if \( \sigma^i(s^i) > 0 \) then \( s^i \) is a best response to \( \sigma^n \)
**Example of Trembling Hand not Subgame Perfect**

Here $L_d,D$ is trembling hand perfect but not subgame perfect

**definition of the agent normal form**

Each information set is treated as a different player, e.g. $1a, 1b$ if player 1 has two information sets; players $1a$ and $1b$ have the same payoffs as player 1

Extensive form trembling hand perfection is trembling hand perfection in the agent normal form
Iterated Dominance

example of iterated weak dominance

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<th>R-l</th>
<th>R-r</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U-u</td>
<td>-1,-1</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>1,1</td>
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<tr>
<td>U-d</td>
<td>-1,-1</td>
<td>1,-1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>1,1</td>
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Eliminate U-d
Eliminate R-r
example of order dependent iterated weak dominance

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<tr>
<th>3,2</th>
<th>2,2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
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eliminate BOTTOM then everything is OK for 2
eliminate LEFT then BOTTOM and only (3,2) left
2 players + iterated dominance + Nash implies subgame perfect
n-players + weak rationalizability + Nash implies subgame perfect

a strategy not weakly dominated by anything is a best response to some correlated opponent strategies

\[ \text{rationalizability vs. dominance} \]

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
-8 & 0 \\
0 & 0 \\
-3 & -3 \\
\end{array}
\]

player 1 choosing bottom gives him -3

bottom is not dominated
if opponents correlate so as to randomize 50-50 between UU and DD then top or middle yields -4

bottom is not rationalizable
50-50 between up and middle guarantees -2 against any opponent uncorrelated strategies
Signaling

sequential vs. trembling hand perfect pooling and separating
Robustness

genericity in normal form games
example of Selten extensive form game

elaborated Selten game
normal form of elaborated Selten game

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<tr>
<td>$D_L D_R$</td>
<td>$1 - 2\varepsilon, 1 - \varepsilon$</td>
<td>$1 - 2\varepsilon, 1 - \varepsilon$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_L U_R$</td>
<td>$1 - \varepsilon, 1 - \varepsilon**$</td>
<td>$1 - \varepsilon, 1 - 2\varepsilon$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U_L D_R$</td>
<td>$-1, -1 + \varepsilon$</td>
<td>$2 - 3\varepsilon, 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U_L U_R$</td>
<td>$-1 + \varepsilon, -1 + \varepsilon$</td>
<td>$2 - 2\varepsilon,-\varepsilon$</td>
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Approximate Equilibria and Near Equilibria

Approximate Equilibrium

- exact: \( u_i(s_i|\mu_i) \geq u_i(s_i'|\mu_i) \)
- approximate: \( u_i(s_i|\mu_i) + \varepsilon \geq u_i(s_i'|\mu_i) \)

- Approximate equilibrium can be very different from exact equilibrium

Radner’s work on finite repeated PD
gang of four on reputation

upper and lower hemi-continuity

A small portion of the population playing "non-optimally" may significantly change the incentives for other players causing a large shift in equilibrium behavior.
Correlated Equilibrium

Chicken

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
6,6 & 2,7 \\
7,2 & 0,0 \\
\end{array}
\]

three Nash equilibria (2,7), (7,2) and mixed equilibrium w/ probabilities (2/3,1/3) and payoffs (4 2/3, 4 2/3)

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
1/3 & 1/3 \\
1/3 & 0 \\
\end{array}
\]

is a correlated equilibrium giving utility (5,5)
Extensive Form Correlated Equilibrium

Public randomization only
Sequential public randomization = sunspot

Extensive form correlated equilibrium
One that is not correlated

Stage 1

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<tr>
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<th>M</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>13,15</td>
<td>13,14</td>
<td>13,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>12,11</td>
<td>12,14</td>
<td>12,15</td>
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Stage 2

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<tr>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>-10,-10</td>
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Stage 1 private signal to 1 is 50-50 between U,D while 2 plays M
Stage 2 private signal to 1 is revealed to 2, if 1 did as required play R, else play P

Notice that in correlated equilibrium 1 must randomize to get 2 to play M, and is not indifferent between U and D, so must expect P when U with positive probability. But can’t happen with positive probability