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SANTA BARBARA · SANTA CRUZ

CALIFORNIA SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERIMENTATION LABORATORY
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
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# CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Effects of Threshold Uncertainty in Public Good Games

You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by X. student from the Economics Department, Y University, and David K. Levine, Professor of Economics at UCLA. Results of this study will be contributed to Mr. X's doctoral dissertation. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you are enrolled at UCLA and have registered to participate in experiments conducted in the CASSEL Laboratory.

#### PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study will look at the effects of threshold uncertainty in public good games. A public good is an economic good from which many people benefit simultaneously. Often such a good is only provided when enough people contribute. If the contributions exceed a certain amount – called a threshold – the good is provided.

One problem in this public good setting is the people may not know (or are uncertain about) the threshold that must be met to provide the public good. This study will test the theory that an increase in threshold uncertainty will increase peoples' contributions if the value of the public good to the individuals is high enough.

## PROCEDURES

There are two parts to this experiment, and both parts should be completed in about 75 minutes. Both parts will consist of players interacting over a computer network. During play, subjects will amass tokens which will be exchanged using a pre-announced exchange rate for US dollars at the end of the experiment.

If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following things:

First Part of Experiment (15 Minutes): In this game, subjects are asked to make simple choices among different monetary options for him/herself and a randomly assigned partner. The researcher will program the computer to offer specific options so that the researcher can determine, based on the subject's choices, the subject's willingness to contribute.

Second Part of Experiment (55 Minutes): In the second game, each subject is given a token and is randomly and anonymously assigned to a 5-player group. Subjects are then told the value of a public good and told a range from which the computer will randomly select a threshold. Subjects are then asked to decide whether or not to contribute their tokens knowing the threshold range, but not the actual threshold. Players will then be awarded tokens based on the accuracy of their guesses. Before actual play, subjects will practice rounds to familiarize themselves with the games.

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Expiration Date:

*Payment (5 Minutes):* At the completion of the game sessions, you will be paid the show up fee of \$5 plus the final amount of money you earned as a results of your decisions made in the game.

*Total Length of Participation:* The total experiment time should take approximately 75 minutes. Actual time may vary, depending on the number of participants in the study.

### • POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS

We know of no potential risks or discomforts associated with this study.

#### POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR SOCIETY

This project may help social scientists better understand individual decision making. We may gain a greater understanding of how real-life public good situations may benefit from the presence of threshold uncertainty. Such research can potentially lead to more successful collective action by individuals who hope to provide goods that benefit society at large.

#### PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION

You will receive a \$5 participation fee for showing up to the experiment. You will earn additional money, the amount of which will depend on your decisions, the decisions of others, and factors determined randomly by the computer. We cannot say for certain how much you will earn for the experimental session, but it is expected that you will make approximately \$12. Payment will be made at the end of the session. Should you withdraw or be withdrawn from the research, you will still receive the \$5 participation fee.

#### CONFIDENTIALITY

The computer will record your responses during the games. Once the experiment is over, this information will be kept indefinitely, but will be anonymous. Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law.

Payment records will be associated with identifying information so that payments can be made once the experiment is over. This information will be kept securely by CASSEL for accounting purposes only, and will not be released with any identifiers. The researcher does not have access to this information.

## • PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL

You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You may also refuse to answer any questions you don't want to answer and still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. We do not anticipate such circumstances arising.

### • IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please fee free to contact: David K. Levine, Department of Economics, UCLA, (310) 825-3810 X, CASSEL, UCLA, and Department of Economics, Y University, X@Y.edu.

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Expiration Date:

# • RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS

You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact the Office for Protection of Research Subjects, 2107 Ueberroth Building, UCLA, Box 951694, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1694, (310) 825-8714

# SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE

I understand the procedures described above. My quest agree to participate in this study. I have been given a co	•
Name of Subject	-
Name of Legal Representative (if applicable)	_
Signature of Subject or Legal Representative	Date

UCLA IRB#: 01-04-064-01

Expiration Date: