Monday October 5: abstract/proposal due. This should be
between a
paragraph and a page. You should talk to one of us before this deadline
to discuss possible topics.
Wed October 21: final proposal due. This should be a
couple of
pages with a more detailed abstract and plan for the paper. You should
talk to one of us about the abstract before preparing the final proposal
Monday November 16: deadline for determining the paper you will referee
Monday November 30: deadline for turning in referee report
Monday December 7 (last day of class) Paper due.
all assignments should be submitted by email by 10 pm on the date due
Two class days will be set aside for student oral presentations
Ergin: 8/27-10/5, 10/26,10/28: 14 lectures (no class Sept 2 - labor day) problem
set #1
references:
*Admati & Perry (1987), "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," The
Review of Economic Studies, 54(3), 345-64.
*Osborne
and Rubinstein, Chap 7.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 4.
Rubinstein, A. (1982) “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining
Model,” Econometrica, 50, 97-109.
Yildiz, M. (2003) “Bargaining Without a Common Prior - An
Immediate Agreement Theorem,” Econometrica, 71, 793-811.
Yildiz, M. (2003) “Walrasian Bargaining,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 45-2, 465-487.
references:
*Osborne and Rubinstein Chaps. 12.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps 8, 9, 11.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982) “Reputation and Imperfect
Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253-279.
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), “Predation, reputation and entry
deterrence,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280-312.
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982)
“Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory,
27, 245-52. Fudenberg,
D. and D. Levine (1989), "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games
with a Patient Player", Econometrica, 57, 759-778.
references:
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 10.
*Gul, F, H. Sonnenschein, & Robert Wilson (1986),
“Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase
Conjecture,” Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 155-90.
Abreu, D. & F. Gul (2000), “Bargaining and
Reputation,” Econometrica, 68, 85-117.
references:
*Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990) “Rationalizability and
Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities,”
Econometrica, 58, 1255-1277.
*Vives (2005): “Complementarities and Games: New
Developments”.
*Topkis.
*Roth and Sotomayor.
*Gale, D. and L.S. Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the
Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.
*Shapley and Scarf (1974): “On Cores and Indivisibility,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 23-28.
Kelso, A. S. and V. P. Crawford (1982), “Job Matching, Coalition
Formation, and Gross Substitutes,” Econometrica, 50, 1483-1504.
Hatfield J. W. and P. Milgrom (2005) “Matching with Contracts,” American Economic Review, 95, 913-935.
Roth, A.E. (2007), “Deferred Acceptance Algorithms. History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions,” mimeo.