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Experimental Economics
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Prisoners Dilemma
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Ask a question about: Prisoners Dilemma
Respond to the question: conditions for the payoffs in prisoners?

05/11/2001 03:25 PM by jay surti;
Theres also the recent work of postlewaite's student at upenn (i forget the name...someone called obara I think: theres a link from postlewaites webpage.)
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03/05/2001 12:37 PM by Pedro Dal Bó; prisoner dilemma's payoffs
I don't think you can express the condition for tit-for-tat to be an equilibrium as a condition in a difference of two payoffs only since three payoffs are involved. The temptation payoff T, the reward payoff R and the sucker payoff S. I think that Tit-for-tat is a NE if and only if the discount factor is greater or equal to (T-R)/(R-S). If I did the calculations correctly, this means that if T-R>R-S Tit-for-Tat can not be a NE for any discount factor.
You can find nice graphs of what can be suported in a Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in a PD game in Stahl, D.O.II. (1991). ``The Graph of Prisoner's Dilemma Supergame Payoffs as a Function of the Discount Factor'', Games and Economic Behavior}, 3(3).
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03/03/2001 09:35 AM by Brandon;
Hi! I understand now but I'm afraid my knowledge's not up to task :) Keep your question here and I'm sure someone would help you with it as soon as they can. [View full text and thread]

03/03/2001 01:45 AM by Birol Baskan; problem is the following
Thank you Brandon for your eager answer. Let me be more specific about what I am particularly interested. When you repeat the prisoner's dilemma infitinitely many times, there arise many Nash equilibrium strategy. One of them is Tit for [View full text and thread]

03/02/2001 08:35 PM by Brandon;
I think I should get it right and more specific here.... When both players cooperate they are both rewarded at an equal, intermediate level (reward, R). Now we want to create a chance to "cheat" so, When only one player defects, [View full text and thread]

03/02/2001 08:21 PM by Brandon;
Hi! I'm not sure a "standard procedure" to go about assigning payoffs but I think one should be able to construct your own simple payoff matrix while keeping the following in mind: No matter what the other player does, you'll be [View full text and thread]

03/02/2001 08:11 AM by Birol Baskan; conditions for the payoffs in prisoner's dilemma
While assigning payoffs to strategies in prisoner's dilemma, what conditions should we impose on the payoffs? [View full text and thread]