

Syllabus

Credibility in Repeated Games: October 15, 16

Question: When does the prospect of future punishment enable a player to achieve an effective commitment?

October 15: Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players

- Fudenberg, D., D. M. Kreps and E. Maskin [1990]: "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," *Review of Economic Studies*, 57: 555-573
<http://www.dklevine.com/archive/fkm.pdf>
- Backus, D. and J. Driffil [1985]: "Inflation and Reputation," *American Economic Review*, 75: 530-538 **available at JSTOR**

October 16: Reputation Models

- Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1989]: "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," *Econometrica*, 57: 759-778 **available at JSTOR**
- Kreps, D. and R. Wilson [1982]: "Reputation and Imperfect Information," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 50: 253-79 <http://www.dklevine.com/archive/krepwilson.pdf>

Innovation and Intellectual Property: October 17

Question: What are the sources of innovation? Does intellectual property increase or decrease innovation?

October 17: Growth and IP

- Boldrin and Levine *The Case Against Intellectual Property* chapters 1-2
<http://www.dklevine.com/papers/ip.ch1.pdf>
<http://www.dklevine.com/papers/ip.ch2.pdf>

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