Economic and Game Theory
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Conferences
Recent papers on the web of interest to economic theorists. Based on data from RePEc.
Updated on: 01-30-2023
Levine, David K [2023-01-30]: "True Myths," Levine's Working Paper Archive.
Betto, Maria and Matthew W. Thomas [2023-01-26]: "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers," Theoretical Economics.
Huang, Xuesong [2023-01-26]: "Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public," Theoretical Economics.
Arieli, Itai, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky and Takuro Yamashita [2023-01-18]: "Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling," Theoretical Economics.
Arnold, Lutz G. [2023-01-18]: "On the neutrality of socially responsible investing," Theoretical Economics.
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed [2023-01-18]: "Pervasive signaling," Theoretical Economics.
Bogomolnaia, Anna, Ron Holzman and Hervé Moulin [2023-01-18]: "On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators," Theoretical Economics.
Chen, Yi-Fan, Wen-Tai Hsu and Shin-Kun Peng [2023-01-18]: "Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade," Theoretical Economics.
Escudé, Matteo and Ludvig Sinander [2023-01-18]: "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics.
Flynn, Joel P., Lawrence D. W. Schmidt and Alexis Akira Toda [2023-01-18]: "Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution," Theoretical Economics.
Grochulski, Borys and Yuzhe Zhang [2023-01-18]: "Termination as an incentive device," Theoretical Economics.
Huang, Chao [2023-01-18]: "Stable matching: an integer programming approach," Theoretical Economics.
Neyman, Abraham [2023-01-18]: "Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization," Theoretical Economics.
Sadakane, Hitoshi [2023-01-18]: "Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers," Theoretical Economics.
Schottmüller, Christoph [2023-01-18]: "Optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Theoretical Economics.
Segal, Uzi [2023-01-18]: "∀ or ∃?," Theoretical Economics.
Xiong, Siyang [2023-01-18]: "Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization," Theoretical Economics.
Liang, Annie and Erik Madsen [2023-01-13]: "Data and incentives," Theoretical Economics.
Onuchic, Paula and Debraj Ray [2023-01-13]: "Conveying value via categories," Theoretical Economics.
Schulz, Karl, Aleh Tsyvinski and Nicolas Werquin [2022-12-20]: "Generalized compensation principle," Theoretical Economics.
Teeple, Keisuke [2022-12-20]: "Surprise and default in general equilibrium," Theoretical Economics.
Levine, David K, Andrea Mattozzi and Salvatore Modica [2022-12-19]: "Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win," Levine's Working Paper Archive.
Foster, Dean and Sergiu Hart [2022-12-07]: ""Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game," Theoretical Economics.
Fudenberg, Drew, Giacomo Lanzani and Philipp Strack [2022-12-06]: "Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs," Theoretical Economics.
Bloch, Francis, Kalyan Chatterjee and Bhaskar Dutta [2022-12-01]: "Attack and interception in networks," Theoretical Economics.
Pérez-Nievas, Mikel [2022-11-28]: "Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?," Theoretical Economics.
Alcantud, José Carlos R., Marco Mariotti and Roberto Veneziani [2022-11-22]: "Sufficientarianism," Theoretical Economics.
Amador, Manuel and Kyle Bagwell [2022-11-22]: "Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers," Theoretical Economics.
Arieli, Itai, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky [2022-11-22]: "The implications of pricing on social learning," Theoretical Economics.
Awaya, Yu, Kohei Iwasaki and Makoto Watanabe [2022-11-22]: "Rational bubbles and middlemen," Theoretical Economics.
Chen, Yi [2022-11-22]: "Dynamic delegation with a persistent state," Theoretical Economics.
Chen, Yi-Chun, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun and Siyang Xiong [2022-11-22]: "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics.
Cheng, Chen and Yiqing Xing [2022-11-22]: "Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons," Theoretical Economics.
Delacrétaz, David, Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti [2022-11-22]: "When Walras meets Vickrey," Theoretical Economics.
Demuynck, Thomas and Umutcan Salman [2022-11-22]: "On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings," Theoretical Economics.
Hendricks, Ken and Thomas Wiseman [2022-11-22]: "How to sell in a sequential auction market," Theoretical Economics.
Nax, Heinrich Harald and Jonathan Newton [2022-11-22]: "Deep and shallow thinking in the long run," Theoretical Economics.
Pomatto, Luciano [2022-11-22]: "Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning," Theoretical Economics.
Zhang, Wenzhang [2022-11-22]: "Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics.
Levine, David K [2022-11-16]: "Phoenix From the Ashes: The Evolution of Mechanism Designers," Levine's Working Paper Archive.
Liu, Ce [2022-11-04]: "Stability in repeated matching markets," Theoretical Economics.
Carroll, Gabriel and Lukas Bolte [2022-10-25]: "Robust contracting under double moral hazard," Theoretical Economics.
Hopenhayn, Hugo and Maryam Saeedi [2022-10-25]: "Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes," Theoretical Economics.
Makris, Miltiadis and Ludovic Renou [2022-10-07]: "Information design in multi-stage games," Theoretical Economics.
Resources in Economics
NajEcon: online reviews
RePEc: online papers
Free Books
Boldrin, M. and D. K. Levine [2008]: Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press:
Boldrin, M. and D. K. Levine [2008]: Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press:
Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein [1994]: A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge
Rubinstein, A. [2000]: Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom
Sandholm, W. H. [2005]: Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics, MIT Press: