Economic and Game Theory
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Conferences
Recent papers on the web of interest to economic theorists. Based on data from RePEc.
Updated on: 10-07-2019
Kimya, Mert [2019-10-06]: "Equilibrium coalitional behavior," Theoretical Economics.
Barron, Daniel, George Georgiadis and Jeroen M. Swinkels [2019-09-30]: "Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent," Theoretical Economics.
Kazumura, Tomoya, Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa [2019-09-27]: "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics.
Szkup, Michal [2019-09-27]: "Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change," Theoretical Economics.
Chade, Hector and Jeroen M. Swinkels [2019-09-20]: "The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem," Theoretical Economics.
Dasaratha, Krishna and Kevin He [2019-09-19]: "Network structure and naive sequential learning," Theoretical Economics.
Li, Wei and Xu Tan [2019-09-13]: "Locally Bayesian learning in networks," Theoretical Economics.
Olszewski, Wojciech and Ron Siegel [2019-09-04]: "Performance-maximizing large contests," Theoretical Economics.
Baisa, Brian [2019-08-21]: "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics.
Heumann, Tibor [2019-08-08]: "Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint," Theoretical Economics.
Dutta, Rohan , David K Levine and Salvatore Modica [2019-08-06]: "Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive.
Golosov, Mikhail and Guido Menzio [2019-08-06]: "Agency business cycles," Theoretical Economics.
Au, Pak Hung [2019-08-02]: "The loser's curse in the search for advice," Theoretical Economics.
Auster, Sarah and Piero Gottardi [2019-08-02]: "Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons," Theoretical Economics.
Bloch, Francis, Bhaskar Dutta and Mihai Manea [2019-08-02]: "Efficient partnership formation in networks," Theoretical Economics.
Duncan, Alfred J. M. and Charles Nolan [2019-08-02]: "Disputes, debt and equity," Theoretical Economics.
Kambe, Shinsuke [2019-08-02]: "An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type," Theoretical Economics.
Loertscher, Simon and Cédric Wasser [2019-08-02]: "Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships," Theoretical Economics.
Silva, Francisco [2019-08-02]: "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics.
Szydlowski, Martin [2019-08-02]: "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking," Theoretical Economics.
Yamamoto, Yuichi [2019-08-02]: "Stochastic games with hidden states," Theoretical Economics.
Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, Daisuke Nakajima and Emre Ozdenoren [2019-07-25]: "Willpower and compromise effect," Theoretical Economics.
Boukouras, Aristotelis , Will Jennings, Lunzheng Li and Zacharias Maniadis [2019-07-19]: "Can Biased Polls Distort Electoral Results? Evidence from the Lab and the Field," Levine's Working Paper Archive.
Chen, Yi-Chun and Gaoji Hu [2019-07-08]: "Learning by matching," Theoretical Economics.
Germano, Fabrizio, Jonathan Weinstein and Peio Zuazo-Garin [2019-06-24]: "Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information," Theoretical Economics.
Kotowski, Maciej H. [2019-06-24]: "First-price auctions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics.
Resources in Economics
NajEcon: online reviews
RePEc: online papers
Free Books
Boldrin, M. and D. K. Levine [2008]: Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press:
Boldrin, M. and D. K. Levine [2008]: Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press:
Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein [1994]: A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge
Rubinstein, A. [2000]: Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom
Sandholm, W. H. [2005]: Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics, MIT Press: