

Commitment

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Econ 4011

STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM

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Consider a normal form game.



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<i>Run</i>	2, 2	9, 0

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Fix a Stackelberg leader, say player 1.

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(*Walk, Run*).

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What is the Stackelberg Equilibrium with player 2 as the Stackelberg leader?

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Is it possible for a player to prefer being a Stackelberg *follower* to being the *leader*?