Zero Sum Games
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if the game is repeated a finite no of times then collusion cannot be rationalised and we can only find one unique equilibrium -- to cheat.
To see this, remember that the only reason to cooperate is to avoid a backlash in the future. this means that, in the last period, there's no incentive to collude. however, if both prisoners are going to cheat in the last period, the next to last period can be analysed as if it were the last period. They would cheat! so then, we end up with the paradox, tat even in the repeated prisoner's dilemma, cheating is the unique equilibrium. [Manage messages]
why are there only one equilibria in finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma. [View full text and thread]
You could start with the book: Fudenberg and Tirole, "Game Theory" (1993), Cambridge: The MIT Press. This book is full of references.
You could also see:
Aumann, R (1987): Game Theory. In J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Nweman [View full text and thread]
|07/12/2000 09:08 AM by Walter;|
I am a student and i have to write a homework about the history and envelopment of the prisoner dilemma and its application to sciences. Could someone give me an advice where to find something about it? (internet pages)
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